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 Summary  
 
We know that managers may use their discretion by structuring transactions that can alter 
financial reports in order to persuade stockholders in their interpretation of the underlying 
economic performance of the company. The study reported in this thesis examines such 
earnings discretion in the six monthly interim reports issued by listed firms in the UK, and 
investigates the relationship between estimates of earnings manipulation and the market 
pricing of the firm’s shares. This is tested by examining whether managers use their 
discretion to sustain earnings trends in the case of ‘winner’ firms, i.e. those that are in the 
upper range of prior returns, and likewise to keep a negative trend in ‘loser’ firms, those in 
the lower range of prior returns. Specifically, momentum portfolios are formed based on 
past six-month returns and tested for differences in future six-month earnings management, 
as measured by discretionary current accruals in six month interim reporting periods. The 
results suggest that discretionary current accruals are significantly associated with past 
returns for winner more than loser firms, and hence that past returns may contribute to the 
explanation of future earnings management, the behaviour being consistent with appearing 
either to persist as winners or to turn losers around. 
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Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview of the thesis 
A considerable body of research is concerned with the relationship between 
accounting earnings and stock returns, and presents important insights into the 
characteristics of financial accounting. Nichols and Wahlen (2004) show that the profit 
available to the shareholders of a firm represents an accounting measure of the change in 
the book value of the firm’s equity during an accounting period. At the same time, the 
stock price change of a firm over the same period (plus any dividends paid) captures the 
change in the firm’s market value. Clearly, the market value of a firm is related to its 
‘bottom line’ performance and it is important to know the nature of this relationship. In 
simple terms, a theoretical link between accounting earnings and stock prices assumes 
that current earnings provide information that can be used to predict earnings in future 
periods, which in turn informs stockholder expectations about dividends in future 
periods, and hence assists in determining the stock price as the present value of expected 
future dividends.
1
  
This thesis examines whether half-yearly (interim) current accruals are used in 
the same way as annual current accruals to increase or decrease giving opportunities to 
                                                          
1 Nichols and Wahlen (2004) show the relation between earnings changes and stock returns and their result 
replicates the result of research of Ball and Brown (1968). Also, they investigate this relationship and its 
connection with the relationship between changes in cash flows from operations and stock returns. 
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managers to continue returns patterns (upwards in winner firms or downwards in loser 
firms). Belkaoui (2004, pp. 179) defines ‘accrual’ as … 
“… the accounting process of recognising noncash events and 
circumstances as they occur, specifically, accrual entails recognizing 
revenues and related increases in assets and expenses and related increase in 
liabilities for amounts expected to be received or paid, usually in cash, in the 
future…”  
In the literature review discussed in this dissertation that deals with accruals, the term 
accrual is used to denote changes in working capital, whether or not these are accruals in 
the strict accounting sense. Many variables can affect the level of accruals. For instance, 
working capital drives changes in accruals which in turn tend to rise with sales. 
Therefore, a high level of accruals may be a reflection of past growth in sales. Some 
studies show that investors extrapolate trends from the recent past too far into the future 
(see Shleifer, 2000).  If this happens investors may overestimate future sales growth 
when pricing firms with high accruals, and future returns are likely to turn out to be 
disappointing. 
The components that form accruals include information about operating 
performance and the market reacts to this information. Changes in inventories, account 
receivables, and account payables are examples of accruals components that are 
commonly employed by security analysts as indicators of business conditions. Such 
changes may suggest difficulties in generating sales. For example, increases in accounts 
payables may imply problems with paying suppliers, which may be due to inadequate 
sales revenues or because of credit difficulties. There is evidence the market may respond 
with a delay to the information in an earnings number (Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok , 
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1996) and part of the response may be due to the components included in accruals. Also, 
components of accruals may be employed as early indicators of deterioration in operating 
performance. 
For example, when sales growth slows managers may face pressures (manage) to inflate 
earnings in order to meet analyst forecasts, so leading to an increase in accruals. These 
forces may be all the stronger as investors and analysts maintain overstated expectations 
about future profitability growth. Inventory may start to accumulate as sales smooth, and 
receivable may raise as competitive pressures force firms to extend better credit terms, so 
accruals increase (Chen et al. (2006)).  
In this thesis our focus is on interim working capital accruals, that including 
current accruals, such as changes in inventories, account receivables, and account 
payables. Our definition of ‘discretionary’ current accruals is the change in non-cash 
current assets minus the change in operating current liabilities. This definition is used 
because it is argued that managers have more control over current accruals in the short-
term. In this respect this study follows Jones (1991) and Teoh et al. (1998b). In the 
literature, discretionary accruals are often used as an indicator of earnings management 
because evidence suggests that discretionary accruals have a relationship with future 
returns
2
 and their association with stock price returns over the current and following 
interim periods.  
Dechow (1994) is the seminal study on how accruals can improve the ability of 
earnings to reflect firm performance, and how this is reflected in stock returns. Typically, 
managers have discretion over the recognition of accruals, an opportunity that can be 
                                                          
2 See Jones (1991), Guenther (1994), Subramanyam (1996), and Erickson and Wang (1999) for earnings 
management proxies and controls. 
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utilised by managers for their private information or to manage earnings. In the latter case, 
Dechow’s research design models this accrual manipulation as the unexpected 
component of earnings, which is seen to incrementally explain stock returns in the same 
period. Sloan (1996) also examines whether movements in stock price reflect information 
about future earnings contained in accruals, while his results show that accruals are not 
fully reflected in stock prices, nevertheless accruals are shown to give rise to arbitrage 
profits, created by selling the shares of high accrual firms, buying those of low accrual 
firms and holding them for a year.
3
 Subsequently, Xie (2001) examines whether the price 
of stock reasonably reflects the earnings implications of discretionary accruals one year 
ahead, and finds that the market overestimates their persistence, and overprices such 
abnormal accruals. In an extension to the work of Sloan (1996), and using a similar 
method, Richardson et al. (2006) show that the less reliable components of accruals have 
a low persistence in predicting future earnings
4
.   
This ongoing inquiry into the relationship between accruals and stock returns has 
been central to a large body of research on earnings management. In general, however, 
there are questions to be asked about the power of the discretionary accruals models used 
in the type of estimation mentioned above. Kothari et al. (2005) compare several methods 
of measuring discretionary accruals, based on stratified-random samples and over multi-
year horizons. The results reveal that performance-matched discretionary accrual 
measures improve the reliability of inferences from earnings management research.  
                                                          
3
 Related evidence was also offered in a paper by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995). 
4
 Sloan (1996) documents accrual reliability in the context of earnings persistence and further research by 
Richardson, et al. (2005) develop this idea by disaggregating accruals on the basis of the balance sheet 
items. They group accruals according to their reliability levels as follows: changes in working capital 
accruals, changes in non-current operating accruals and changes in financial accruals.  
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Kang et al. (2010) report that the power of discretionary accruals that are aggregated 
across periods in predicting returns is robust not only with regard to the accruals model 
used to estimate discretionary accruals, but also to the choice of sample period, the 
measurements of returns, business conditions and proxies of risk. However, the ability of 
accrual models to spot simulated and actual earnings management is still questioned 
elsewhere. For instance, Stubben (2010)
5
 suggests that revenue-based accrual models are 
less biased, better specified, and more powerful than commonly used accrual models. 
Livant and Santicchia (2012) argue that if extreme quarterly accruals contain valuable 
information about future earnings and stock return reversals, then users of financial 
statements should focus on quarterly cash flows and accruals to obtain an early warning 
that future earnings may reverse
6
. 
The present study builds on this prior work regarding the contribution of accruals to 
explaining future returns, and attempts to investigate the relationship by linking earnings 
management in interim financial reporting to short-term return momentum in the UK. 
 
1.2 The motivations of the present study  
 The aim of the present study is to produce a better understanding of how the accruals 
information provided in reported earnings is interpreted by investors. If investors focus 
                                                          
5 Stubben’s revenue model is similar to existing accrual models (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995), but with 
three key differences. First, he models the receivables accrual, rather than aggregate accruals, as a function 
of the change in revenues. Second, he models the receivables accrual as a function of the change in 
reported revenues, rather than the change in cash revenues (Dechow et al. 1995). Third, Stubben uses the 
changing in annual receivables as a linear function of two components of the change in annual revenues: 
first three quarters, and change in fourth-quarter revenues. Note that Jegadeesh and Livnat (2005) study the 
stock price relationship with revenue more directly. They find that stock with a large revenue surprise 
produces a significant abnormal return in the post-announcement period. 
 
6
  Livant and Santicchia (2012) show firms with extremely high (low) current quarterly accruals have 
significant and negative (positive) abnormal returns through the subsequent four quarters. 
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on reported bottom-line income, they may be temporarily deceived. This suggests that it 
may be necessary to limit managers’ discretion with regard to accounting, since investors 
apparently cannot resolve the valuation effect of earnings reported under current 
reporting standards.  
In the paper by Dechow (1994) mentioned briefly above, accruals improve the 
ability of earnings to measure firm performance; over short measurement intervals, 
earnings have a high association with stock returns. The link to earnings management is 
even more evident in Dechow et al. (1995), who show that accounting accruals are above 
the average for firms subject to performance actions by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission
7
. Although there is no direct evidence to show that managers of firms with 
high accruals intentionally manipulate results, the very fact of a high level of 
discretionary accruals suggests an undefined measure of earnings manipulation. 
Elsewhere, Subramanyam (1996) demonstrates how the discretionary net accrual (the 
abnormal component) is priced by the stock market, with discretionary accruals not only 
associated with contemporaneous stock prices but also with future earnings. This result is 
consistent with the pricing of opportunistic earnings manipulation by an efficient market. 
Further, Subramanyam suggests that the pricing of discretionary accruals arises because 
managers use their discretion to improve the ability of earnings to show fundamental 
value (also called intrinsic value; the value of a security that is intrinsic to, or contained 
in, the security itself).  
                                                          
7
 Dechow et al. (1995) work on the most extreme deciles of each performance measure. Their samples have 
more extreme performance than that occurring in specific earnings management studies. They confirm that 
the performance induced misspecifications are not limited to the extreme deciles. 
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Investors are not necessarily able to interpret signals about fundamental value if 
they only focus on measures such as return on assets. The research described above 
suggests that analysts may also use information on accruals and the components such as 
changes in receivables, inventories and accounts payables, as indicators of business 
conditions. These accruals are driven by changes in working capital, which in turn tend to 
rise with sales. Nevertheless, whilst a high level of accruals may be a reflection of strong 
past growth in sales, a high level of accruals accompanied by a high stock price may be 
built on an overoptimistic estimate of future growth rates. At the same time, although the 
components of accruals include information about operating performance, the market 
seems to react slowly to this information. This study attempts to provide evidence about 
the association between returns in the short term and discretionary accruals in this 
context, taking sales growth into account, together with unexpected earnings which can 
contain signals about earnings quality as well as sales growth.
8
 
 
1.3 Objectives of the thesis 
This study has two objectives. The first objective is to investigate whether analysis 
based on half-yearly accrual data leads to similar results as analysis based on annual 
current accruals
9
. As the literature review demonstrates, most studies explain annual 
accruals without considering whether interim accruals contain useful information 
about future stock returns reversals. Most industry analysts are interested to revise 
earnings forecasts after interim earnings are published. Similarly, if investment and credit 
                                                          
8
 Some researchers such as Bernard and Thomas (1989) and Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006) examine stock 
price responses to earnings surprises. They use standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) as their measure of 
earnings surprise.  
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managers have information on a half-yearly basis, they are unlikely to wait until the end 
of the financial year for the next annual earnings announcement to make a change in their 
portfolios or make decisions about their outstanding credit positions.  
The second objective is to establish whether managers in winner firms 
continue returns patterns through upwards management of accruals, and whether 
managers of loser firms manage earnings downwards in the buy-and-hold period, thus 
seeking to cause a reversal in earnings after a huge decline. To test these assumptions, 
returns portfolios are sorted into winner and loser firms based on their past six months’ 
stock returns. The results support the hypothesis that firms’ managers engage in such 
behaviour.  
This study looks at variables such as sales growth and economic variables to see 
whether they are correlated to returns momentum performance. Finally, the study explores 
whether returns momentum is explained by earnings management. The analysis is based on 
UK interim reported data from 2004 to 2009. Financial firms are excluded from this study. 
The empirical tests employ data from the Thomson One Banker database. 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is subdivided into eight chapters. This chapter has provided an introduction to 
accounting earnings and stock returns resulting from the market.  
Chapter 2 presents a review of the main papers focused on interim accounting 
earnings, earnings management and the methods that managers use to manage earnings. 
The chapter includes a discussion of the idea that managers are motivated to maintain 
growth in earnings because their rewards are usually tied to their firm’s profits. In 
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addition, the use of different kinds of accruals (discretionary and non-discretionary) and 
the role of accruals components such as inventory are explained. The third section of 
Chapter 2 deals with stock returns, one of the most important variables of this study. The 
theory behind price momentum is presented and related research is discussed. The 
relationship between income stocks and growth stocks is also analysed in Chapter 2. 
Section 2.4 is concerned with the relationship between earnings management and stock 
returns.  
Chapter 3 describes interim accounting reports. Also Chapter 3 illustrates the 
published accounting standards with respect to interim reports and shows how interim 
financial statements should be presented.  
The methodologies used in the empirical part of this study are presented in 
Chapter 4. The chapter explains how discretionary accruals, sales growth and standard 
unexpected earnings explain future returns. In addition, it discusses earnings management 
in winner and loser firms. The first section of Chapter 4 focuses on the role of investors 
with regard to expected returns and possible earnings manipulation as a part of earnings 
management. Section 4.2 provides the definitions of winner and loser firms used in this 
study. The incentives of winner firms to create positive accruals are another important 
focus of Chapter 4. The related research shows that there are incentives for managers of 
winner firms to engage in earnings manipulation to get better results. The motivations for 
loser firms to make negative accruals and the actions of distressed firms are also discussed 
in this section. The final section of Chapter 4 considers the predictability of returns. 
Data selection and treatment processes are the focus of Chapter 5. The main issue 
is how accounting data from Worldscope and market data from the Datastream database 
are treated. Variable definitions are presented in this chapter. This study considers six-
  
10 
 
monthly data as interim data and divides each year into two parts: first semester and 
second semester. The main basic statistical characteristics of the sample are presented.  
The regression models for testing hypotheses are presented in Chapter 6. The 
main regression tests the association between past returns and other independent 
variables such as current returns, sales growth and discretionary accruals. The regression 
results are provided in Chapter 7. Finally, Chapter 8 contains the conclusion and also 
provides suggestions for future research. 
 
1.5 Summary 
This chapter presents the main research topics relating to earnings management through 
accruals in winner and loser firms. Also, the chapter presents different motivations for the 
study. The two objectives of the study are to determine whether interim accruals contain 
useful information about future earnings and stock returns and to examine whether 
managers of winner and loser firms tend to manage earnings upwards or downward. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Accrual accounting, earnings management, and stock returns 
 
 2.1 Introduction  
The responsibility for publishing external accounting information lies with the managers of 
firms. Regulations direct managers to prepare financial statements that are relevant and reliable. 
However, informational asymmetry between managers and the users of these financial 
statements provides managers with the discretion to prepare financial information in 
accordance with perceived advantages. A considerable body of research has investigated the 
connection between managers’ incentives and accounting choices. Tests of managerial 
incentives using accruals commenced in 1985 in Healy’s research, which demonstrates how 
managers may manipulate corporate earnings in order to increase their bonuses.  
Much of the research into managerial incentives assumes that earnings management is 
driven by its impact on stock returns. Earlier studies find that managers may manage earnings 
to smooth income in order to make the firm appear a less risky investment (Trueman and 
Titman, 1988), or to meet the expectations of analysts (Kasznik, 1999). This prior research 
demonstrates that both income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management may 
be used strategically either to hide poor performance or to defer earnings to future periods. 
The stock price consequences of such behaviour may motivate management to take 
opportunities to manipulate earnings particularly in the short term, and this is linked to 
several share-related anomalies such as price behaviour around equity issuances. In this thesis, 
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an attempt is made to link earnings management to the returns momentum that may be 
observed in the market. 
 
2.2 Accrual accounting  
Most research methods that attempt to find evidence of earnings management rely on the 
computation of accounting accruals separated into two parts: the expected accruals 
(defined as nondiscretionary) and the unexpected accruals (defined  as discretionary). 
Discretionary accruals are estimated and statistical tests are run to determine if accruals 
differ from zero, the normal or expected value.  
The role of current and non-current accruals in the relation between stock returns 
and earnings for intervals of one to four years were examined by Loftus and Sin (1997). 
They argue that current and non-current accruals have different roles because the former 
turn over more frequently whilst the latter have permanent differences. Their results 
suggest that both accruals are important over short intervals. 
There is no agreement in the literature about models or methods of estimating 
discretionary accruals, or guidelines about the estimation of models in order to improve 
the power of the tests. Some early authors developed recommendations and they are 
found in Dechow et al. (1995) and Guay et al. (1996) with US data, and in Young (1999) 
using data from the UK. These attempts concentrate on the Healy (1985), DeAngelo 
(1986), and the Jones (1991) models. Other studies find a relationship between accruals 
and cash flows. Shivakumar (1996) added cash-flow variables to the Jones model. These 
studies improve the traditional Jones model, but the fundamental methodology is 
unchanged. This chapter tries to explain the literature by reviewing how discretionary 
  
13 
 
accrual models are typically estimated and develops a framework that may be used to test 
for earnings management. 
The researcher divides accruals into normal accruals and the residuals which are 
left by the model of expected accruals. The expected model will capture most of the 
volatility and will not concentrate on a small amount of variation in the discretionary 
accruals. A weak model will not consider variation in total accruals and will lose most of 
it in the discretionary section of accruals. Most of accruals models (see DeAngelo (1986), 
Healy (1985) and Jones (1991)) are developed to show whether management manipulates 
earnings during a specific period; they assume certain behaviour of non-discretionary 
accruals, and estimate the discretionary accruals as the error obtained from the these 
models. DeAngelo considers as last year’s value of total accruals as the nondiscretionary 
component of this years. Healy defines nondiscretionary accruals as the average of past 
total accruals. Thus the predictive power of accruals to determine earnings management 
is linked to the standard error of the discretionary component of accruals. This is the main 
assumption of this work, and it is tested on a series of accrual models. This chapter first 
seeks three sources of difference in total accruals: time, exchange effects, and industry 
classification. These factors have an important role in identification of accruals because 
accruals are supposed to reflect the economic activity of the firm. Differences in the level 
of total accruals indicate economic conditions change from year to year. Initial results 
suggest that these three sources (time, exchange effects, and industry classification) are 
significant. 
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2.2.1 The objective of accrual accounting  
The objectives of financial reporting and its relation to accrual accounting are laid out by 
the FASB is in its ‘Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts’; 
“The primary focus of financial reporting is information about an 
enterprise’s performance provided by measures of earnings and its 
components [CON1, para. 43]…Accrual accounting attempts to record 
the financial effects on an entity of transactions and other events and 
circumstances that have cash consequences for the entity in the periods 
in which those transactions, events, and circumstances occur rather than 
only in the periods in which cash is received or paid by the entity [CON6, 
para. 139]…Accrual accounting uses accrual, deferral, and allocation 
procedures whose goal is to relate revenues, expenses, gains, and losses 
to periods to reflect an entity’s performance during a period instead of 
merely listing its cash receipts and outlays. Thus, recognition of 
revenues, expenses, gains, and losses and the related increments or 
decrements in assets and liabilities – including matching of costs and 
revenues, allocation, and amortization – is the essence of using accrual 
accounting to measure performance of entities [CON6, para. 145]” 
The essential objective of accrual accounting is to inform investors about economic 
performance during the period of using accounting principles. Related research (e.g., 
Dechow (1994)) reports that earnings tend to be smoother than cash flow information; 
earnings present investors with better information about economic performance than cash 
flows. 
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2.2.2 Working capital accruals 
The role of accruals documented in the research of Dechow (1994), Guay et al. (1996) 
and Dechow et al. (1998) can be explained as mitigation of operating cash flow noise 
created from exogenous or manipulative variation in working capital levels. In 
comparison, operating cash flow is noisier than accounting income because it does not 
incorporate every period variation in working capital assets such as accounts receivable, 
inventory, prepayments, and in working capital liabilities such as unearned revenue and 
accounts payable. This noise causes operating cash flow to be a less efficient contracting 
variable than accounting earnings. For example, a firm that uses a service close to the end 
of fiscal year, but carries on from its historical accounts payable payment policy, could 
delay paying the debt until the following year. The delay is exogenous and manipulative 
(e.g., managers attempting to show current-year performance measures by timing the 
cash payments). Delayed payment can increase the firm’s year-end cash balance; 
therefore it will be current-year operating cash flow. The effect of cash flow will be 
transitory, because the payment is delayed by one period. When payment is made in the 
following year, operating cash flow is reduced in that year. It means that delays in 
payment create a transitory increase in accounts payable and increase transitory noise to 
operating cash flow, which reverses over time. 
 Accrual accounting attempts to cover this transitory noise from accounting 
income by expensing the cost of the service when it is used in creating revenue, rather 
than when it is paid for. Further, accounting earnings seem to be a less noisy variable 
than cash flow from operations
10
. Working-capital accruals (such as inventory, accounts 
                                                          
10 Ball and Shivakumar (2006) demonstrate that cash flow effect is transitory: it reverses the following year 
when the accounts are paid. They illustrate that accrual accounting shields accounting income from this 
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receivable, and accounts payable) adjust operating cash flow to create an earnings 
variable. This variable is less noisy for measuring periodic performance and more 
efficient for contracting with managers and other lenders. According to Dechow (1994) 
one role of accounting accruals is to create a measure of short-term performance. Her 
finding shows that earnings are more strongly associated with stock returns than are 
realized cash flows. Dechow demonstrates that working capital accruals are 
contemporaneously and negatively correlated with other things such as equality (long 
term gain and loss in accruals), accruals and cash flows from operations. Cash flows are 
more negatively correlated serially than earnings, and these are more volatile than 
earnings. Earnings are more highly correlated with stock returns. 
According to Dechow’s research, the correlation between earnings and stock 
return pressurises managers to manage earnings, and this is one of the reasons that this 
study explorers the impact of this practice on winner and loser firms.  
 
2.2.3 Discretionary and non-discretionary accruals 
It is difficult to separate total accruals into discretionary and normal accruals (or 
nondiscretionary) because motive is unobservable and economic events cause changes in 
total accruals from year to year. According to the literature two methods are used to 
estimate these expectation models. The time-series approach estimates the parameters for 
each firm in the sample selection by using data from periods prior to the periods in 
                                                                                                                                                
transitory noise, making it a more efficient performance measure. Therefore, they find that compared with 
contracts based on cash flow, contracts based on accounting income are more efficient because they reduce 
transitory noise in the payoffs. 
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question. In contrast, parameters in the cross-sectional models estimate for each period 
and each firm in the event sample, using data for firms in the same industry.  
Dechow et al. (1995) and Guay et al. (1996) contain tests based on the time-series 
approach. This method could only be used for firms with long series of financial data, for 
example, Guay et al. (1996) considered 15 years of data in his study. Some researchers 
separate firms by SIC code and estimate nondiscretionary accruals by using yearly cross-
sections of firms (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). In this method, it is assumed that the 
economic situation will affect the firms in the industry in a similar way. 
 
2.2.4 The role of accrual components  
Sloan (1996) raises an important question about accruals, namely, which part of the 
accruals are considered to drive the results. The study by Thomas and Zhang (2002) 
suggests that inventory is the main component of accruals driving the accruals anomaly. 
They also find that the firms which have the highest and lowest extremes of changes in 
inventory distribution are characterised by higher and lower profitability. Thomas and 
Zhang (2002) explore which accruals components are responsible for accruals 
mispricing.  They find that inventory change is the component of the accrual measure that 
is strongly related to next year’s abnormal returns. Firms in the lowest deciles of 
inventory accruals show higher levels of growth and future abnormal returns, while firms 
with the highest deciles of inventory accruals show lower levels of growth and abnormal 
returns.  
One explanation for mispricing accruals is that investors are unable to incorporate 
the information that was created by the abnormal component from operating accruals. By 
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analysing a cross-sectional version of the Jones (1991) model, Xie (2001) finds that both 
normal and abnormal accruals are mispriced by the market. 
 The early research conducted by Sloan (1996) shows that discretionary accruals-
based investment strategy is able to create 11% size-adjusted abnormal stock returns one 
year ahead, but a nondiscretionary accruals-based strategy is only able to create a 
statistically insignificant abnormal stock return of 2.3%. Thus, the market seems to be 
able to correct the price of firms with normal operating accruals.  
The results in Xie (2001) provide confirmation that the information about accruals 
conveyed at the managers' discretion is given too much emphasis by the market. His 
ideas are extended by the market’s reaction to the information included in abnormal 
working capital accruals in the earnings announcement date (see DeFond and Park, 
2001). DeFond and Park show that the market, on average, does not fully impound the 
pricing implications of abnormal working capital accruals associated with earnings 
surprises. They report that there is an asymmetry in the market reaction to the type of 
news conveyed by companies and abnormal working capital accruals. According to 
DeFond and Park’s findings, firms with good news have higher earnings responses. They 
show that income-increasing abnormal accruals exaggerate the magnitude of good news 
earnings surprises therefore they expect the market to infer that the underlying surprise is 
actually smaller than reported. Also, abnormal accruals have the opposite implications for 
reported bad news surprises. Income-increasing abnormal accruals destroy the magnitude 
of bad news earnings surprises and thus should lead the market to infer that the 
underlying surprise is actually larger than reported. Recent research reveals evidence that 
accruals information is correctly priced by the market for those firms which disclose 
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information about accruals in earnings announcements (Louis et al, 2008). This evidence 
is robust for both discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals components.  
 
2.2.5 Accruals and earnings characteristics 
An important aspect of the present study is to focus on accruals and earnings 
characteristics to produce a better understanding of the impact of accruals mispricing. 
The main reason behind this focus is that earnings and accruals characteristics have 
different predictive values for forecasting future returns. These essential characteristics 
may put pressure on accruals mispricing, or they can explain accruals mispricing. 
The abnormal accruals can be driven by unreliable accruals components, with 
reliability being defined as the level of subjectivity associated with each component. The 
research shows that more reliable accruals components have higher persistence than less 
reliable components on earnings (Richardson et al, 2005). Sloan (1996) provides 
evidence that accruals mispricing is the reason that the market is unable to price the 
different persistence of earnings components correctly when forecasting future earnings, 
and he shows that more reliable components of accruals would be less mispriced than less 
reliable components. 
Richardson et al. (2005) disaggregate total accruals into their different 
components and classify them into reliable versus less reliable categories. These authors 
provide evidence that the less reliable components are the items having a lower 
persistence in predicting future earnings. Moreover, it seems that the market’s inability to
price the lower persistence of the less reliable accruals components correctly, leads to a 
mispricing of these components. Also, the less reliable accrual component leads to an 
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abnormal return and this is higher than the one obtained if using the most reliable accrual 
component. 
According to Richardson et al. (2005) investors are unable to price the effect of 
special items on future earnings correctly. Subsequently, Dechow and Ge (2006) analyse 
the effect that special items have on accruals mispricing. Dechow and Ge argues that the 
behaviour of earnings persistence differs between high and low accruals firms. They 
provide evidence that firms with low accruals are characterised by a reduction in assets 
due to downsizing, and assets are reduced by asset impairment and it shows that the 
accruals information is associated with the structure of the balance sheet. As a result, 
firms with low accruals will report temporary items if the reported earnings causes their 
earnings persistence to decrease.  
Firms with high accruals, especially firms characterised by large positive accruals 
are more likely to be growing but, according to accounting conservatism, the future 
benefits of such events are not accounted for in the balance sheet, while their costs are 
directly expensed. As a consequence, these firms are more likely to report transitory 
negative cash flows that are mitigated by accruals and improve earnings persistence. 
Empirical evidence regarding this issue is documented in prior studies. In regards to 
accrual anomaly, Xie (2001) shows that the market overestimates the persistence of 
discretionary accruals and thus overprices them. Other researchers such as DeFond and 
Park (2001) find that the earnings response coefficient (ERC) is higher or lower when 
discretionary accruals show the magnitude of a positive earnings surprise. DeFond and 
Park suggests that the market partially adjusts for the possibility of accruals management 
on the earnings announcement date. Other researchers Baber et al. (2006) confirm the 
DeFond and Park results and show that the ability of market participants to detect 
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earnings management is improved when firms elect to provide a balance sheet and cash 
flow disclosures at earnings announcement. 
Overall, the evidence shows that accruals reliability is one of the factors affecting 
accruals mispricing. Thus in the present study, accruals are used instead of operating 
accruals. 
 
2.2.6 Management of accruals and accrual reversals 
Accruals are created when the expenses and revenues that build income are not 
completely cash based. In other words, accruals show the amounts that are received as 
revenue and expenses are incurred but do not convert into cash on the balance sheet and 
do not show up on the income statement. The net income reports both cash income and 
accrual income. All firms always have a certain level of accruals as presented in 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Therefore, net income is divided 
into two parts: Cash income and Total accruals as follows: 
Net Income = Cash income + Total Accruals                                                 (2.1) 
An increase in accruals can accompany an increase in income. Accruals can turn 
into cash, so they can give investors valuable information about the future cash flow of 
firms. However, sometimes accruals do not turn into cash therefore, some managers use 
accruals to hide their inability to generate cash income for shareholders. There is a 
question here: research is needed into when the use of accruals is ethical and when it is 
unethical. Total accruals can be measured by the balance sheet method or cash flow 
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method. The balance sheet method
11
 of measuring accruals is captured by equation (2.2) 
below. 
Total Accruals =Δ (Current assets – Cash) – Δ (Current liabilities) - Depreciation    (2.2) 
The cash flow
12
 method for measuring is the equation (2.3); 
Total accruals = Earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations - 
Operating cash flow + Depreciation and amortization                                        (2.3) 
Managing current accruals suggests itself as a potentially popular technique for 
managing earnings. Healy (1985) demonstrates that accrual management is less costly 
and more likely on a multi-period basis than changes in accounting methods as a means 
of transferring earnings between periods. Also, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) point out 
that working capital accruals are more susceptible to manipulation than non-working 
capital accruals
13
. This study investigates the links between discretionary working capital 
accruals and stock returns in the short term.  
The accrual process is an important aspect of financial accounting. There is 
limited research documenting and explaining the properties of accruals in interim periods. 
This study seeks to contribute to research in this area by documenting some fundamental 
properties of accounting accruals in the short term and describes their implications for 
accounting research and practice. 
                                                          
11
 The balance sheet method use changes in various amounts of balance sheet items to measure the accruals 
component through the net income. 
12
 The cash flow method implies operating cash flows to measure the accrual components of net income. 
13 Kreutzfeldt and Wallace (1986) show that accounts receivable, inventory, accounts payable, accrued 
liabilities and also fixed assets are among the five accounts in which errors are most frequently detected by 
auditors. They also provide evidence that judgmental errors (e.g., underestimation of bad debt expense) are 
relatively frequent for these accounts. They find such judgmental ‘errors’ are consistent with manipulation. 
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 Allen et al (2011) provide evidence that extreme accruals lead to a 
disproportionately high frequency of extreme reversals and reversals can impact earnings 
in the future. As an example, they demonstrate that extreme positive inventory accruals 
are followed by a high frequency and magnitude of subsequent inventory write-downs. 
Also, they show that the popularity of extreme accrual reversals explains a number of 
results from prior research. They show a negative relationship between accruals and 
future stock returns which are attributable to accrual reversals frequency. In addition they 
show that extreme accruals are associated with systematic reversals indicating that 
accountants and auditors are unsuccessful at identifying the systematic errors in extreme 
accruals. 
 
2.3 Earnings management   
It is hard to detect the machinations of earnings management from the financial 
statements provided by firms because management has become very adept at it. Early 
research on earnings management is concerned with the detection of changes in 
accounting methods because that is usually easily observable (see Watts, 1998). Other 
research focuses on accruals, showing that earnings management goes unnoticed by the 
market (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  
According to the assumptions of this thesis investors are misled by earnings 
management as they are unable to incorporate the quality of earnings into stock returns. 
A reason is that managers do not disclose information that is necessary to determine the 
quality of accounting earnings. According to the research by Louis and Robinson (2005), 
when accrual information is not disclosed, investors misprice earnings at the time of the 
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earnings announcement and only partially correct them at the end of financial year when 
accounts are filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) suggest that investors pay insufficient attention to 
accruals information, and are interested in understanding and following the process when 
accruals information is disclosed. Another principal assumption for testing the hypothesis 
is that managers of winner and loser firms have incentives to maintain returns in spite of 
changes in the fundamentals. The managers of winner firms have incentives to hide poor 
performance because their reputation is tied to the earnings of the firm. DeGeorge et al. 
(1999) show that managers are interested in increasing reported earnings according to the 
market’s expectations. Managers of loser firms have incentives to continue the decline in 
order to report higher earnings in the future. Some of these incentives are driven by the 
management’s wealth exposure to the stock price. Healy (1985) demonstrates that after a 
period where earnings are depressed, managers have incentives to select income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals to increase future reported earnings and bonuses. This study is further 
extended by Chance, Kumar, and Todd, (2000), who show that options strike prices get 
reset after periods of bad performance. Other incentives are provided by the pressures 
they face in meeting earnings expectations. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) provide 
evidence that the sensitivity of a firm’s stock price to earnings news, as measured by 
outstanding stock recommendations, affects its motivations to manage earnings. They 
find that firms rated ‘sell’ are more frequently engaging in extreme income-decreasing 
earnings management, indicating that they have incentives to engage in earnings decline. 
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2.3.1 Definition of earnings management and methods   
It is difficult to discuss and analyse earnings management partly because there is no 
single definition of earnings management. Earlier studies find an association between 
stock returns and accruals over long returns intervals. The empirical evidence indicates 
that accruals have information content.  
Schipper (1989) demonstrates that opportunities for earnings management in the 
reporting system do not eliminate the usefulness of accounting earnings for valuing 
stocks, which is advantageous for investors. In addition, earnings management can have 
positive or negative aspects and it seems that researchers tend to focus on earnings 
management that is advantageous to managers. For instance, earnings management is 
defined by Schipper as: 
“Disclosure management in the sense of a purposeful intervention in the 
external financial reporting process, with the extent of obtaining some 
private gain (as opposed to merely facilitating the neutral operation of 
the process)” 
Earnings management can occur at any part of the disclosure process and in 
several ways. In addition, it can be accomplished by timing investments or financing 
decisions to alter reported earnings. Under this definition, the benefits of earnings 
management come from its informational aspects. According to this idea, earnings are 
one of the instruments that might be used to make certain judgments. As opposed to the 
economic income aspect, the earnings numbers show a true income perspective. 
According to the income perspective, some numbers, such as economic income, are 
manipulated, and this can be the result of earnings management. Accounting numbers are 
produced by accounting rules which measure the true income with errors, where the 
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benchmark can be used to evaluate the degree of this measurement error to be a true 
income metric. Thus, the true income perspective shows that earnings which are not 
managed are a noisy measure, and that managing earnings can change the properties of 
the noise such as amount bias. Therefore, the change in properties determines the effect 
of the earnings management, and it can indicate whether it is positive or negative.  
The perspective of standard setters for financial reporting shows that standards 
add value when they enable financial statements to illustrate differences in company’s 
performance in a credible manner. According to this issue, standard setters follow this 
definition by Healy and Wahlen (1999): 
‘Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers’ 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) focus on the negative aspects of earnings management. 
Their definition implies that managers can use many methods to mislead stakeholders 
about the economic performance of the firm. This definition of earnings management is 
difficult to operate directly because researchers first need to estimate earnings before 
demonstrating the effect of earnings management. One of the most important factors is 
identifying conditions in which the motivations of managers to manage earnings is 
strong, and then testing patterns of unexpected or discretionary accruals or accounting 
choices are consistent with motive. These studies raise two critical research design issues. 
First, they have to consider managers’ reporting incentives and second, they have to 
compute the effects of managers using accounting discretion in unexpected accruals or 
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accounting proxy choices. The earlier studies examine the first issue and identify the 
different types of motivations for earnings management.  
Healy and Wahlen’s definition makes it very difficult for researchers to design a 
procedure using reported accounting numbers, because the focus is on managerial 
decision that is not observable. Financial fraud is the only form of earnings management 
that has a transparent definition because the intention of managers is clear. Dechow and 
Skinner (2000) explains the ways in which managers can exercise judgment over 
financial reports, as shown in figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1  
The ways in which managers exercise judgement in financial reporting (Dechow and Skinner, 2000) 
 
 
 
Conservative accounting  Neutral earnings  Aggressive accounting  Fraudulent accounting  
Within GAAP  Violates GAAP 
Overly aggressive 
recognition of reserves  
Overvaluation of 
acquired in-process 
R&D in purchase 
acquisitions 
Overstatement of 
restructuring charges 
and asset write-offs 
Earnings that result 
from a neutral operation 
of the process  
Understatement of the 
provision for bad debts 
Drawing down 
provisions or reserves in 
an overly aggressive 
manner 
Recording sales before 
they are realizable 
Recording fictitious 
sales                                
Backdating sales 
invoices   
Overstating inventory 
by recording fictitious 
inventory  
Delaying sales 
Accelerating R& D or 
advertising expenditures 
  
Postponing R&D or 
advertising expenditures 
Accelerating sales 
  
 
2.3.2 Motivation of managers to engage in earnings management 
An extensive body of academic research in accounting is devoted to earnings 
management, broadly defined as the opportunistic exercise of managerial discretion to 
create reported earnings differing from real earnings. This can be produced from a neutral 
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application of generally accepted accounting principles (e.g., Dechow and Skinner 2000). 
Ronen and Yaari (2008) classify the definitions of earnings management in to three 
different colours; white, gray and black
14
.  
Many researchers focus on the motivation of managers to engage in earnings 
management, and the detection and quantification of upward earnings management. 
Ronen and Sadan (1980) focus on income smoothing literature.  
In the most highly cited research study on earnings management, Healy (1985) 
attempts to predict managers’ choices of accounting method. He argues that managers try 
to find ways in which they can manage net income in an attempt to maximise their 
bonuses according to the firm’s compensation plans. He writes that bonus schemes come 
from a contract between the firm and its managers that set the basis for managerial 
compensation. Generally speaking, bonuses give a direct linear relationship between 
managers’ conpensations and current reported net income. Healy (1985) demonstrates 
that the bonuses tend to begin at a minimum amount of net income and either level off at 
a maximum amount of net income or continue infinitely. He demonstrates accruals can 
modify the timing of reported earnings. Therefore, discretionary accruals assist managers 
in transferring earnings between periods. 
                                                          
14 They explain white as follows: “earnings management is taking advantage of the flexibility in the choice 
of accounting treatment to signal the manager’s private information on future cash flows”. Many studies 
such as Ronen and Sadan (1981), Demski, Patell and Wolfson (1984), Suh (1990), Demski (1998), Beneish 
(2001), Sankar and Subramanyam (2001) follow the white alternative. Grey is defined as follows; 
“earnings management is choosing an accounting treatment that is either opportunistic (maximizing the 
utility of management only) or economically efficient”. Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001) and Scott (2003) 
follow this alternative.  Finally the black alternative demonstrates; “earnings management is the practice of 
using tricks to misrepresent or reduce transparency of the financial reports”. Researchers following this 
definition include Schipper (1989), Healy and Wahlen (1999), Tzur and Yaari (1999), Chtourou, Bédard 
and Courteau (2001), Miller and Bahnson (2002). 
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Some items of earnings management are focused on contractual motivation. From 
this aspect, earnings management helps managers avoid violating the terms of a debt 
contract. Such violations can be highly costly to managers and could affect their ability to 
operate the firm. As mentioned before, earnings management gives a manager the 
flexibility to choose those accounting policies that avoid close proximity to covenant 
violation. 
 Another aspect of earnings management is ‘political motivations’. Many firms 
are often in the public eye or subject to governmental inspection; therefore, firms use 
earnings measurement to reduce reported net income to prevent external bodies from 
forcing a politically visible firm to lower its profitability. These issues are discussed in 
the empirical research by Jones (1991). 
A kind of earnings motivation that is addressed by many in the accounting 
literature is tax motivation (e.g. Palmrose et al. 2004; Hennes et al. 2008). Stringent 
regulations on the calculation of tax on net income mean that firms have few 
opportunities to apply earnings management to income taxation. So, a firm may change 
its inventory methods (change from a given method to LIFO) to reduce its reported net 
income and the taxes calculated on that income. These actions can positively affect stock 
prices, because investors tend to invest in firms with lower taxes when market prices are 
rising. 
Managers are interested in maintaining growth in earnings because their rewards 
are usually tied to the firm’s profit. In practical terms, the news that a firm falls short of 
earnings expectations can lead to a drop in its stock price; on the other hand, the market 
may well reward firms that exceed their expectations. As accruals are the difference 
between firms accounting earnings and its underlying cash flow, high accruals indicate 
  
30 
 
that earnings are high relative to cash flows (Sloan, 1996). This relationship is evident in 
the work of Teoh et al. (1998a) and Degeorge et al. (1999). These authors document the 
managerial manipulation of earnings and demonstrate how managers amplify earnings at 
a greater rate than cash flows, for example, increasing accounts receivable through 
recording sales before their due date or by decreasing current liabilities such as warranty 
expenses.  
The literature suggests that managers have several incentives for engaging in earnings 
management. Managers want to hide poor performance because their job security and wealth 
is dependent on the profitability of their firms, and their reputation is tied to earnings 
(Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). They find that the holding values of stocks and options are 
two important factors because the compensation of CEOs is closely tied to them. 
In addition, managers seek to increase reported earnings to meet the expectations of 
the market (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Another study by DeGeorge et al. (1999) shows 
that CEOs have incentives to meet three thresholds: reporting positive earnings, maintaining 
recent (positive) performance and matching analysts’ forecasts. Abarbnell and Lehavy 
(2003) show management try to report earnings close or slightly higher than analysts’ 
forecasts.  
Use of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported earnings is more pronounced 
in companies where the CEO’s potential compensation is more closely tied to the value 
of shares and option holdings (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). These authors find that 
during years of high accruals, CEOs exercise large quantities of options and sell large 
numbers of shares. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) provide evidence that companies 
with more ‘incentivized’ CEOs, whose compensation is more responsive to company 
stock prices, have higher levels of earnings management. For this reason, CEOs are 
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aggressive users of discretionary components of earnings to impact their firms’ reported 
performance.  
 
2.3.3 Earnings persistence  
Persistence of earnings performance depends on the proportions of the cash and accrual 
components. According to Sloan’s research (1996) into the role of cash flows and accruals in 
the time-series of earnings’ behaviour, the accruals portion of earnings is less persistent than 
the cash portion of earnings. Accruals in one period lead to lower profitability in the next 
period when the accruals reverse. Sloan considers information that contains the cash flow 
component and the accruals component inside earnings, and examines whether investors’ 
expectations of future earnings embodied in share prices reflect this information
15
. The result 
shows that the accrual and cash flow components of current earnings have different 
implications for achieving future earnings. Both components help current earnings. Current 
earnings performance is less likely to persist if it is attributable to the accruals component of 
earnings, as opposed to the components of cash flow, because accruals are less likely to recur 
in future periods of earnings. Sloan demonstrates that the persistence of current earnings goes 
down by the magnitude of the accruals components of earnings. Conversely, it goes up by 
increases in the magnitude of the cash flow components of earnings
16
.  
                                                          
15
 Dechow and Ge (2005) show that the higher persistence of the cash component of earnings is more 
attributable to net cash distributions to shareholders, and investors can anticipate the lower persistence of 
the rest cash component of earnings. Lev and Nissem (2006) discuss the accruals anomaly continues to 
exist and also became even more pervasive. 
16
 Francis and Smith (2005) provide evidence that it is very important to understand how the different kind 
of measures of accounting information are defined in accounting research, because different measures lead 
to different inferences regarding persistence. 
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Solan (1996) provides a different view of persistence of current profitability for 
achieving future profitability
17
, and shows that operating accruals, compared with operating 
cash flow for one-year ahead, are less persistent. Following up on Sloan (1996), Richardson 
et al. (2005) demonstrate that it is attributable to the lower reliability of the accrual 
component of earnings. In contrast, Fairfield et al. (2003) and Wu et al. (2010) shows that 
it is attributable to diminishing marginal returns to new investment. Collins and Hribar, 
(2000) and Xie (2001) test this finding and extend it to total accruals. This research suggests 
that profitability is attributable to either operating or non-operating cash flow. 
Xie (2001) uses the market pricing model of Jones (1991) (the estimated 
discreationary accruals model) to test whether stock prices show the earnings implications of 
accruals. He extends the Sloan (1996) research by using one year ahead earnings implications 
of accruals, to show that the lack of persistence and the overpricing of accruals are mostly 
down to abnormal accruals.  
The existence of a negative relationship between accruals and future abnormal returns, 
documented by Sloan (1996) and Thomas and Zang (2002), is mainly due to one specific area 
of accruals, namely, inventory. These authors find that changes in inventory represent the one 
component that shows a consistent and significant relationship with future returns. This result 
for inventory changes is important because in many instances, like inventory acquisitions, 
there is no direct relationship between the components of accruals and earnings.  
Beneish and Vargus (2002) examine the effect of managerial discretion in the 
persistence of earnings. They test the insider trading by firms’ managers. They find that 
                                                          
17
 Solan (1996) investigates whether stock prices reflect information about future earnings contained in the 
accrual and cash flow components of current earnings. The persistence of earnings performance is shown to 
depend on the relative magnitudes of the cash and accrual components of earnings. However, stock prices 
act as if investors fail to identify correctly the different properties of these two components of earnings. 
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trading is informative about a firms’ earnings quality, since managers like to process private 
information with regard to economic factors associated with the persistence of accounting 
accruals. The firms’ managers create strategic operating designs and they process private 
information with regard to economic factors to suggest the likelihood that accounting accruals 
will result in future earnings.
18
 If the managers know that higher reported earnings persist and 
lead directly to higher future stock prices, then they are motivated to purchase their firm’s 
stock. Also, if income increases from the accruals process because managers manipulate their 
earnings to hide deteriorating firm performance, it is expected that managers will act on the 
knowledge that accruals are unlikely to persist and sell their firms’ stock.  
The lower persistence of income increasing accruals can be caused by changes in 
the firm’s economic environment. This means that accruals are less informative 
approximately one year ahead of earnings and may therefore be useful for managers 
involved in opportunistic earnings management. It is difficult to distinguish between 
these two possibilities. Accruals that cause an increase in income because of abnormal 
insider trading may lead the market to overprice them. Managers of these firms have a 
better understanding about the reliability of accruals than investors. 
Alternatively, the lack of persistence of accruals may not necessarily be due to 
earnings management. Other researchers argue that lack of persistence of accruals can be 
created by errors in estimation (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). These authors consider the 
                                                          
18
 For example, if there is an increase in accounts receivables it creates an increase in earnings. An increase 
in receivables could mean that sales are increasing and also it could point to solid future sales growth (see 
Beneish and vargus, 2002). However, increasing receivables could mean credit checks or granting easier 
credit terms that firms take to avoid reporting lower sales growth. Managers know which of these two 
options causes the increase in the accounts receivable of accrual. Therefore, we expect that managers have 
special information about the likelihood that income-increasing accruals will give them an advantage in 
higher future earnings, and similarly that income-decreasing accruals will give them an advantage in lower 
future earnings. 
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quality of earnings from the standpoint of the quality of the accruals, and they examine the 
role of estimation of errors, and present a new measure of the quality of working capital 
accruals and earnings. According to Dechow and Dichev (2002) one role of accruals is to 
adjust the recognition of cash flows over time; therefore the adjusted numbers (earnings) are a 
better measure of firms’ performance, even though accruals assume the future cash flow. They 
also argue that estimation errors and their corrections are noise that can reduce the beneficial 
role of accruals. Their measure extends to show which working capital accruals drop into 
operating cash flow realisation. They provide an empirical measure of high quality accruals 
and define it as residuals omitted. 
Hanlon (2005) addressed the difference between financial reporting, taxable earnings 
and earnings persistence. She investigates the role of book-tax differences (differences of 
book income and taxable income) in indicating the persistence of earnings, accruals, and 
cash flows for one-period-ahead earnings. Also she examines whether the level of book-
tax differences influences investors' assessments of future earnings persistence. According 
to her findings, the firm-years with large book-tax differences have earnings that are less 
persistent than firm-years with small book-tax differences.  
Francis and Smith (2005) re-examine the persistence of the accrual and cash 
components of income, focusing on two features of persistence. The first concerns its 
time specificity and the second its firm specificity. This research focuses on time 
specificity. According to Francis and Smith time specificity refers to the persistence when 
current-period shocks to income translate into next-period income. They argue that the 
traditional measures of accruals are functions of current - and noncurrent - period 
transactions. They find that the inclusion of non-current-period transactions leads to a 
downward (upward) bias on the persistence of accruals. Some researchers argue that 
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managers manage earnings and do not distort them; thus management smooth earnings to 
eliminate their natural volatility. Managers engage in earnings smoothing when they 
increase or decrease discretionary earnings to make up for a decrease or increase in 
income. Reporting earnings that give the market information about future prospects of 
their firms can be a good justification for smoothing. When earnings are volatile, stock 
returns can become volatile and increase the risk of stock losing value and in turn impose 
a cost on the firm’s shareholders. Accruals need to be carefully evaluated bearing in mind 
the motivations of managers to manage earnings, to assess correctly the overall prospects 
and profitability of a firm   
 
2.4 Stock returns  
Share prices reflect asset value changes at the time that those changes occur, whether 
those changes imply losses or gains in asset value. With regard to this view, stock prices 
always reflect the value of stocks. According to research by Fama (1970):  
“The primary role of the capital market is allocation of ownership of the 
economy's capital stock. In general terms, the ideal is a market in which 
prices provide accurate signals for resource allocation: that is, a market 
in which firms can make production-investment decisions, and investors 
can choose among the securities that represent ownership of firms' 
activities under the assumption that security prices at any time ‘fully 
reflect’ all available information. A market in which prices always ‘fully 
reflect’ available information is called ‘efficient’.” (Fama, 1970, pp. 383) 
Accounting earnings present some information about firm values to investors. 
Researchers such as Ball and Brown (1968), Beaver (1968), and Rendleman et al. (1982) 
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show that earnings surprise are positively related to contemporaneous stock returns. 
Bernard and Thomas (1990) also find a positive relationship between earnings surprises 
and stock returns, though they emphasise that investors are likely to under-react to the 
information contained in earnings. However, investors are affected and there is no doubt 
that earnings disclosures affect stock prices.  
Managers can exercise some discretion in earnings without violating accounting 
rules. For instance, firms may affect reported earnings by further revenue recognition and 
they can defer identifying expense for the future. This activity causes a shift in earnings 
from the current period to a future period. Managers can also change methods of 
inventory accounting or use different estimating methods such as bad debt expense. 
Firms may use discretionary accounting choices to manage earnings disclosures. 
For example, there is evidence of consistent earnings manipulation by firms that violate 
debt covenants (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Therefore, the present study focuses on 
the relationship between earnings management and stock returns because managing 
earnings by managers may affect stock returns. 
 
2.4.1 Explanations of price momentum  
The price momentum anomaly has been documented extensively in the research literature and 
it has been implemented in the active money management industry as a base of excess 
returns for a long period of time. Price momentum refers to distinct anomalies; the 
intermediate term price momentum is measured over 3-12 months (Jegadeesh and Titman, 
1993), and the long-term price reversal is measured over 3-5 years (DeBondt and Thaler, 
1985). Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) explain price momentum as follows: 
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“The stocks with relatively high returns over the past three to twelve months 
should return to investors above average returns over the next three to 
twelve months.” 
The model of price momentum is defined under the assumption that the stock 
market is not a completely efficient market. Two explanations of this model include: 
firstly, investors take the results of human behaviour into the account, including a 
‘herding’ mentality and an overreaction to news; secondly investors use a price 
momentum strategy face an additional risk because higher returns are required to 
compensate these investors. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) provide a large number of 
trading strategies. One of the main results from their study was that by buying past 
winners and selling past losers, investors achieved above average returns over the period 
1956 to 1989. In particular, stocks classified on their prior 6-month performance and held 
for 6 months, realized an excess return of over 12% per year on average. 
According to the above model, current theories attempting to explain the price 
momentum anomaly are divided into two groups: First, investors take advantage of 
human behaviour, such as a "herding" mentality and overreaction to news. Second, 
investors take on additional risk by using a price momentum strategy, therefore, their 
models must predict higher returns reimburse them for the risk that they assume. 
According to the human behavioural explanation there are a number of theories that 
provide positive intermediate-term and negative long-term autocorrelation in stock returns. 
Some of the models build on the idea that prices initially overreact to essential news, and 
then overreacting is continued for a period of time, ultimately correcting in the long run 
(Daniel et al., 1998). These authors find that overreaction is based on individuals 
overestimating their ability to interpret financial information. 
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Overreaction to news is confirmed by public information in the short-term. Losers 
who continue to have negative earnings news and winners, who continue to have positive 
earnings news, lead to a positive autocorrelation in stock prices over the intermediate 
horizon. Over the long-term the overreaction causes prices to become overvalued, thus 
leading to negative autocorrelation in stock returns. 
Initially, according to price momentum theory, firms’ investors (i.e. over a period 
of 1-12 months) do not like to incorporate all the good (or bad) news announced through 
earnings. So, as good or bad news is announced, this under reaction builds a positive 
autocorrelation in stock prices over that period. However, over a longer period (3-5 years), 
investors overreact to good (or bad) news, leading to securities being overpriced and 
therefore returning to the mean. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find evidence that investors who buy the winner 
portfolio and sell the loser portfolio based on past 3 - 12 months returns and hold them for 
3 - 12 month, create significant positive returns. According to their findings, a portfolio that 
is formed on the basis of past six month returns create an average cumulative return of 9.5 
percent over the next six months. Subsequent research found this anomaly to be robust in 
several aspects. The researchers test different time-series for price momentum and they find 
that after an anomaly has been published it seems to be pervasive during the following  years 
and the evidence shows it is independent of which time-series is selected (Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 2001). This anomaly has been found to be robust across different financial markets. 
Rowenhorst (1999) shows price momentum is not only a phenomenon in the United 
States market but also it is found in international markets. Subsequent research finds that 
momentum persists across different financial markets, and that it cannot be 
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explained by macroeconomic risks (Griffin and Martin, 2003). This empirical evidence 
suggests that price momentum is a robust anomaly and is unlikely to be due to data mining. 
 
2.4.2 Income stocks and growth stocks  
The terms ‘share’, ‘common stock’ and ‘stock’ are used in this study as interchangeable 
words to mean an ordinary share (as defined in the dictionary of Accounting and 
Finance). The theory underlying this concept argues that an owner of a share is entitled to 
vote in an annual general meeting or an extraordinary meeting, but not guaranteed 
dividends. The definition of growth stocks below is presented by Butler et al (1997): 
“Securities that are expected to offer the investor sustained capital 
growth. Investors and investment managers often distinguish between 
growth stocks and income stocks. The former are expected to provide 
capital gains; the latter, high income. The investor will usually expect a 
growth stock to be an ordinary share in a company whose products are 
selling well and whose sales are expected to expand, whose capital 
expenditure on new plant and equipment is high, whose earnings are 
growing, and whose management is strong, resourceful, and investing in 
product development and long-term research” (Butler et al, 1997, pp. 
162-163) 
Also, Butler et al (1997) define income stocks as follows: 
“The stocks or shares bought primarily for the steady and relatively high income 
it can be expected to produce” (pp. 170) 
All definitions of stock show that stock returns are generally used to classify growth and 
income stocks. In computing share evaluation, the factors of future cash flow include the 
  
40 
 
dividend stream that is received over the time and the price of a share at the end of the 
period.  
 In the single period model, it is assumed that investors hold shares during a 
specific period and sell the shares at the end of the same period. The elements of the 
required returns on equity invested in the shares K can be classified as follows:   
According to the single period model, the required rate of return on equity has two 
components: dividend yield and capital gain that are defined as growth in stock price. 
The earnings of firms can be distributed to shareholders; however they can be retained 
partly, or entirely, to fund future operations. In general, such firms present lower free 
cash flow and pay lower cash dividends. Nevertheless, firms with high growth rates and 
extensive demand for capital investment normally tend to pay less cash dividends. 
Stock is usually valued by high aggregated information on the future internal 
performance of the firms, external factors such as the future level of demand, the 
behaviour of other firms (especially in the same sector) and the macroeconomic 
environment. Hence, capital gains can demonstrate future growth accurately.  
 
2.4.3 Accruals and stock returns 
The empirical question of whether the net effect of accruals is to improve or reduce the power 
of earnings to measure firm’ performance is examined in this thesis. The main assumption is 
that stock prices precisely reflect the economic performance of the firm. Some early research 
focuses on the effects of the information content of accruals on stock prices. Ball and Brown 
(1968) investigate the relationship between the magnitude of change in unexpected 
income and the associated stock price adjustment. They provide evidence that the 
association between security returns and earnings is stronger than the association between 
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returns and operating cash flow. Accruals arise from differences between cash flow and 
earnings; this concept suggests that accruals increase the power of accounting income to 
reflect firm performance. Researchers such as Wilson (1987), Livant and Zarowin(1990) 
demonstrate that accruals and cash flow components  have information content. Dechow 
(1994) provides evidence that accruals improve the ability of earnings to reflect firms’ 
performances; in particular the accruals are important in performing this role. Dechow’s 
results show that earnings have a stronger association with stock return than net cash flows or 
cash from operations over the  short term (e.g, quarterly) . 
Barth et al. (2001) extend Dechow’s (1994) ideas by demonstrating the accruals 
components. They show different information in relation between future cash flow and 
aggregate earnings. Dechow states that  stock price reflects the value of future cash flow by   
disaggregating accruals into larger components such as inventory, accounts receivables and 
other accruals; hence stock price  has the ability to predict returns. Besides, stocks price cannot 
fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings. Therefore, firms 
with high or low grades of accruals may face positive and negative future abnormal returns, 
while stock returns act as the accruals anomaly. 
Researchers use a number of different methods to provide evidence of the relevance of 
accruals regarding relations between stock returns and earnings. Dechow (1994) shows the 
association between stock returns and earnings by considering the association that is between 
stock return and cash flows from operations. She chooses a sample of firms that are listed in 
the United States and compares the association between quarters one and four in each years. 
She concludes that accruals have a substantial role to improve the association between returns 
and earnings, specifically when quarterly data is considered. 
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Dechow tests the associations between returns and earnings arising from firms’ 
operations and uses quintile samples ranked by the magnitude of current and non-current 
accruals. Loftus and Sin (1997) extend Dechow’s finding about the role of accruals by 
comparing the association between stock return and earnings and cash flow from operations. 
Loftus and Sin use a sample of firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). They 
find that current accruals show short term timing differences. For example, they show 
differences between the cost of sold inventory and payments to suppliers during an accounting 
period. 
 However, Dechow (1994) emphasizes the role of total accruals, current accruals, 
and noncurrent accruals with due regard to the relation between stock returns and earnings for 
a sample of firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the United States Stock. This 
researcher compares regressions of stock returns on each of earnings and cash flows from 
operations. The result shows that cash flows from operations have less explanatory power than 
earnings. Also, she states: 
“accruals are performing a useful role in mitigating timing and matching 
problems in cash flows” and “management manipulation of accruals is of 
second-order importance” (Dechow, 1994, pp. 26, 28)4 
 According to Dechow the R-squared of the earnings’ regression is higher for longer 
measurement intervals. She argues that there are some differences between the role of current 
and noncurrent accruals. By comparing the R-squared of the cash flows from operations and by 
considering three groups of quintiles based on the magnitude of total, current, and non-current 
accruals, Dechow concludes as follows: “The improvement in the association between earnings 
and stock returns is driven by current accruals” (pp. 7, 33, 35).  
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According to Xie (2001), abnormal accruals, which are defined as accruals not raised 
from the sales of the firm’s assets, are affected by lack of persistence and overpricing. In 
addition, abnormal accruals are used by managers as a significant way to impose their 
judgement on the financial statement. Thoms and Zhang (2002) find that the negative 
relations between accruals and future abnormal returns documented by Sloan (1996) were 
mainly due to one component of accruals, namely inventory. 
 
2.4.4 Earnings and stock returns  
Many users employ earnings as an important measure because earnings are used as a 
summary measure of a firm performance. For example, they are used in executive 
compensation plans, in debt agreements and by investors and creditors. Information 
asymmetries between management and other parties make demands for an internally 
generated measure of firm performance that will be reported over finite intervals 
(Dechow, 1994). According to Dechow’s study, two important principles in accounting 
drive the production of earnings which are: the revenue recognition principle and the 
matching principle.  Based on these principles, the accrual process is hypothesised to 
mitigate timing and matching problems in cash flows, so that earnings will more closely 
reflect firm performance. Accruals can also improve the ability of earnings to measure 
the firm performance that is documented by the FASB. As an illustration, see Statement 
of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No.1, paragraph 44                     
 “Information about enterprise earnings and its components measured by 
accrual accounting generally provides a better indication of enterprise 
performance than does information about current cash receipts and 
payments.” 
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Nichols and Wahlen (2004) summarize the theory on how accounting earnings 
information relates to stock returns of firms, particularly for the benefit of students and 
practitioners. Their research outlines the theory connecting the earnings numbers of firms 
and stock returns. This connection is based on three assumptions about the information 
contained earnings and share prices. First, the theory assumes that earnings present 
information to shareholders about profitability in current and future terms. Second, the 
theory supposes that current and future expected profitability presents to shareholders 
information about the firm’s dividends in current and future period. Third, the theory 
assumes that a stock price equals the present value of expected future dividends accruing 
to the shareholder. Researchers test these theories with empirical data and they examine 
the associations between accounting earnings numbers and stock prices underlying the 
associations implied by each of the above links. Figure 2.2 demonstrates that current 
period - earnings numbers provide important information that is useful for forming 
dividends expectations about current period wealth creation, and information about 
potential earnings in the future.  For the former firms use accruals accounting to measure 
the effects of transactions on shareholder equity earnings: therefore, current period 
earnings contain important information about the wealth that will be created for 
shareholders. For the later, current earnings and information from the financial statement 
present useful information to determine future earnings. 
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Figure 2.2 
The three links relating earnings to stock returns (Nicols and Wahlen, 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, link 3 provides an approach to assess equity: the share price is the present 
value of future dividends that the shareholders expect to receive over the remaining term 
of the firm. Generally, if earnings are higher than expectations, share prices will increase; 
if earnings are less than expectations, share prices will decrease. The size of any increase 
and decrease of share price depends on many factors. The persistence of unexpected 
earnings is the most substantial factor. In other words, when a firm announces 
unexpected earnings, then it can be concluded that the share’s price will probably modify 
soon. Besides, when the firm announces an unexpected change in earnings, it can be 
expected that this persistence will continue in future, and share prices generally rise or 
fall to the relation between current and future earnings persistence.         
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Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)
19
 show that a strategy of buying stocks that have strong 
performance in the past and selling stocks that have performed poorly in the past create 
significant positive returns over 3 to 12 month holding periods. They rank stocks into 
deciles based on their returns over previous quarters. According to their research, buying 
stock in the highest deciles and selling stock in the weakest is recommended. They also 
skip a week between formation and holding periods to avoid the price pressure and 
lagged reaction effects. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) examine the profitability of the six-monthly strategy 
(six month formation and six month holding period) within subsamples which is stratified 
on the basis of firm size and ex- ante estimates of betas
20
. They find the momentum 
strategies within the subsamples show returns increase with beta and are not related 
strongly to size. They find a momentum strategy yields losses about 7% on average 
including January, which becomes 1.66% per month excluding January. They find returns 
in two-thirds of months are positive (about 60% in big firms) but it is positive 96% of 
Aprils and 24% of Januaries. They also show that if the holding period is longer than 12 
months, with every holding period after this term, the end of month 12 gives rise to a 
negative return. 
                                                          
19
 They show at the zero-capital position by average about 1% a month profits, works better than holding 
for longer periods. Thus, they consider 12-month formation period, 3-month holding period and one week 
as a lag between formation and holding periods to achieve earning 1.49% per month. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) find that the winner firms have larger average size but smaller average beta compared to loser firms. 
Therefore, the result shows that long period portfolio with negative beta, are subjected to systematic risks 
that do not support their returns. According to their study, the factor autocorrelation neither explain the 
changing in profits nor does a lead-lag model, in which case securities consistently overreact to the market 
factor, or under react to it. 
20  Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) divide momentum strategies into price momentum and earnings 
momentum. The former strategy is based on expectations of a short-run continuation in returns, buying past 
winners and selling past losers, and the latter is based on post-announcement drift.  
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 DeBondt and Thaler (1985) investigate stock return reversals over 3 year 
horizons. They create equally-weighted portfolios based on excess return of stock over 
the market. For every stock with 85 months of prior data, every three years starting in 
December of 1932, they determine firms to be either winners or losers. They compute 
residual values and then they find average excess return as the average of the residual 
returns from each stock during the last 36 months. They rank the stocks (top 35, top 50, 
and top 10%). Their results show that most of the returns’ differences are created in 
January and many of them occur after two years of the holding period. They also find 
formation periods require at least two years for the reversal, and it continues even after 5 
years. The authors include risk adjustment, their results show the winner portfolio has 
lower CAPM beta than the loser portfolio. 
If the earnings momentum can be split from the price momentum as separate 
factors, the effect of one factor on the other factor can be controlled. In fact, these factors 
could be independent variables to explain parts of the return (Chan et al., 1996). Chan et 
al. consider a 4 to 5 days gap between the portfolio formation date and the holding 
period. They employ four variables as measures of earnings and abnormal price 
momentum; the variables are returns, standard unexpected earnings (SUE), analyst 
revision (ARV) and the past 6-month returns (RET6). They rank stocks on the basis of 
either past returns or a measure of earnings news. Then they assign the ranked stocks to 
one of ten deciles portfolios. In their earnings momentum strategies, they use the 
Standardized Unexpected Earnings (SUE) variable as a measure of earnings news. They 
examine whether the continuation in past price movements and the under-reaction to 
earnings news are the same phenomenon. They find that each of the variables they 
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analyse - prior return, as well as each of the earnings surprise variables considered - has 
marginal predictive power for the post formation drifts in returns.  
In 1998, Conrad and Kaul argue momentum profits result from cross-sectional 
dispersion in expected stock returns. They believe that momentum profits make money 
because investors purchase stocks with high expected return, and sell low-expected-
return stocks. Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) do not admit this, instead they consider a 
weighted momentum strategy where investors purchase stocks with weight proportional 
to their past return minus the market return over that current period. Figure 2.3 shows 
how some prior researches motivate this study. 
Figure 2.3 How prior research motivates this study 
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2.5 Summary 
In this chapter the literature on the main research topics of earnings management and 
stock returns is discussed. The chapter also describes the main methodologies used 
throughout the study for exploring these research topics.  
This chapter is subdivided into three sections; the first section explains the 
incentives of managers to maintain growth in earnings and the main reasons for 
managing earnings. Section two describes the kinds of accruals and the role of accruals 
components such as inventory in accruals and related earnings management. Finally, the 
third section provides an explanation of stock returns. Links between income and growth 
stocks, and also between accruals and stock returns, are discussed. 
As mentioned earlier, this thesis focuses on accruals accounting used by managers 
and how it may mislead users of financial information when interpreting reported 
earnings. According to the most of the research documented in the literature review users 
are unable to assess correctly the persistence of earnings or the pricing implications.  
Gaps in the existing research literature are identified with respect to accruals and 
short term returns for winner and loser companies in the UK. These gaps include the 
absence of thorough tests of earnings management in short term returns in the UK using 
interim data.  
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Chapter 3 
Interim accounting reports 
 
3.1  Introduction  
Interim reports are summary statements that, in the UK, are usually prepared in semi-
annual format. Until the EU’s Transparency Directive was implemented in the UK in 
2007, there was no legal requirement for firms to prepare interim reports.
21
 Instead such 
preparation was only a requirement of the London Stock Exchange. The obligation on 
firms listed on the London Stock Exchange to prepare these reports was first made as a 
recommendation in 1964, to meet demand for updates by financial analysts (May, 1971). 
In 1973, this recommendation to provide the market with interim information became a 
requirement for the admission of securities to listing on the Exchange (Lunt, 1982). 
In the UK, the first guidance on this topic from the regulator was Interim Reports 
(Accounting Standards Board, 1997). More recently, these guidelines have been re-
placed by a new statement entitled Half-yearly Financial Reports (Accounting Standards 
Board, 2007). For listed companies, however, the Financial Service Authority, 
implementing the Transparency Directive, requires these companies to apply IAS 34, 
                                                          
21
 The Transparency Directive (TD) was published in the Official Journal of the EU on 31 December 2004, 
and came into force as a Directive on 20 January 2005, with a 24 month implementation period. The TD 
was was implemented in the UK on 20 January 2007. 
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Interim Financial Reporting (International Accounting Standards Board, 1998, 2010). 
According to Deloitte (2010), the impact of IAS 34 is as follows
22
: 
“IAS 34 ‘Interim Financial Reporting’ prescribes the minimum  
content of an interim financial report. It outlines the recognition  
and measurement principles which are to be followed in interim  
financial statements.” 
Another aspect of interim financial reports worth highlighting at this stage is that they are 
not audited, which might be thought to influence their reliability for investment decision-
making, although both Firth (1981) and Opong (1995) show that the UK market, like the 
US market, appears to incorporate interim information into prices relatively quickly. 
Opong finds interim financial reports contain information that is price sensitive and the 
impact of this information occurs on the day such reports are released. 
 
3.2 Interim reports and accounting standards 
Professional guidelines for the preparation of interim reports have been in place in the 
USA since the 1970s, in the form of APB Opinion No. 28, Interim Financial Reporting 
(Accounting Principles Board, 1973). It is worth noting here that, whilst interim reports 
in the UK are prepared semi-annually, this is different to the situation in the US where 
they are prepared on a quarterly basis as legally required by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. In fact, the SEC’s founding charter in 1934 gave it authority to require 
interim reports, but, in the face of considerable opposition, although the requirement was 
                                                          
22
 IAS 34 determines the minimum content for an interim financial report and the principles for recognition 
and measurement in such reports, for more information see  http://www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/2E15F246-
850B-4717-987B-50C21C375EF5/0/IAS34.pdf. 
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first introduced in 1946, it was dropped in 1952, and then reintroduced again in 1970 
(Yee, 2004). Through the FASB, accounting standards in this respect were first 
developed as SFAS No. 3 Reporting Accounting Changes in Interim Financial 
Statements (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1974) and further as SFAS No. 18 
Financial Reporting for Segments of a Business Enterprise: Interim Financial Statements 
(Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1977). Under the regulatory framework now in 
force in the USA, it is Regulation S-X and subsequent Financial Reporting Releases that 
set out the formal requirements for interim financial statements as required under the 
securities legislation, with regular modifications between 1981 and 2011.
23
 
In the UK, when the ASB first published Interim Reports (Accounting Standards 
Board, 1997), it was designed to have persuasive influence over best practice rather than 
mandatory force (it was not issued formally as an accounting standard because interim 
reporting was not required under the Companies Act). The ASB’s 1997 statement 
proposed that interim reports should be drawn up by employing the same principles and 
practices used for annual reporting, and that such reports should include a narrative 
commentary and a summarised profit and loss account, balance sheet and cash flow 
statement, together with details about exceptional items, acquisitions and discontinued 
operations, and comparative figures both for the corresponding interim period and for the 
previous full financial year.  
In July 2007, the 1997 statement was re-titled Half-yearly Reports, having been 
updated and revised as a result of new disclosure and transparency rules.  It should be 
                                                          
23
  The relevant Financial Reporting Releases are: 46 FR 12489 (Feb 17, 1981), 50 FR 25215 (June 18, 
1985), 50 FR 49533 (Dec 3, 1985), 57 FR 45293 (Oct 1, 1992), 64 FR 73401 (Dec 30, 1999), 73 FR 956 
(Jan 4, 2008), 74 FR 18616 (Apr 23, 2009), 76 FR 50120 (Aug 12, 2011). 
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noted, however, that this thesis is concerned only with UK listed companies, and their 
interim reporting is now required to be in accordance with IFRS.
24
  The development of 
an international standard started with exposure draft E57 in 1997, leading to the 
publication of IAS 34 Interim Financial Reporting (International Accounting Standards 
Board, 1998), which became effective on 1 July 1999. A related IASB Interpretation has 
been issued since then, i.e., IFRIC 10 Interim Financial Reporting and Impairment,
25
 
(International Accounting Standards Board, 2006), which became effective for annual 
periods beginning on or after 1 November 2006. Also, there have been two consequential 
amendments to IAS 34, one arising from the revision of IAS 1 in 2007, and the other 
arising from the Annual Improvements Programme in 2010.
26
  
Whilst IAS 34 specifies the content of an interim financial report conforming to 
International Financial Reporting Standards, it does not mandate which entities should 
publish interim financial reports, nor how frequently. The IASB leaves such matters up to 
national governments, securities regulators, stock exchanges, and/or accountancy 
standard setters. However, the Standard encourages interim financial reports, at least for 
                                                          
24
 For fully-listed companies, the first set of consolidated accounts which had to be prepared under IFRS 
was for the first period that commenced on or after 1
st
 January 2005, i.e. for companies with December year 
ends, the first IFRS accounts were for the year ended 31st December 2005. 
25
In 2006, The International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC)
 
issued an 
Interpretation IFRIC 10 Interim Financial Reporting and Impairment. The Interpretation addresses the 
apparent conflict between the requirements of IAS 34 Interim Financial Reporting and those in other 
standards on the recognition and reversal in financial statements of impairment losses on goodwill and 
certain financial assets. IFRIC 10 states that any such impairment losses recognised in an interim financial 
statement must not be reversed in subsequent interim or annual financial statements. 
 
26
 The effective date of the latest (May 2010) amendment to IAS 34 is 1 January 2011. 
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the first half of the financial year, to be made available not later than 60 days after the 
end of the interim period.
27
 
IAS 34 recommends the following minimum content of the interim financial 
report: 
 a balance sheet as of the end of the current interim period and a comparative 
balance sheet as of the end of the immediately preceding financial year;  
 a statement of comprehensive income (and income statement, if presented) for the 
current interim period and cumulatively for the current financial year-to-date, 
with comparative statements for the comparable interim periods (current and year-
to-date) of the immediately preceding financial year;  
 a statement of changes in equity cumulatively for the current financial year-to-
date, with a comparative statement for the comparable year-to-date period of the 
immediately preceding financial year;  
 a statement of cash flows cumulatively for the current financial year-to-date, with 
a comparative statement for the comparable year-to-date period of the 
immediately preceding financial year; and 
IAS 34 requires that the same accounting policies should be applied for interim reporting 
as are applied in the entity’s annual financial statements. An example is for accounting 
policy changes made after the date of the most recent annual financial statements that are 
to be reflected in the next annual financial statements (IAS 34.28). A key provision is that 
an entity should use the same accounting policy throughout a single financial year. If a 
                                                          
27
  Before 20 January 2007, listed companies were required to issue an interim report within 90 days of the 
period-end. For accounting periods beginning on or after 20 January 2007, a half-yearly report must be 
issued within two months of the period end. 
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decision is made to change a policy mid-year, the change is implemented all together, and 
previously reported interim data is restated (IAS 34.43). 
Measurements for interim reporting purposes should be made on a year-to-date basis so 
that the frequency of the entity’s reporting does not affect the measurement of its annual 
results. The following considerations are made explicit in this respect: 
 Revenues that are received seasonally, cyclically or occasionally within a 
financial year should not be anticipated or deferred as of the interim date, if 
anticipation or deferral would not be appropriate at the end of the financial year 
(IAS 34.37); 
 Costs that are incurred unequally during a financial year should be estimated or 
deferred for interim reporting purposes if, and only if, it is also appropriate to 
anticipate or defer that type of cost at the end of the financial year (IAS 34.39); 
 Income tax expense should be recognised based on the best estimate of the 
weighted average annual effective income tax rate expected for the full financial 
year (IAS 34.B12).
28
 
 If the companies’ business is highly seasonal, IAS 34 encourages disclosure of 
financial information for the latest 12 months, and comparative information for 
the prior 12-month period (IAS 34.21). 
Although there is no formal requirement for auditors to review half-yearly reports before 
they are published, directors can arrange for a review to be carried out as a separate 
engagement. Previously, the Auditing Practices Board Bulletin Review of Interim 
                                                          
28
 Appendix B to IAS (34) provides guidance for applying the basic recognition and measurement 
principles to various types of asset, liability, income and expense.  
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Financial Information (Auditing Practices Board Bulletin, 1999) set out guidance for 
auditors on the procedures to be undertaken when reviewing half-yearly reports. For 
accounting periods ending on or after 20
th
 September 2007, this is superseded by APB’s 
adoption of the International Standard on Review Engagements (UK and Ireland) No. 
2410, Review of Interim Financial Information Performed by the Independent Auditor of 
the Entity (Auditing Practices Board, 2007). This takes account of the changes to the 
detailed requirements on the publication of the half-yearly reports by UK listed 
companies as a result of the EC Transparency Directive. Where the auditor’s work is 
carried out in accordance with the ABP guidance, the auditor’s review report should be 
published in the half-yearly report. If the scope of the work carried out by the auditor is 
less than that set out in the APB guidance, the directors should describe the financial 
information in half-yearly report as ‘neither audited nor reviewed’. 
The S-X Regulations in the USA also allow interim reports to be unaudited. It is 
worth noting here that they may be highly condensed financial statements. For example, 
under SEC rules, interim balance sheets and income statements only need to include only 
major captions (with the exception of inventories, where data on raw materials, work in 
process and finished goods inventories must be included either on the face of the balance 
sheet or in the notes to the financial statements). Where any major balance sheet caption 
is less than 10% of total assets, and the amount has not increased or decreased by more 
than 25% since the end of the preceding fiscal year, the caption may be combined with 
others.  
Similarly, when any major income statement caption is less than 15% of average 
net income for the most recent three fiscal years and the amount has not increased or 
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decreased by more than 20% as compared to the corresponding prior interim period, the 
caption may again be combined with others.  
The statement of cash flows may also be abbreviated, starting with a single figure 
of net cash flows from operating activities and showing cash changes from investing and 
financing activities individually only when they exceed 10% of the average of net cash 
flows from operating activities for the most recent three years.  
These detailed rules in the US demonstrate how firms can provide highly 
aggregated data in their interim financial statements, which, together with audit 
considerations, have given rise to a number of influential research studies investigating 
the quality of interim financial statements, which is the background to the present thesis.  
Brown and Pinello (2007) investigate the efficiency of the financial reporting 
process at restraining earnings surprise games. They argue that the annual reporting 
process is subject to an independent audit while the interim reporting process is not. Also 
the annual reporting process has more precise expense recognition rules than the interim 
reporting process. It follows that annual reporting gives managers fewer opportunities to 
manage earnings upward. They document that annual reporting reduces the probability of 
income-increasing earnings management. However it increases the magnitude of 
downward expectations management. Their findings show that regulatory attempts to 
monitor corporations’ internal checks and balances are likely to be more effective at 
restricting upward earnings management than at justifying negative surprise avoidance. 
The Brown and Pinello results shows that annual reports, unlike interim reports, are 
subject to independent audits and more stringent expense recognition rules. Relative to 
the interim reporting process, they demonstrate the annual reporting process reduces 
managers’ tendency to manage earnings upward. Also, their findings show that managers 
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use downward expectations management as an alternative method to earnings surprise 
games when their ability to manage earnings upward is restricted. 
Mangena and Tauringana (2007) examine the effectiveness of agency related 
mechanisms on the level of disclosure compliance of interim reports with the ASB 
Statement. They show that overall disclosure compliance is not high and companies do 
not fully conform to the ASB Statement on interim reports. They use an ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression model to establish whether selected company-specific and 
corporate governance characteristics relate to the degree of disclosure compliance. Their 
results show that multiple listing, company size; interim dividend, and new share 
issuance are associated positively with the degree of compliance. Also, they find that the 
level of disclosure compliance is positively associated with auditor involvement, audit 
committee financial expertise and audit committee independence.   
 
3.3 The quality of interim financial statements  
Yee (2004) voices concerns that, in the US, the quality of interim financial statements 
may suffer from the fact that, without final audit, material transactions such as business 
combinations, restructuring provisions, major contracts and lawsuits, may not be 
allocated properly to the accounting period. This could result in final period adjustments 
when more focused audit procedures are performed on those events and transactions. 
Such adjustments can cast doubt on the integrity of the interim financial reporting, and 
cast a shadow over the reliability of interim financial statements. Furthermore, 
seasonality factors may create more volatile interim financial results, with revenues and 
costs in one particular period being shown as applicable to another period, and with 
uncertainties arising about costs that are not known until the fiscal year-end. These issues 
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may appear to be more acute under quarterly reporting in the USA, but it is notable that 
similar concerns are also raised with respect to semi-annual reporting, both in the UK 
(Opong, 1995; Mangena and Pike, 2004; Mangena and Tauringana 2007) and more 
widely in the EU (Schiller and Vegt, 2010).  
Schiller and Vegt (2010) examine the effect of interim reporting on accounting 
quality. They assume that management’s preferred objective is a high stock price. They 
argue that managers may bias accounting reports in each sub-period. Also, Schiller and 
Vegt assume that the enforcement system ties sanctions to the detected gap between total 
reported earnings and total cash flows at the liquidation stage. They argue that there are 
many circumstances in which interim reporting do not improve accounting quality. Their 
result indicates that biased reports in the short term go along with lower incremental 
sanctions at each reporting period. They seek another explanation for the low accounting 
quality of interim reports. They try to look at the strategic interaction between managers 
and investors. 
Schiller and Vegt show that interim reporting improves accounting quality if there 
is equilibrium with earnings-inflating reports and if the manager's preference for having a 
high share price is sufficiently low relative to the sanctions for detected misreporting. 
Also, they believe the reverse consequences on accounting tend to occur if these 
preferences are sufficiently high relative to the sanctions. They show biased interim 
reporting even makes a problem if the manager has no short-term preference to get a high 
share price. The result has implications for the discussion of management compensation. 
To protect reputation, a manager will bias earnings in the short term even if there is no 
short-term incentive to do. 
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Yee (2004) presents four reasons in favour of interim reporting. First, he believes 
that improving the timeliness of disclosure helps investors monitor the performance of 
management and consequently reduces agency frictions. Second, if news can be 
incorporated more frequently in prices, this improves the efficiency of capital allocation. 
Third, spreading news across interim earnings announcements reduces information 
asymmetry between sophisticated and less sophisticated traders, which may improve 
market liquidity on earnings announcement dates. Fourth, by reducing interim 
information asymmetry between insiders and the public, more frequent interim reporting 
may reduce the usefulness of rent-seeking efforts by analysts trying to acquire 
undisclosed information. More specifically, by providing an indication of how the firm is 
progressing during the yearly reporting cycle, interim reports can aid financial analysts in 
predicting, at a minimum, the probable outcome for the year with respect to the variables 
of interest to them. That is, in providing an update on firms’ activities to financial 
analysts in this way, interim reporting is able to contribute to a reduction in insider 
trading by putting into the public domain timely information which would otherwise be 
privately held until the year end (Opong, 1995). 
Mensah and Werner (2008) examine empirically the extent to which the 
frequency of interim financial reporting affects stock price volatility over the course of 
the fiscal year in four countries with different interim reporting regimes: the United 
States and Canada with quarterly reporting, and Great Britain and Australia with semi-
annual interim reporting. They argue in the trade-off between timeliness and predictive 
value of the interim reports, semi-annual interim reporting will lead to lower price 
volatility. These expectations are supported in their results. Furthermore, additional tests 
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conducted on American ADRs of British and Australian companies show that such firms 
have higher volatilities than comparable domestic firms on their home stock exchanges. 
Mensah and Werner argue that the choice of interim reporting intervals could be 
important to get greater efficiency in the capital markets for two reasons. First, more 
frequent interim reports can signal that security prices show the latest firm-specific 
information, leading to more efficient security pricing. Secondly, more frequent interim 
reports can force firms to make more estimates. Therefore, more informed estimates are 
available only with the passing of time. However, the more frequent interim reports may 
be subject to more error (as viewed from the annual report standpoint). Thus, investor 
response to the more frequent interim reports may cause greater volatility in security 
prices.  
The London Stock Exchange had long included among its listing requirements the 
production and distribution of interim financial reports at semi-annual intervals. 
Accounting regulators in Great Britain formally adopted such interim reporting rules only 
in 1997. The Accounting Standards Board of Great Britain’s Statement on Interim 
Reports and their Statement on Preliminary Announcements (issued in July 1998) 
provided voluntary ‘best practice’ guidelines intended to supplement the guidelines of the 
London Stock Exchange. Mensah and Werner’s results show that quarterly reporting 
appears to emphasize capital market volatility in the United States and Canada as 
compared to the capital markets in Great Britain and Australia. 
An old argument against preparing more frequent interim reporting relates to the 
administrative costs associated with compiling and distributing such reports, although 
modern computer technologies and the internet have reduced the force of such 
arguments. Also, it is still unclear whether mandating more frequent interim reporting 
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actually does increase overall disclosure. According to McNichols and Manegold (1983), 
interim reporting simply provides information that would be otherwise disclosed in 
subsequent annual reports. Indeed, Gigler and Hemmer (1998) argue that mandating 
more frequent interim reports causes managers to reduce their voluntary disclosure.  
According to Butler et al. (2002), in the United States unlike the UK, there is 
evidence that the establishment of mandatory quarterly reporting did not increase actual 
earnings timeliness. The main reason is that quarterly reporting replaced timely voluntary 
disclosures by firms beyond the financial statements. This may even have undesirable 
side effects, as Butler et al. claim, that forcing managers to report earnings more 
frequently may cause them to make unreasonable decisions, and reducing asymmetry 
information between competing firms through increasing the timeliness of disclosure can 
affect the nature of competition in the product market and may potentially distort 
productivity and innovation.  
A further argument is that more frequent reporting may induce additional 
information collection activity by analysts and other users, with the increased expenditure 
on such activities being a social cost. For example, when Cuijpers and Peek (2010) 
examine how quarterly and semi-annual reporting affects investor information, they show 
that a firm’s reporting frequency has no effect on the precision of that information, on 
average. However, in spite of some of the reservations expressed above, their analysis of 
price variance in announcement periods provides counter-evidence that an increase in 
reporting frequency can make financial reports more valuable to investors. That is, as 
investors in semi-annual reporters appear to obtain more pre-announcement information 
than investors in quarterly reporters, it may be construed that an increase in a firm’s 
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reporting frequency reduces investors’ incentives to acquire private information between 
consecutive announcement dates. 
Recently, Doran (2011) shows that interim period earnings performance is related 
to year-end earnings performance. He measures earnings performance as the differences 
between reported earnings and forecasted earnings. He compares interim period and the 
year-end earnings performance by analysing two groups of firms. One of the groups  
contains as firms with only interim future reports included in the earnings forecast, the 
other group contains as firms where the forecast concludes at fiscal year-end. The results 
show that the fiscal year-end group has relatively unfavourable earnings performance. 
Pahlevan and Ranjbar (2011) examine the factors (company attributes, 
management and performance) affecting the timeliness of interim financial reporting in 
the listed companies of Malaysia. Their research considers transparency as a company 
attribute, capital structure and the agency problem as characteristics of company’s 
management. Also they consider growth, net gain, and profitability in the interim period 
as measure of company performance. They focus on the Malaysia exchange market and 
they choose the 30 largest and 70 mid-size companies listed in the main board of the 
Malaysia stock exchange in 2007. After exclusion of banks, financial institutes, and 
companies with lack of data, the remaining list includes 72 companies. The fourth quarter 
of 2007 is considered as the basis of interim financial reports. According to their research 
these companies disclose their reports with a lag of 54 days on the average. The official 
deadline for revelation of companies’ quarterly reports is two months, therefore it is 
concluded that companies are inclined to disclose their reports with a delay. 
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3.4 Implications for research design 
Dechow et al. (1998) argue that, whilst a shorter earnings measurement interval and a 
consequent increase in observations are the benefits that come from using interim data, 
short period data makes analytics and empirics more complicated by introducing 
considerable measurement error into the analysis. They also argue that seasonality in 
such data may require the analytics to be modified or the seasonality removed from the 
data prior to testing. The benefits, it seems, are more than offset by the difficulties of 
modelling and estimating the intra-year accounting process.  In shorter periods, accruals 
are largely related to cash flows, which gives rise to greater differences in forecasts given 
the time-series properties of earnings, accruals and operating cash flows. In addition, 
there is evidence that the accrual process may differ between interim reporting periods, 
i.e. quarterly in the US (Collins et al., 1984; Kross and Schroeder, 1990; Salamon and 
Stober, 1994; Rangan and Sloan, 1998), and that more temporary earnings items and 
losses are reported in the fourth-quarter (Hayn and Watts, 1997), consistent with an 
accounting process that concentrates on an annual horizon.  
The GAAP requirement that each quarterly reporting period be considered an 
integral part of the annual reporting period is consistent with evidence presented by 
Rangan and Sloan (1998) concerning the auto-regressive structure of seasonally 
differenced quarterly earnings. As the fiscal year progresses, estimates are revised and 
estimation errors from earlier quarters are incorporated in earnings, as they are realized. 
For example, merchandising firms, which are permitted to use the gross profit method to 
estimate cost of goods sold, appear to apply an estimated gross profit margin to reported 
quarterly sales to determine quarterly cost of goods sold in the first three fiscal quarters, 
whilst physical inventory levels are counted and audited to determine annual cost of 
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goods sold to prepare year-end financial statements. Taxes provide a second example of 
interim expense allocation. Firms calculate quarterly tax expense by estimating the 
effective tax rate for the full fiscal year and applying this rate to quarterly earnings, with 
the estimated effective tax rate than being updated.  
These inferences are not new. In a relatively early study, Newell (1969) states 
that, since year-end adjustments have a significant effect on the last interim period (the 
fourth quarter in the US), revenue and other expense items in the reported net income will 
often be affected. Newell’s study demonstrated how interim data are subject to many 
limitations, e.g. (a) the allocation of annual fixed costs to interim periods; (b) the 
allocation of windfalls or miscellaneous revenues; and (c) accounting for needed 
adjustments which are discovered only at year-end. Moreover, as interim statements were 
then unaudited, Newell pointed out the opportunity for the firm to present financial 
statements that are not derived as a result of principles acceptable to an independent 
public accountant, providing greater opportunities to ‘manage’ reported interim income 
than reported annual income.  
Recent research in the UK echoes these considerations. Mangena and Tauringana 
(2008) investigate the relationship between audit committees and the decision to engage 
external auditors to review published interim reports. They use interim reports of 258 UK 
listed companies, and find that engaging an external auditor to review interim reports 
increases with audit committee independence and financial expertise, concluding that 
such decisions can enhance the quality of interim financial reporting. 
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3.5 Summary 
This chapter has described interim accounting reporting in the UK, including professional 
guidelines for the preparation of interim reports, and accounting standards for interim 
reporting. Also presented is a discussion of the main purpose of interim reports, the 
methods of preparation, the benefits of reviewing the reports, and empirical research 
about them. 
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                                              Chapter 4 
              
               Methodology and hypothesis development 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The review of prior research in previous chapters reveals an unresolved issue in understanding 
the effects of discretionary accruals on stock price, specially the short-term effects on return 
momentum. This chapter is concerned with specifying the likely connection between earnings 
management and short-term stock returns, focusing on the accrual process in interim and year-
end reporting in firms that are either winners or losers in the market. Return momentum may be 
seen as a market anomaly if firms are able to maintain their positions as winners through 
earnings management. A similar argument may be made when firms are able unexpectedly to 
reverse their track record as losers. Neither behavioural nor rational theories about 
investor behaviour have been able to explain this abnormality appropriately. The present 
study does not focus on the behaviour of investors or on the underlying business conditions 
that are faced by firms. Instead, this study follows the actions of the other party involved in 
influencing stock returns, namely the managers who engage in earnings management in winner 
or loser firms, either to signal changes in business conditions or to mislead investors and affect 
share prices for their own benefit.  
This study examines how managers judge and manage financial reports, by using 
accounting accruals to report earnings. Ball and Shivakumar (2006) provide evidence that 
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accruals are used to reflect the timely recognition of economic losses
29
. This aspect of 
accrual accounting has important implications for the interpretation of accruals.  
In this chapter, the main set of methodologies is introduced that is used throughout 
the study to explore the main research topic, which is to find the theoretical links between 
earnings management by means of accrual accounting and stock returns. 
 
4.2 Investors and expected returns and earnings management 
Investors are not necessarily able to interpret earnings manipulation; hence they cannot be 
immediately aware of the quality of earnings in determining stock prices (Louis et al., 2005). As 
stated in the literature review, an investor’s inability to fully incorporate earnings quality into 
stock prices is for a variety of reasons. Managers do not disclose information required to 
determine the quality of earnings when they announce the earnings. Therefore, investors 
misprice earnings at the time of the earnings announcement because accrual information is not 
fully disclosed. Mispricing in earning announcements may be only partially corrected when the 
information is reviewed at the end of year by the securities and Exchange Committee. In 
addition, whenever accruals information is disclosed, or the level of short-term trades is high, 
discretionary earnings are discounted in the earnings announcement. This study tries to find the 
relation between return momentum and accruals in earnings at times when there is inadequate 
disclosure and when a low level of short term trades exists.   
 
 
                                                          
29 Ball and Shivakumar (2006) argue that economic gain and loss can be considered as the current-period cash 
flow. According to this argument, timely recognition of gains and losses must be shown in part through 
accruals since it is based in part on revisions of future cash flow expectations.  
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4.3 Winner firms and loser firms  
Grundy and Martin (2001) provide the definition of winners and losers that is adopted in 
the present study. Winners and losers are defined as stocks in the top and bottom deciles of 
return performance over a six-month ranking period. Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) adopt 
this same approach towards winner and loser portfolios to ask whether earnings momentum 
and price momentum are related. They test for price momentum by using a strategy that 
purchases previous winners’ stock and sells previous losers’ stock. Afterwards, they assess 
whether a portfolio combining stocks from the top and bottom deciles of return 
performance over the prior six-month period earns abnormal returns. The winners-minus-
losers portfolios (WML) are compared with an earnings-based zero-investment portfolio
30
 
according to the most recent earnings surprises. Then, the difference is measured using the 
standardised unexpected earnings (SUE) formula.  
Chordia and Shivakumar group firms into deciles according to their returns. They 
create portfolios having the highest earnings surprise and the lowest earnings surprise and 
deduct them (i.e. the positive-minus-negative portfolio, or PMN).  
The main research question is to see whether winner and loser returns persist in the 
short term, and how this may relate to predictable earnings management behaviour. The 
question is whether past returns can drive future earnings management, and, if they can, is 
there any correlation between earnings management and future returns. In the main model, 
future discretionary accruals are considered as a function of past returns and other control 
variables, in which a significant relationship with returns is taken as the confirmation of the 
                                                          
30
 Taylor (2004) demonstrates that a zero-investment portfolio is established by buying and shorting 
component securities, usually in the context of an arbitrage strategy.” When shorting a stock, the shares are 
not owned by the investor but borrowed through a broker and sold in the market and later repurchased to 
replace the loan.  
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market’s expectation of future earnings management. All stocks in the sample are based on 
the past six months’ returns. Future six months’ earnings management are scaled by 
discretionary accruals. Then the model is tested to see whether a difference between 
portfolios exists, and whether the returns of winner or loser firms are impacted by earnings 
management. 
This thesis shows that winner and loser firms try to continue the return pattern from 
the first period to the next period by using discretionary accruals. Also,  this study attempts 
to find whether the returns over the next period correlate negatively with discretionary 
accruals; and can the positive or negative earnings management create positive or negative 
returns? In other words, do accruals drive the returns in the same period, i.e. 
synchronously? 
In this thesis, the objective is to see whether discretionary accruals are a measure of 
earnings management. In examining the related hypotheses, linear regressions are applied 
to portfolios containing winner and loser firms. We expect a negative relationship between 
accruals and future stock returns as documented for yearly data by earlier researchers e.g, 
Sloan (1996) and Chan et al (2006). Firms with high current accruals have a large increase 
in accruals over the past period, accompanied by a substantial deterioration in cash ﬂows. 
The high accrual for each period marks a turning point in the fortunes of these ﬁrms. Firms 
with large accruals exhibit high levels of past earnings and sales growth (see Chan et al, 
2006). Firms continue to report growing earnings even as accruals are high, and only in the 
subsequent period do earnings show signs of deterioration. As a result, the time-series 
behaviour of accruals and operating performance for ﬁrms with the largest accruals give 
strong evidence that managers are manipulating earnings, and the market is misled. 
Furthermore, in subsequent periods, the amount of income-decreasing special items relative 
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to total assets is larger for the ﬁrms with high accruals.  
In present thesis past returns are ranked to determine winner and loser firms and 
then discretionary accruals are examined for the future period, to see if there is a positive 
correlation between the components of earnings management. It is shown that some 
manipulation and engagement is done by managers of firms for the future period. To study 
the impact of earnings management on the short-term returns of winner and loser firms 
some steps are carried out. First, returns are computed as will be discussed in the data 
collection section (Chapter 5). Second, firms are classified by returns into quintiles. The 
data for six-month portfolios and lagged data are for the previous six-month period in 
accordance with the method of Jegadeesh and Titman
31
 (1993). Third, since stocks can be 
ranked based on return portfolios according to their past performance, stocks’ past returns 
can be used for the next six months after the formation of the portfolio. Thus, the ranking 
variable used in this study is a stock’s past compound raw return. 
 ‘Winners’ are firms whose returns are among the best and remain positive at the 
top of the portfolio in the next period (months 7-12). Similarly, ‘Losers’ are firms whose 
returns are among the worst and remain negative at the bottom of the portfolio.  
In Chapter 7, stock returns of winner and loser firms are presented by each interim period. 
Loser firms fall in the lower quintiles of returns over the last six months. It is also 
important to know that the transaction shares of ‘winners’ could be increased, when most 
investors are interested in purchasing winner’s stock, because investors could expect a 
repeat performance occurs in the following period. Also, investors, by forming an arbitrage 
                                                          
31
 Following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Chordia and Shivakumar (2005), we form  quintile portfolios 
to avoid test statistics anchored in overlapping returns. 
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portfolio holding winners and shorting losers, can get more profit and diversify the risk 
portfolio.  
This study determines whether past returns motivate managers of ‘winner’ firms to 
manage earnings. It seems that two sorts of factors can impact manipulation by managers: 
external factors which are the financial and economic conditions of the firm; and internal 
factors which are the accounting activities relating to the profit or loss of the firm. 
Skinner and Sloan (2002) find evidence that managers avoid reporting 
disappointing earnings because the stock price of their firm may be affected negatively. 
Management is rewarded if stock returns do not show disappointing earnings surprises. 
Conversely, management may lose if their firm has disappointing earnings compared with 
other firms. Managers avoid disappointments by inflating earnings through the 
manipulation of accruals.  
 
4.3.1 Momentum and contrarian strategies 
In this study, quintile research design uses a trading strategy to test for price momentum 
and earnings momentum, following Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), their approach is 
summarised as follows: 
a) Price momentum. This strategy is based on expectations of a short-run 
continuation in returns, buying past winners (long in stocks that 
increased in price in the previous period) and selling past losers (short in 
stocks that decreased in price in the previous period). 
b) Earnings momentum (also referred to as post-announcement drift). In 
this case, it is presumed that firms reporting unexpectedly high earnings 
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subsequently outperform those firms that report unexpectedly low 
earnings; a zero-investment portfolio is constructed that buys (holds 
long) the highest earnings surprise portfolio and sells (holds short) the 
lowest earnings surprise portfolio.  
The profitability of price momentum strategies is documented in an earlier study by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).  Later, all the anomalies were examined by the Fama and 
French (1996) in their three-factor model. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) show that their 
initial results are not due to data mining; it is typically the hardest to address because 
empirical research in non-experimental settings is limited by data availability as profits to 
momentum strategies. They show profits to momentum strategies of about 1% per month. 
Furthermore, Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) examine the relationship between earnings 
momentum and price momentum. They find that price momentum is captured by the 
systematic component of earnings momentum. Ball and Brown (1968) document the 
earnings momentum strategy (the pre-earnings announcement drift) for the first time and 
others, such as Foster et al. (1984), Bernard and Thomas (1989) and Foster et al. (1984), 
confirm the robustness of Ball and Brown’s (1968) findings. Chordia and Shivakumar show 
monthly returns to earnings momentum portfolios (in the US, 1990-1999). Since stock 
prices are likely to be driven by earnings, we test whether they articulate a strong rationale 
for the strategies as follows: 
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Table 4.1 Momentum strategies 
 
Price momentum Earnings momentum 
Buy “Winners” Positive earnings surprise 
Long Highest past returns 
Highest  unexpected change in 
earnings 
Sell “Losers” Negative earnings surprise 
Short Lowest past returns 
Lowest  unexpected change in 
earnings  
 
Price momentum is the strategy that buys past winners and sells past losers, earning 
abnormal returns for a period of up to one year after the performance of the strategy. 
Earnings momentum refers to the fact that firms reporting unexpectedly high earnings 
outperform firms reporting unexpectedly low earnings. The superior performance lasts for 
about nine months after the earnings announcement.  
Forbes et al (2012), the contrarian strategy can be described as: stocks in the lowest 
‘earnings to price’ or ‘book value to price’ decile are judged most overvalued and hence 
sold with the proceeds being used to buy stocks in the highest decile. They also describe 
this as: the most glamorous stocks (lowest decile of earnings to price, cash-flow to price, or 
market to book ratio in the last year) are sold each year in favour of the most valuable 
stocks (highest decile of earnings to price, cash-flow to price, or market to book ratio) in 
order to access the value-premium.    
Table 4.2 Contrarian strategies 
Sell “Winners” “Glamour” – overvalued 
 
Highest past returns 
Lowest  earnings: price, 
Lowest  book: market, etc. 
Buy “Losers” “Value” – undervalued 
 
Lowest past returns 
Highest  earnings: price, 
Highest  book: market, etc. 
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The seminal papers use simple univariate strategies based on sorting stocks by past returns 
(De Bondt and Thaler, 1985) and earnings to price or book to market (Lakonishik, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1994). “Glamour stocks” are overvalued because high PE (i.e. low EP) implies 
earnings are expensive 
Forbes et al (2012) describe price momentum as well as contrarian strategies. For 
returns-based tests, stocks that have lost value in the recent past (the decile of stocks 
containing the worst performers in the last year) are bought, their purchase being funded by 
the sale stocks that have gained value in the recent past (the decile of stocks continuing best 
pattern in the last period).  
Forbes, Kiselev and Skerratt (2012) give the following result for US S&P stocks, 
using simple price-based contrarian trading strategies (as suggested by De Bondt and 
Thaler, 1985:  buy losers over the last year, funding the strategy by selling prior winners 
over the same period). Figure 4.1 demonstrates that the return to this contrarian strategy is 
very volatile, yielding a small loss when averaged over the whole period. In other words, a 
price momentum strategy would yield a small profit overall but it is equally volatile. 
 
Figure 4.1 Contrarian profits to strategy based on past returns 
 (Source: Forbes, Kiselev and Skerratt, 2012) 
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Dissanaike and Lim (2010) refer to the two strategies as follows: the extreme decile 
of loser/value (winner/glamour), stocks is formed to portfolio one (ten). The contrarian 
portfolio is presented as the loser/value portfolio (one) minus the winner/glamour portfolio 
(ten). They investigate different contrarian strategies based on a variety of variables such as 
book-to-market, earnings-to price and past returns. The report on UK study where they sort 
into deciles based on past 3 years return. Their result shows that returns over years t+1 t+2, 
and t+3 are equal 0.0153,0 .0865 and0 .1220 respectively.  Also their return based on 
market-to-book value is 0.0865, 0.0618. 
A variety of variables have been used to form contrarian portfolios: book-to-market, 
earnings-to price and past returns, to more sophisticated measures based on the residual 
income model (RIM) or the Ohlson model
32
. Dissanaike  and  Lim (2010) investigate 
whether: (a) contrarian strategies based on RIM perform better or worse than those based 
on the Ohlson model; (b) contrarian strategies based on more sophisticated valuation 
models (e.g. Ohlson and RIM) perform much better than the relatively simpler ranking 
variables that have been used so extensively in the finance literature. Given that the RIM 
and Ohlson models require greater information inputs and technical know-how, and make 
different implicit assumptions on future abnormal earnings, it is important to ascertain if 
they offer significantly greater contrarian profits to outweigh the increased costs that they 
entail. Indeed, a surprising finding is that simple cash flow-to-price measures appear to do 
almost as well as the more sophisticated alternatives. One would have expected the 
                                                          
32 The Residual Income Method (RIM) is a model linking share price to book value, documented by earlier 
researchers such as Peasnell (1982), Ohlson (1995). The Ohlson model (OM) is established on the 
accounting-based residual income valuation model for equity valuation by Feltham and Ohlson (1995). 
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sophisticated models to significantly outperform the simple cash flow to price model for the 
reasons given by Penman (2007). 
 
4.3.2 Theoretical timeline 
An important issue for calculating portfolio returns over an investing period is that the 
returns should measure the wealth effects for an investor. Many studies have discussed 
multi-month holding-period portfolio returns based on decomposed monthly portfolio 
returns. Liu and Strong (2008) demonstrate a straightforward calculation of decomposed 
portfolio returns which preserve their buy-and-hold property, measuring the investor wealth 
effects. They construct this calculation of monthly portfolio returns from a multi-month 
holding period; this procedure naturally generalises to other intervals.
33
 They demonstrate 
that the monthly portfolio return in each holding-period month is a weighted average with 
the weight attached to each stock in the portfolio depending upon the stock’s performance 
over previous holding-period months. Liu and Strong (2008) show that rebalancing to equal 
weights is a common practice.
34
  
The research on stock returns shows that the cross-section of stock returns relative to 
past returns is predictable. Debondt and Thaler (1985) find that long-term past losers result from 
long-term past winners over the subsequent three to five years. Further research suggests that 
                                                          
33
Some studies reporting monthly portfolio returns are done by Lakonishok et al. (1994). They also use annual 
portfolio returns from a long-term investment horizon of five years to examine investment strategies. 
Wermers (1999) examines the relation between mutual fund herding and stock prices and reports herding-
classified portfolio returns on a quarterly basis. Some authors use daily returns of deciles portfolios from a 
holding period of one quarter to measure persistence in mutual fund performance ( Bollen and Busse, 2005). 
 
34
 They find 16 papers in the Journal of Finance over the 10-year period 1996–2005 that clearly use the 
rebalanced method, as well as seven papers in the Journal of Financial Economics and four in the Review of 
Financial Studies also using the rebalanced method over the five-year period 2001–2005. Furthermore, some 
earlier studies use the rebalanced method, such as Chan et al. (1991), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and 
Lakonishok et al. (1994). 
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part of these predictable price changes occurs during the 3 to 12 months after the holding period, 
and may not exist permanently. According to Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), a portfolio formed 
on the basis of the last six months returns can realise an average cumulative return of 9.5% over 
the following 12 months. However, they find that losses occur in the following 24 months with 
the amount equivalent to half of the returns gained in the first 12 months. 
Dargenidou et al. (2011) investigate how the firm’s disclosure activities affect the 
mix of earnings information reflected in its current returns. They focus on explaining 
current returns in terms of innovations about current performance and future earnings 
expectations. According to their model, this information is captured by the level of current 
and future earnings after controlling for the already anticipated level of earnings (in terms 
of prior and current earnings) and future unanticipated innovations (in terms of future 
returns). According to their research, stock returns of the i firm for year t are measured over 
the 12 month period, ending three months after the fiscal year end. 
 Recently published papers in the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Financial 
Economics and the Review of Financial Studies using the rebalanced method (Liu and 
Strong, 2008) are listed in Appendix A. 
In this study, the reference time is set at point zero, and the past period is defined as six 
months prior to the defined reference point (1-6). The future period is identified as six months 
after the reference point (7-12).                                                              
The stock returns are divided into two parts, winners and losers. If the stock returns over 
the one to six month period (1-6) are among the best, it signals a winner firm. In contrast, if the 
return momentum during the period is at the lower end, these stocks are labelled losers. 
Therefore, investors try to purchase the stocks of winner firms because they believe that these 
firms can make more earnings than loser firms over the one to six month period. On the other 
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hand, the stocks of the loser firms which have low returns are sold because of their earnings 
have fallen and are not expected to rise over the one to six month period. According to the return 
momentum that is related to price momentum, it is expected that winner firms try to keep their 
situation over the future period as winners; while the loser firms tend not to remain in their 
current situation over the same period. This issue has been documented by Chan et al. (1996). 
In the following sections, the role of managers in winner and loser firms will be 
discussed, and hypotheses will be provided based on these assumptions.   
 
4.3.3 Motivation of winners   
Past stock returns can provide motivation for the management of winner companies to engage 
in earnings manipulation to get desirable results. Further analysis in the following chapter 
shows that the chief executive managers of companies; with current increases in stock prices 
have an incentive to maintain this increment as long as possible. There are three 
components to this argument: 
The first component is associated with the business performance of firms; the 
second component discusses the earnings management relating to gain or loss 
functions appearing in the stock prices manipulated with surprise earnings; the third 
component relates to the compensation that managers achieve as an incentive factor. Each 
component will be discussed in detail below. 
According to the first component, by considering the underlying performance of 
competing firms in the product market, firms can go through periods of extreme growth in 
economic earnings, but this growth reverts to the mean growth over time. For the second 
component, if companies having good economic earnings are reported as winners, these 
companies can face earnings disappointments over the seven to twelve month period. 
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Therefore, when managers look at the gain or loss from earnings surprises in their stock 
returns, they may see them as costly (Skinner and Sloan, 2002).  
Skinner and Sloan show that growth stocks exhibit at least as many negative 
earnings surprises as positive earnings surprises. They also demonstrate that when earnings 
news is positive, returns are very high; thus, even when the news is good, the reaction of 
the market is stronger for growth stocks. As a result, managers are penalised if large 
numbers or moderate levels of earnings become the norm.  
There is a limited volume of accruals that managers can use to inflate earnings and 
create earnings surprises. Regarding the gain or loss function that is described above, 
winner firms have great motivation to report positive accruals to meet investors’ and 
analysts’ expectations since they do not want to disappoint the market with small amounts. 
Many winner firms can remain winners only over an intermediate term because they have 
a limited supply of accruals with which to manage earnings. 
The third motivation is the wealth and compensation of managers relative to stock 
prices. Documented findings demonstrate that managers have a motivation to hide low-level 
performance since their wealth compensation and reputation are affected by earnings (Weisbach, 
1998). The relations between stock performance and wealth or compensation have been 
demonstrated in the literature. One type of relation is that the value of a CEO’s options is 
related to the current market price. Most CEOs have options with various expiration dates. 
Therefore the longer the period over which the stock price is high, the more positive is the 
impact on the CEO’s wealth by taking benefit of such options. This is the main reason that 
managers have motivation to employ accruals to manage earnings over the specified period 
from seven to twelve months; they want to maintain the return pattern from the previous six 
month period (1-6).  
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Managers have motivation to maintain the return pattern as winners in order to increase 
their compensation amount at the end of the year. Therefore, they can achieve full bonuses by 
managing earnings well. As a result, they choose decreasing income accruals to keep the 
opportunity to increase future compensation above this level (Healy, 1985). 
As stated above, managers of winner firms have the motivation to continue their 
performance as winners. Therefore the first of two hypotheses maintained in this study is as 
follows: 
H1: Winner firms use discretionary accruals in the first semester to provide positive earnings 
surprises to remain as winners. 
This first hypothesis concerns positive accruals. As discussed above, managers have 
motivations to employ accruals to create positive earnings surprises, or at least not to face 
earnings disappointment, during the second semester. Therefore this study extends the 
present literature and implies that over the second semester, positive accruals for winner 
firms are expected, as well as positive earnings surprises for these firms. 
 
4.3.4 Motivation of losers 
Even though most of the research in earnings management concentrates on winner firms, some 
research focuses on the opposite side, which are loser firms. This is because losers face the 
same situation in terms of limited accruals and compensation motivations as winners. 
The relevant studies demonstrate that past stock returns cause management of loser firms to 
engage in earnings manipulation. Managers, who find decline in stock prices of their firms, 
have motivations to put the performance of their firms in the category of poor stock returns in the 
short or intermediate term rather than long-term. 
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Moreover, the motivations of loser firms to manipulate earnings come from a 
fundamental business performance. Generally, mean reversion in economic earnings implies 
that return momentum
 
losers experience a period of significant decline in economic 
earnings over one to six month period. Furthermore, disappointing past earnings over one 
to six month period would make the market’s expectations of earnings for the seven to twelve 
month period to be lower than they were over the one to six month period. 
If the earnings management is not obvious, loser firms could have an easier time 
generating earnings surprises than average firms. Therefore, at first glance it might be 
suggested that losers do not want to remain losers over the seven to twelve month period. 
However, this simple viewpoint may not be appropriate when considering compensation 
systems. As stated in the classification of winners, the management compensation cycle is 
an annual process. Based on the existing literature, this demonstrates that, for a firm whose 
share price has dropped due to bad earnings reports over the first six months of the year, 
there is little motivation for its managers to use discretionary accruals to create earnings 
surprises during the following six months.  
Earlier studies indicate that ‘good news’ is not recognised by the market and is not 
rewarded with positive returns in the first three quarters of the reporting year as much as it is 
rewarded in the fourth quarter, which is known as ‘the fourth quarter good news effect’ 
(Dempsey, 1994). Therefore, according to this research some managers of loser firms select to 
settle the continuing negative earnings surprise by gathering valuable discretionary accruals 
which can be utilised in future periods.  
It is well known that managers of winner firms have motivations to restrict the 
decline in stock prices, and the period over which the stock prices are declining, for the same 
reasons described above for loser firms. This concept leads to the conclusion that when 
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managers are motivated by bonuses, they look for ways to escape from disappointing 
earnings, or to escape from positive surprises, as much as possible. Hence, according to 
the literature, stock options prices get reset after periods of bad performance (Chance et al., 
2000).  
Most of the research that follows winner firms also considers loser firms, as losers 
face the same gain-loss function, limited accruals and compensation motivations as 
winners. This study argues that past stock returns affect the motivations of the management 
of loser firms to take part in earnings manipulation. This study shows that firms with a recent 
decline in stock returns have incentives to continue having poor stock returns relative to other 
stocks over an intermediate period. With regard to management’s incentives to manipulate 
earnings in loser firms, it is important to discuss what drives managers to manipulate 
earnings. Therefore, according to the above reasons, the second hypothesis maintained in 
this study is as follows: 
H2: Loser firms attempt to keep their earnings as a loser in the short term in order 
to be considered as winner over the longer term. 
. 
Some loser firms are distressed. Researchers suggest that managers of firms with persistent 
losses and dividend cuts can select income-decreasing accruals so that they can keep a 
better position to renegotiate contracts during financially distressed periods (DeAngelo et 
al., 1994). Bad economic earnings over the one to six month period are assumed to be in the 
loser firm’s classification ‘distressed’. Indeed, such losers would have the incentive to 
continue the decline in earnings over the intermediate term of seven to twelve months and 
save accruals for the period after any contracts are renegotiated. 
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According to the relevant documents in the literature review, the hypothesis 
regarding loser firms is: “Loser firms use negative discretionary accruals over the seven to 
twelve month period to create negative earnings surprises to remain losers over this period”. 
The above hypothesis suggests there will be lower earnings for loser firms on average over the 
seven to twelve month period compared with the one to six month period.  
 
4.3.5 Experimental test support implications 
Managers use accruals to manipulate earnings if the underlying economic earnings are not in 
a desirable trend. The opportunity to manipulate exists if managers have incentives and if 
investors do not fully incorporate the earnings manipulation into the stock price. 
Moreover, if fundamental business conditions affecting economic earnings growth 
are better than anticipated for winner firms over the one to six month period, then the earnings 
growth will be expected to be excessive which leads stock prices to go up. This seats winner 
firms among ‘return momentum winners’. On the other hand, disappointing growth that is 
potentially negative for a firm over the one to six month period leads to earnings falling in the 
next period. Loser firms among ‘return momentum losers’ continue over the seven to twelve 
month period to manipulate earnings towards accruals to maintain losers. In addition, the 
managers of winners experiencing mean reversion may manipulate earnings upward to 
create positive earnings surprises. In contrast, in loser firms experiencing mean reversion 
option compensation motivations may make management manipulate earnings downwards 
to continue their status as losers. Thus, they defer earnings gains to take their benefit in the next 
compensation cycle period.  
Two main empirical assumptions follow the hypotheses mentioned above. First, 
there is a relationship between returns and earnings, and it is expected that past returns 
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are positively correlated with future earnings management. This implication comes 
straightforwardly from the existing hypotheses that winner and loser firms attempt to keep the 
return pattern from the one to six month period in the seven to twelve month period using 
discretionary accruals. The other assumption is that returns over the seven to twelve month 
period are positively related to current discretionary accruals for return momentum firms. 
The expectation is that positive or negative earnings management is used to create positive or 
negative earnings surprises. These surprises guide positive and negative returns so that a 
positive correlation between earnings management and returns is expected. In general, accruals 
can drive returns where the motivations are considered to continue the returns through 
earnings management. 
In Chapters 5 and 6 empirical tests are performed to test these hypotheses. The tests 
focus on whether the data support the assumption that earnings for momentum firms provide 
the motivation to manage earnings in the seven to twelve month period. Earnings management is 
not reflected in earnings surprises and investors cannot use other measures like the return on 
asset (ROA) ratio to distinguish the use of earnings management. However, these variables 
are used as control variables in further analysis and empirical tests. 
In Chapters 6 and 7, some methods for testing the hypotheses will be used. The first 
method employs linear regression. To test the hypothesis, a regression is run between 
discretionary accruals and past returns and other independent variables. According to the main 
regression, if the returns are explained by earnings management, then it is expected that a 
positive relation will be found between accruals and earnings. 
The second method is presented in Chapter 7. Past returns are categorized and then 
analysed by looking at whether returns of winner or loser firms have higher or lower 
discretionary accruals over the seven to twelve month period. For testing the hypothesis, 
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dependent classification is used. First, tests are run on past returns to identify winners and 
losers, and then on consecutive discretionary accruals. Subsequently, it is seen whether there is a 
positive correlation between firms engaging in earnings management and their returns over the 
seven to twelve month period.  
As stated in the literature review, there is less supporting argument for the motivation 
for earnings management by losers than by winners. The results are expected to be less 
supportive for the loser hypothesis than for the winner hypothesis. This research does show 
linear relations between discretionary accruals and stock returns. 
The conservative view in accounting is that profits should be more persistent than 
losses, because financial statements do not recognise unverifiable increases in profits when 
they occur; rather they are recognised over future periods as and when the cash flows 
generating those increases are realised. For example, if an asset value increases because it is 
expected to throw off more future cash flows, then the profit will be recognised over the 
next several years. This implies that gains tend to be persistent. Otherwise, firms with 
positive earnings or earnings changes are likely to have recognised gains, and positive 
earnings and increasing earnings are also likely to be persistent. 
Companies with negative or decreasing earnings are more likely to have recognised 
losses. According to Watts (2003), these losses do not recur in future periods; negative 
earnings and earnings decreases are less likely to be persistent compared with positive 
earnings and earnings increases, because those negative earnings and earnings decreases are 
transitory. The amount that persistence or transience of earnings and earnings changes are 
considered provides a measure of conservatism. 
Skewness and variability are defined as two measures of conservatism of earnings 
distribution. Distribution of returns on assets, whether derived from a time-series of 
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individual firms or the cross-section of firm-years, is skewed negatively for most of the 
periods that have been examined by Givoly and Hayn (2000). They demonstrate that there 
is a significant increase in firms reporting losses on and a decline in the accounting rate of 
return on assets with increased skewness which indicates increased conservatism over time. 
 
4.4 Accrual estimation 
The treatment of gains and losses creates an asymmetry in accruals. Although losses tend to 
be fully recognised gains are not; periodic accruals tend to be negative, and cumulative 
accruals tend to be understated. This shows that negative periodic net accruals and negative 
cumulative accruals can be taken as measures of conservatism. 
Generally speaking, conservatism tends to show those losses that significantly 
capitalise on reductions in future cash flows can create larger accruals than gains. This 
conservatism reflects increasing cash flow during the period of its occurrence.  
Givoly and Hayn (2000A) find a significant increase in firms reporting losses 
accompanies a decline in the accounting rate of return. Their study shows that there is 
neither an increase in the incidence of negative cash flows, nor a decrease in the CFO-to-
assets ratio. These results strongly suggest that the decline in profitability found in the 
examined period is not a result of a change in the distribution of the underlying cash flows; 
it stems from a change in the relation between cash flows and earnings.  
Givoly and Hayn (2000) demonstrate that consistency in frequency of negative 
accruals across firms over a long period can be construed as conservatism. Their results 
show an almost continuous accumulative trend of negative accruals since the 1980s. They 
demonstrate that net income before depreciation is systematically and consistently below 
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cash flows from operations, and the pace of accumulation of accruals accelerates in the 
later periods, showing a change in the level of conservatism over time.  
 
4.5 Summary  
This chapter has presented an overview of the parameters affecting investors when earnings 
management takes place. It has also discussed the role of winner and loser firms in using 
accounting accruals in financial accounting, and the impact of this use on stock returns. It 
has been established that the motivations of winner and loser firms are tied to stock returns. 
Winner firms try to find solutions to keep their position as winners and, in contrast, loser 
firms try to keep their position as losers with the intention of changing their weak position 
to a strong position at a more suitable time. 
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Chapter5 
Data definitions and sample characteristics 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter reviewed the expected relation between discretionary accruals and 
stock returns, where hypothesising that their association is conditioned by a variety of other 
factors, and that the relation varies for winner and loser firms. This chapter describes the 
collection of research data required to test these hypotheses, and describes the methods 
used in preparing the data for the empirical study reported in this thesis. This discussion 
covers the criteria employed in initial sample selection and the processes involved in the 
construction of the final sample, highlighting the issues that have to be resolved when using 
commercial data sets in this respect, i.e. Thomson One Banker and Worldscope. As the 
reliability of all empirical research in accounting is ultimately achieved through the quality 
of the accounting data on which it is based, this aspect of the research study is described in 
detail below.   
 
5.2 Data sources  
The data set used for sample selection combines both interim and year-end accounting 
results, thus providing a time series of first-half and second-half data for each year for UK 
listed firm. The interim accounting data available through Thomson on Banker includes up 
to 100 financial statement items, from the balance sheet, the income statement and the cash 
flow statement. Note that, in the Thomson database, interim financial statement data may 
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be available not only semi-annually, but also may be given quarterly, depending on each 
individual company’s reporting pattern, usually in response to additional listing 
requirements. Note also that, in Thomson, there are two effective options to download such 
data, either quarterly or annually. Hence, even for semi-annual interim data, the quarterly 
download function must be used. For UK companies, which are only required to report 
semi-annually, the first semester (interim) results are indicated in Thomson as ‘second 
quarter’ and the second semester (fiscal year-end) as ‘fourth quarter’.  
 For UK firms, interim accounting data were required from 2001 onwards, and are 
generally available from 2004 through Thomson, who use the Worldscope source.
35
 The 
market data used in the study are also obtained through Thomson, in this case from the 
Datastream source.
36
 All variables used in this study are listed below, in two separate tables. 
Table 5.1 presents the descriptions of the accounting variables collected from Worldscope, 
and Table 5.2 the price and dividend variables from Datastream.  
 
  
                                                          
35
 The Worldscope Global Database is used in the financial industry for detailed financial statement data and 
profile data on public companies domiciled outside of the United States of America. Using primary source 
documents, Worldscope data analysts extract the data to global templates. The Worldscope database can be 
accessed through Thomson. 
36
 Datastream is an extensive, historical time series database which provides financial and economic data, 
including equity market data. The Datastream database can be accessed through Thomson. 
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Table 5.1 Data definitions - Worldscope 
 
 
Variable Name 
 
Explanation Worldscope Code 
 
Total Receivables 
(AR) 
 
Represents the amounts due to the company resulting 
from the sale of goods and services on credit to customers 
which should reasonably be expected to be collected 
within a year or within the normal operating cycle of a 
business. 
 
 
02051 
Cash and Short term 
Investments  
(CI) 
 
Represents the sum of cash and cash equivalents. 
 
02001 
 
Total Current Assets 
(CA) 
 
Represents total receivables, cash and equivalents, 
inventories, prepayments and other current assets.  
 
02201 
Short Term Debt and 
Current Portion of 
Long Term Debt  
(SD) 
 
Represents that portion of debt payable within one year 
including current portion of long term debt and sinking 
fund requirements of preferred stock or debentures. 
 
03051 
Total Current 
Liabilities  
(CL) 
Represents debt and other obligations that the company 
expects to satisfy within one year, i.e. short term debt, 
accounts payable, accrued payroll, income taxes payable 
and other current liabilities. 
 
03101 
Total Assets  
(TA) 
 
Represents the sum of total current assets, long-term 
receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, 
other investments, net property, plant and equipment and 
other assets. 
 
2999 
 
Shareholders’  Equity  
(BVE)  
 
Represents the book value of ordinary shareholders' 
capital investment in a company plus accumulated 
reserves. 
 
3501 
 
Year-end market 
Capitalisation  
(MVE) 
Represents the market value of equity, i.e. Market Price 
at Year End × Number of Shares Outstanding 
 
8001 
   
Sales 
 (SA)  
 
Represents gross sales and other operating revenue less 
discounts, returns and allowances. 
 
01001 
 
Operating Income        
(OI)     
 
Earnings Per Share 
(EPS) 
Represents the difference between sales and total 
operating expenses. 
 
Income before extraordinary items + Preferred dividends, 
divided by the number of shares in issue. 
1250 
 
 
05202 
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5.2.1 The Worldscope conventions on labelling reporting periods  
Some firms have a fiscal year that ends on a date other than 31
st 
December. For these firms, 
Worldscope assigns the annual financial data to the calendar year in which the company’s 
fiscal year ends; for example, fiscal years ending on 28
th
 February 2009, 20
th
 November 
2009 and 31
st
 December 2009 are all treated as ‘2009’ data in Worldscope. Another 
convention is that the fiscal year is determined with respect to a cut-off date of 15
th
 January 
date for non-US firms. Accordingly, data for a fiscal year ending on or before 15
th
 January 
are treated as the previous year's information, i.e. company data for a fiscal year ending 15
th
 
January 2009 are given as 2008, while data for a fiscal year ending 16
th
 January 2009 are 
given as 2009.
37
  
Given these conventions, care has to be taken when downloading all accounting 
data, both annual and interim, in order to ensure that the complete series is downloaded, 
especially when there is a change of reporting period. Furthermore, with regard to interim 
accounts, it is sometimes the case that second semester data is not recorded by Thomson in 
the interim accounting dataset, and must be collected by reference to the fiscal year-end 
accounts available in the annual accounts section of the database. In other words, second 
                                                          
37 For US firms this story is different. The fiscal year cut-off date for allocating these companies to a calendar 
year is on 10
th
 February.  
 
Table 5.2  Data definitions - Datastream 
 
Name  Explanation Datastream 
Code 
   
Closing Price 
(P)  
The last price at which an issue is traded 
for a specified day. 
 
UP#S 
Dividend Amount 
(D) 
The dividend amount paid for the past 
year. 
DI 
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semester figures are not made available as interim report downloads through Thomson, 
then the data must be obtained as a fiscal year-end download. Even if the second semester 
accounts are included as interim data, care has to be taken to verify that they are consistent 
with the fiscal year-end accounts, e.g. that first-half and second-half sales add up to annual 
sales, and that balance sheet figures are reported identically both in the second set of six-
monthly accounts and in the annual accounts. Finally, it should also be noted that the 
default labelling used by Thomson is based on quarterly reporting conventions, and 
therefore defines UK interim accounts issued after the first six months as if at the end of 
‘quarter 2’, and the second half year’s accounts as if at the end of ‘quarter 4’. 
Table 5.3 below illustrates these issues with downloaded interim and annual balance 
sheets (in summarised form) for the Burberry group (BRBY).  
Table 5.3  
 Interim and annual balance sheet data: an illustration (Burberry Group) 
    
 Interim Accounts Final Accounts 
 30 September 2008 31 March 2009 31 March 2009 
    
The quarterly  convention used 
by Thomson One Banker 
2009-2 2009-4 2009 
The semi-annual convention 
used in this thesis 
2009-1 2009-2 2009 
(Pounds in millions)  
 
   
Current Assets  709.8 742.4 742.4 
Total Assets 1079.4 1068.0 1068.0 
    
Current Liabilities 531.2 546.8 546.8 
Total Liabilities  530.1 524.1 524.1 
    
Shareholders’ Equity 547.2 539.3 539.3 
Total Liabilities & Equity 1079.4 1068.0 1068.0 
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The table shows the last annual balance sheet of this company used in this study, 
which has a year-end date of 31
st
 March 2009. Accordingly, it can be seen how the first-
half results to 30
th
 September 2008 may be described as 2009-1 and the second-half results 
to 31
st
 March 2009 as 2009-2. Although Thomson describes them on a quarterly basis (as 
2009-2 and 2009-4 respectively), the convention used throughout this study of UK half-
yearly reporting is to use the suffixes -1 and -2 strictly to refer to the first and second halves 
of the reporting year.  
 
5.2.2 Reconciling year-end data in Worldscope with interim data  
Table 5.4 extends the Burberry illustration for the full period 2004-2009, and shows 
reported figures at the end of each six monthly accounting period and at the end of each full 
year. For total assets, it is again demonstrated that, as in Table 5.3 above, the second-half 
reporting figure is identical to the amount reported in the annual accounts. With regard to 
income statement and cash flow statement figures, the sum of the first semester and the 
second semester figures should be equal to the amount reported for the year as a whole. 
Table 5.4 shows this to be correct, with the sales amounts taken from the interim income 
statements reconciling to the annual figure, and similarly with respect to the net cash flow 
taken from the cash flow statements. For instance, at 31
st
 March 2009, second-half sales are 
662.4, which, together with the first-half sales to 30
th
 September 2008 of 539.1, sum to the 
annual reported sales of 1021.5.  
As will be discussed below, an important part of the data validation process for this 
study is to ensure that these seemingly obvious relationships hold, as it is found that there 
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exist unexplained differences within commercial databases that render the data for some 
companies unusable. 
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Whilst a large number of companies have a fiscal year which coincides with the calendar year, many other companies have a fiscal year-end date on a 
date other than 31
st
 December. Normally, the year to which Worldscope assigns financial data is the calendar year in which the company’s fiscal year 
ends, so fiscal years ending 28
th
 March 2009 or 31
st
 December 2009 are both treated as ‘2009’ on Worldscope. This convention has been followed in 
assigning the interim periods in the first column. Hence, the year ended 31 March 2009 is considered as ‘2009’, and thus the interim accounts ended 
30 September 2008 and 31 March 2009 are labelled as 2009-1 and 2009-2 respectively.
 
Table 5.4  
 
Reconciling interim and year-end data of the Burberry Group  
(Pounds in millions)  
 
  
Period Interim Report Date Year-end Report Date Total Assets Sales    Operating Cash Flow 
   Interim Year-end Interim Year-end Interim Year-end 
2004-1 30/09/2003  593.1  321.3  25.4  
2004-2 31/03/2004 31/03/2004 613.6 613.6 354.5 675.8 138.3 138.3 
2005-1 30/09/2004  665.3  347.5  19.4  
2005-2 31/03/2005 31/03/2005 663.8 663.8 368.0 715.5 130.7 130.7 
2006-1 30/09/2005  648.2  354.9  9.3  
2006-2 31/03/2006 31/03/2006 655.5 655.5 388.0 742.9 106.4 106.4 
2007-1 30/09/2006  692.8  392.0  13.6  
2007-2 31/03/2007 31/03/2007 725.1 725.1 458.3 850.3 113.8 113.8 
2008-1 30/09/2007  780.1  449.1  -15.4  
2008-2 31/03/2008 31/03/2008 923.7 923.7 546.3 995.4 45.4 45.4 
2009-1 30/09/2008  1079.0  539.1  34.9  
2009-2 31/03/2009 31/03/2009 1068.0 1068.0 662.4 1201.5 209.8 209.8 
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5.3 Data procedures   
A key aspect of the analysis undertaken here is to form hedge portfolios in each period 
based on estimates using accounting data. Therefore, given the repeated rearrangement of 
portfolios over the study period, it is important that the data series for each firm is 
complete, with the downloaded data covering each period when interim reporting took 
place and also providing an accounting observation in each period for all variables of 
interest. In some cases, the fiscal year may be more or less than 12 months, mainly because 
of a change of reporting date, and care has been taken in downloading accounting data that 
all such periods are included in the initial retrieved data set in order to ensure completeness. 
Nevertheless, even in periods when interim reporting is known to have taken place, there 
are many instances where line items (even key line items, such as current assets, or sales) 
are not given in the downloaded data (i.e. the cell is blank). Instead of simply deleting firms 
for which the data series is incomplete, steps were taken to attempt to recover missing 
information, for instance (i) by summing components (e.g. by deducting long term assets 
from total assets to recreate the current assets figure, and validating this as part of the 
balance sheet identity where total assets equals equity plus liabilities), or (ii) by tracing 
missing second semester balance sheet amounts directly to the annual accounts download 
rather than the interim accounts download, or (iii) by reconstruction if the annual figure and 
the figure for only one semester is given. These procedures are discussed in greater detail 
below. 
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5.3.1 The validity of interim data 
Sometimes it can found that some elements of total assets are contained in the database but 
the figure for total assets is missing. As already indicated above, in the case of the second 
semester, the figure reported as Total assets in the annual accounts may be used. For data 
missing from the first semester, there is usually no other option but to exclude it. In all 
cases, however, a simple check can be carried out to verify that the following accounting 
identities hold 
Total assets = Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity                      (5.1) 
and 
Total assets = Total liabilities + Shareholders’ equity                       (5.2) 
Where no value appears for total assets in the database, it is worth noting that the figure 
may be reconstructed by adding total liabilities to shareholders’ equity if these latter 
amounts are reported. In addition, a similar check may be carried out to verify whether the 
sum of the various asset accounts agrees with the figure reported as total assets, i.e.  
Total assets = Current assets + Total investments + Total property plant and 
equipment net + Other assets                                          (5.3) 
Again, it may be possible to reconstruct a missing total assets figure by inference from the 
above accounting identity. Similar checks have been carried out for other variables, 
recovering missing values where these can be supported by the appropriate accounting 
identity, i.e. 
Current assets = Cash and investments + Total receivables + Total inventories + 
Prepaid expenses and taxes + Other current assets                   (5.4) 
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Current liabilities = Accounts payable + Income tax payable + Accrued payroll + 
Dividends payable + Other current liabilities    (5.5) 
Total liabilities = Total current liabilities + Long term debt + Deferred taxes + Other 
liabilities = Total liabilities and Shareholders’ equity – Shareholders’ equity 
= Total assets – Shareholders’ equity                   (5.6) 
Finally, when the market capitalisation is not given in the database, the following 
calculation is used to recover the missing value  
Market capitalisation = Closing price × Number of shares outstanding         (5.7) 
 
 For the key aggregates in the variable listings above in Table 5.1 and 5.2, the initial 
results of data enhancement are given in Table 5.5, showing the numbers of observations 
recovered either by backfilling the missing values, or by using other approaches. That is, (i) 
where a failed accounting identity could not be backfilled from other line items, as these 
were not all present, in such cases the firm‘s financial statement summaries were reviewed 
directly on Thomson pages, or a copy of the relevant annual report was consulted; and (ii) 
for sales information, if still missing at this stage, the amount for the interim period was 
estimated as: Interim sales = Yearly sales × (Number of days in the interim period ÷ 
Number of days in the annual period). When Market capitalisation for the interim period is 
missing and items of Closing price and Common share outstanding are available, then 
calculated Market capitalisation is replaced as follows: interim Market capitalisation = 
Closing price × Common share outstanding. 
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The initial sample is limited to financial statement data for full reporting periods 
ending in 2004 through until those ending in 2009 (i.e. from the first-half interim period 
2004-1 to the second-half interim period 2009-2). As mentioned above, the reason for this 
selection period is that interim information is not widely available on the database before 
2004. Whilst the initial download covered all UK active and inactive nonfinancial 
companies, i.e. 2,939 firms for up to 12 interim reporting periods, any firm-half-year with 
missing observations on all of the accounting variables used in the study was excluded. 
This resulted in 17,390 firm-half-year observations, as shown in Table 5.5. The variable 
with the minimum number of observations is short term debt (SD) with 14,324 firm-half-
years, and the variable with the maximum number of observations is sales (SA) with 17,292 
firm-half-years. 
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Table 5.5 
Enhancing downloaded data using backfilled accounting identities and other procedures 
 
 
Downloaded data 
Backfilled Other Corrections 
Enhanced data 
Total 
Variable Name 
Downloaded 
as values 
Downloaded 
as N/A 
Useable 
values 
Missing 
values 
Cash and Short term Investments  15770 1620 62 0 0 15832 1558 17390 
Total Receivables 15692 1698 66 0 0 15758 1632 17390 
Total Current Assets 15774 1616 140 0 0 15914 1476 17390 
Total Current Liabilities 15818 1572 26 0 2 15846 1544 17390 
Short Term Debt and Current LTDebt 14294 3096 30 0 0 14324 3066 17390 
Total Assets  15870 1520 58 0 13 15941 1449 17390 
Shareholders’  Equity  15870 1520 28 0 0 15898 1492 17390 
Year-end Market Capitalisation  13892 3498 1250 915 0 16057 1333 17390 
Sales 14500 2890 0 1393 6 17292 98 17390 
Operating Income           15790 1600 0 0 2 15792 1598 17390 
EPS 15979 1411 0 0 0 15979 1411 17390 
Return 14478 2912 0 0 0 14478 2912 17390 
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As a second step, the data set was further reviewed in order to ensure completeness across 
the key variables required for estimation. That is, when the following criteria are satisfied, 
the firm-half-year is then removed from the data set even if other data items are not 
missing: 
 
1a)      Total Current assets (CA) is missing, and all of the components of Current 
assets are missing, and hence CA cannot be recovered  
-1,474 
1b)      The sum of the components of Current assets is not equal to total  Current 
assets, and more than one component of Current assets is missing, and 
hence CA still cannot be recovered  
-112 
2a)      Total Current liabilities (CL) is missing, and all of the components of 
Current liabilities are missing, and hence CL cannot be recovered 
-31 
2b)      The sum of the components of Current liabilities is not equal to total  
Current liabilities, and more than one component of Current liabilities is 
missing, and hence CL still cannot be recovered  
-1,994 
3)        Interim Sales (SA) is missing and cannot be estimated by apportioning 
yearly Sales 
-83 
4)        Year-end Market Capitalisation (MVE) is missing  and cannot be backfilled 
or estimated 
-341 
5)        Book value of Shareholders equity (BVE) is missing -25 
6)        Operating income after tax (OI) is missing  -138 
7)        Earnings per share (EPS) is missing -10 
8)        Return (R) is missing  -1,017 
  
Total number of firm-half-years excluded  -5,225 
 
After deducting the missing items listed above, the data set comprises 12,165 firm-half-year 
observations (i.e. 17,390 – 5,225). 
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5.3.2 Sample structure and the implications of using commercial sources  
The final screening concerns the length of each accounting period, given by 
Worldscope#05351, which represents either the number of days in the annual reporting 
period under full reporting, or gives the same information for any sub-period (eg quarter, 
half-year) under interim reporting. In this study, the length of all interim periods is first 
verified against the duration between reporting dates. It is also checked that the length of 
semester 1 plus the length of semester 2 is equal to the fiscal year length. All data where the 
length for both semesters sums to between 363 and 367 days are included in the sample. As 
a result, a further 879 firm-half-years are removed because the total number of days in the 
first and second semesters [S1(days)+S2(days)] is not  between 363 and 367. Thus, after 
excluding all nonstandard reporting periods, there remain 11,286 firm-half-years with a 
complete set of observations (i.e. 12,165 – 879). In the final steps, firms are excluded which 
do not have data available for both semesters 1 and 2 in any one reporting year, following 
which the sample is reduced to 9,490, and the remaining firms are then checked to ensure 
that there is a complete series of interim reports, from the first available half-year results to 
the year-end in which the last interim reporting takes place, following which the total 
number of firm-half-years is reduced to 8,172 observations.  
The distribution of these complete available series from start period to end period is 
given in Table 5.6 below. This table shows the number of firms that have data for both (the 
first and second semesters) and also have complete series data. Therefore, 1,318 firm 
interim period observations are excluded from the sample.  
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Table 5.6   
Number of interim accounting periods sampled, by start and end of series 
         
 START       
END 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
2004 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
2005 24 6 0 0 0 0 30 
2006 12 24 26 0 0 0 62 
2007 136 66 100 116 0 0 418 
2008 230 168 180 180 98 0 856 
2009 2,292 1,260 1,104 1,122 840 186 6,804 
Total 2,696 1,524 1,410 1,418 938 186 8,172 
        
Note. For the research period 2009-2010, the year specified in the top row is the first year of 
interim reporting, and the year specified in the left-hand column is the last year of interim 
reporting. For example, 2 companies start interim reporting and also finish in 2004, and 6,583 
companies start in 2004 and finish in 2009.  
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Finally, after using initial observations in the lagging operation, the number of useable 
firm-half-years comprising the estimation sample comprises 6,917 firm-half-years (see 
Table 5.7). 
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Table 5.7  
Sample selection of UK companies 
              
Interim period:  2004-1 2004-2 2005-1 2005-2 2006-1 2006-2 2007-1 2007-2 2008-1 2008-2 2009-1 2009-2 Total 
              Firm-half-years with no missing values   322 756 500 920 700 1,097 1,006 1,241 1,192 1,242 1,149 1,161 11,286 
Data available for both semesters 1 and 2 319 319 497 497 692 692 988 988 1,153 1,153 1,096 1,096 9,490 
Complete series (full sample) 240 240 406 406 603 603 872 872 1,020 1,020 945 945 8,172 
Data after lag operations (estimation sample) 
 
240 239 406 397 603 582 872 761 1,020 852 945 6,917 
 
Note. UK semi-annual observations between Jan 2004 and Dec 2009 are presented in the above table. First, financial firms have been taken out of the sample. 
Second, all missing values associated with the estimation sample result in exclusions. Third, after scaling the lagged data, truncation is performed in order to take the 
extreme values out of the estimation sample. 
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In the Thomson One Banker database, the main industry classifications are GISC, 
ICB and GIC, with industry classification generally being based on the dominant 
contribution to net sales or revenues. The General Industry Classification (GIC) provides 
the greatest coverage, i.e. 4,051 firms. The Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) 
covers 2,404 firms, and the Global Industry Classification Standard (GISC) covers the 
lowest number of firms, 1,472.  In the present study, the General Industry Classification 
(GIC) has been used for sector identification since it gives the required information on the 
largest number of firms, although the sector classifications are relatively basic, i.e. 
Industrial (01), Utility (02), Transportation (03), Banks (04), Insurance (05) and Other 
Financial (06). Financial firms (04-06) are excluded as their revenues and balance sheets 
are not comparable with those of other firms. Furthermore, the interest of the present study 
is in working capital accruals, and the accrual generating process is known to be 
considerably different in financial firms (Peasnell et al., 2000). 
In every semester from January 2004 to December 2009, all firms are included in 
regression analyses based on the following variables: the natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity (SIZE), the book-to-market value (BM), the previous six months’ returns 1-6 
(LSR), the future  growth in sales from months 1 to 6  of the current period (sales growth), the 
current discretionary current accruals (DACC) from months 7 to12, and  standard unexpected 
earnings (SUE) from months 7 to12. Total assets are lagged by 6 months compared to current 
accruals, and the change in sales is measured at six-monthly intervals. 
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5.4 Definition of variables 
This section describes the definition of data used to test the hypotheses presented in the 
previous chapter. As shown in the literature review, both earnings management and 
discretionary accruals have been studied extensively.  
 
5.4.1 Discretionary and non-discretionary accruals  
Kothari et al. (2005) find evidence to compare the effectiveness of performance matching, 
versus a regression-based approach; they estimate the performance-matched
38
 modified-
Jones model of discretionary accruals. They add return on assets (ROA) into the models as 
an additional discretionary accrual measure. For managerial control purposes, accruals are 
categorised into current and non-current. In addition, the researchers divide accruals into 
two sections: total and working capital accruals (current accruals). They estimate 
discretionary accruals in the following way: total accruals are the change in non-cash 
current assets minus the change in current liabilities; they exclude the current portion of 
long-term debt (minus depreciation and amortization) and scale the whole by lagged total 
assets. Working capital accruals (current accruals) are calculated by taking the sum of 
differences in inventory, accounts receivable and other current assets, less the sum of 
changes in accounts payable, income taxes payable and other current liabilities. In general, 
                                                          
38 Kothari et al (2005) provide properties of discretionary accruals adjusted for a performance-matched firm’s 
discretionary accrual, where matching is on the basis of a firm’s return on assets and industry member ship. 
Their reasons to use ROA as the matching variable as opposed to other candidates (e.g., size, earnings growth, 
earnings yield, market-to-book, etc.). They provide a performance-matched discretionary accruals model and 
show that the performance-matched model performs better than the modified Jones model. They match each 
firm year observation and year with the closest return on assets in the current year, ROA (net income divided 
by total assets). The existing literature on the accrual-based anomaly is based on the performance-matched 
model. 
  
109 
 
working capital accruals are considered more susceptible to management manipulation than 
total accruals (Kreutzfeldt and Wallace, 1986). 
According to the study of Teoh et al. (1998), current accruals include short-term 
assets and liabilities supporting daily operations. Also, they divide total accruals into 
discretionary and non-discretionary based on sales growth and property, plants and 
equipment. Accruals generally result from sales growth, hence sales is defined as a 
component of earnings. They also provide evidence that for firms with abnormal 
discretionary current accruals, the abnormal portion is the difference between the change in 
non-cash current assets and the change in operating current liabilities. Their results indicate 
that discretionary current accruals have a stronger and more persistent influence on future 
returns. Therefore, consistent with earnings management, they explore the idea that high 
discretionary current accruals can predict post-issue long-run earnings and stock return 
underperformance. 
Earlier research builds on working capital accruals rather than total accruals because 
working capital accruals are based on the connection between changes in working capital of 
balance sheet accounts, and accrued expenses and revenues on the income statement ((see 
Dechow (1994) and Kerstein and Rai (2007)). Dechow (1994) found working capital 
accruals especially important in helping the market resolve problems inherent in cash flows 
from operations. 
Hribar and Collins (2002) show that the frequency and magnitude of errors 
introduced when using balance sheet-based accruals estimates can be substantial. Their 
findings have implications for studies designed to detect earnings management, the 
estimation of discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals, and the mispricing of these 
  
110 
 
accruals components. Among the definitions of current accruals, following the modified 
Jones model (1991) and the methodology developed by Teoh et al. (1998b) and documented by 
Wie and Xie (2008), current accruals for a firm i in month t (CA
i
t)  are calculated as follows 
39
: 
     
                       
        
                                                               
Where: 
      
 
: Current accruals; 
   
 
: Total Current assets (WS#06615);  
     : Cash and Short term investments (WS#02001);  
   
 
: Total Current liabilities (WS#03101);  
    
 
: Short term debt and Current portion of long term debt (WS#03051);  
      : Total assets (WS#02999) from the last period; 
  : the six-monthly change in a variable. 
According to this model, normal or non-discretionary accruals are functions of 
designated factors or drivers. The components of accruals not explained by these drivers are 
defined as discretionary (abnormal). As mentioned in section 5.4.1, total accruals are 
modelled as a function of the change in sales or revenue and gross property, plant and 
equipment by Jones (1991). 
                                                          
39
 Early research expresses concern about measuring accruals as change in balance sheet accounts introduced 
by measurement error into total accruals, primarily as a result of mergers, acquisitions and discontinued 
operations (Collins and Hribar, 1999). Collins and Hribar demonstrate that in the Jones (1991) model, the 
error in total accruals measured through the balance sheet approach is unlikely to be correlated with the 
assumed drivers of accruals, resulting in the measurement error being captured entirely by the residual or 
discretionary accruals estimate.  
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This study focuses on discretionary current accruals. The idea behind this is that 
long-term accruals such as depreciation are unlikely to be an effective means of managing 
earnings because of their visibility, and the ability of the market to observe and unwind the 
earnings implications of any attempt to manipulate them (Young, 1999; Gore et al., 2002).  
According to the accruals literature, to obtain cross-sectional and time-series 
comparisons between firms, all variables are deflated by the lag of total assets.  
Following Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), accruals are related to sales 
changes. In this thesis, discretionary current accruals are used for measuring earnings 
management. For calculating the discretionary current accruals for firm i in the six-month t 
the following formula can be used (see Teoh et al., 1998a)
40
: 
       
 
        
   
         
      
                                                          
Where: 
                  : total current accrual for firm i and six month t; 
      : change in Sales (WS#01001) for the six-month period; 
      : accounts receivable (WS#02051) 
      : total asset from the previous six months. 
Thus, discretionary total current accruals are computed as follows: 
         ; 
               
 
        
   
         
      
                                             
                                                          
40
 Teoh et al. (1998a) subtract the increase in trade receivables from change in sales in calculating 
discretionary accruals to allow for possibility of credit sales manipulation by the issuer. As an example, they 
show by allowing generous credit policies to obtain high sales prior to the offering. 
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       discretionary total current accruals =                                           
If discretionary accruals are deducted from current accruals, the result will be non-
discretionary accruals as follows: 
                    =     -     =      -                                                              
 In this study, any observation that cannot provide sufficient information to be used 
in the calculation of the mentioned variables is excluded.  
The specification of the discretionary accrual model assumes critical importance in 
making unbiased inferences. Earlier researchers (Dechow et al., 1995) show that Jones-
models reject the null hypothesis of no earnings management in firms with extreme 
financial performance. For these reasons, Kothari et al. (2005) perform a simulation to 
show that performance matching of return on assets helps to improve the level of reliability 
of earnings management tests. Nevertheless, returns on assets and growth are highly 
correlated with discretionary accruals; this fact is documented by McNichols (2000) who 
provides evidence suggesting the matching of return on assets may not be adequate. In the 
modified Jones model quarterly data includes changes in quarterly sales as an explanatory 
variable. Therefore, McNichols’ study measures sales growth rate as the growth in sales 
from the interim period. To adjust the effect of sales growth, this measure can be added to 
the modified Jones model Equation
41
. The theory behind this model suggests that there is a 
                                                          
41
 The discretionary accruals can be estimated using the Modified Jones Model suggested by Dechow et al. 
(1995) as an improvement in the original Jones model (Jones 1991). In this model, discretionary accruals are 
the residuals of the following model:              
 
        
    
              
      
    
     
        
     
where     is the total accruals of firm i in year t,        is the change in revenues of firm i between years t 
and t-1,        is the change in receivables of firm i between years t and t-1,       is the level of property, 
plant, and equipment of firm i in year t and       is the total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1. The 
regression terms are deflated by       to adjust the size effects. It is assumed that       is non-stochastic. 
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linear link between sales growth and quarterly accruals. Subsequently, there may be 
interaction effects between returns on assets and sales growth. So, Kothari et al. (2005) 
examine the underlying nonlinear relationship between discretionary accruals and return on 
assets. Their findings show that the matched firm approach works better than the linear 
regression approach
42
. Related research by Gong et al. (2008b) uses five portfolios by 
classifying observations into quintiles based on their returns on assets. The portfolios are 
formed in the same quarter in the previous year as recorded by the performance 
discretionary accrual. Then they calculate the difference of the discretionary accruals for 
the sample firm and the median discretionary accrual of the matched portfolio. The current 
study reports a parallel method to assess the measures with interim period data.  
Previous studies explaining the relationship between discretionary accruals and 
stock returns use the static power of discretionary accruals to achieve a more exact 
measurement of earnings management (Dechow et al., 1995). Recent studies show sales and 
earnings demonstrate the performance of each firm. According to Kotari et al. (2005), past 
returns on assets (   ) is an independent variable in the cross-sectional regression to 
estimate discretionary accruals. Thus, in this study, the ROA-adjusted discretionary is 
included as current accruals as follows: 
         
 
        
   
         
      
                                                            
                                                                                                                                                    
 
42 Kothari et al. (2005) match firms on ROA in period t or t-1 to obtain performance-matched Jones model 
discretionary accruals. They add the lagged year’s ROA to the Jones Model (Modified-Jones model) as an 
additional explanatory variable.  
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Equation (5.16) can be adjusted for the seasonality effect, i.e. the change in realised 
sales for semester (t) since last semester (t-1) and the change in realised sales for semester 
(t) since same semester last year (t-2). In this case, the equation for accruals estimation is 
defined as follows
43
:   
                     
 
        
   
                       
      
   
                       
      
   
   
      
                               
Given Equation 5.11 both current nonfinancial assets and liabilities for semesters 1 
and 2 (interim periods) are calculated and presented in Table 5.8, for BBA Aviation PLC. 
Increases and decreases in Current Non-financial assets (NACCt) represent the current 
accruals before deflation for the periods from 2004-1 to 2004-2. After deflation current 
accruals (0.037), is the sum of non-discretionary current accruals and discretionary current 
accruals. When non-discretionary current accruals from the result of regression 5.16 
(0.065), are deducted from deflated current accruals then the result is discretionary current 
accruals (-0.027). 
Table 5.9 displays the estimation of discretionary current accruals from the interim 
report BBA Aviation PLC. Table 5.9 contains actual data, and an estimation of certain 
variable. The estimated variables are: (1/TAt-1), is inverse lag of total assets; (ΔSAt - 
ΔARt)/TAt-1 is changing in sales and account receivable deflated by lag total assets; (ROAt-1) 
is return on assets. The difference between the real value and the estimated value creates the 
                                                          
43
 Note that, for the yearly model, t is interpreted as the financial year, not the half yearly period. 
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numbers presented in the prediction column. For instance, the prediction for the regression 
variable STA is calculated as follows;  
0.035= -0.045× -0.775 
Non-discretionary current accrual (NDACCt) in Table 5.9 is (0.0645). This figure results 
from the prediction of the following items: inverse lag of total assets, change in sales and 
accounts receivable, return on assets and intercept
44
. The result of Table 5.8 is confirmed 
by the result of Table 5.9 for nondiscretionary current accruals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44
 All related items to calculate current accruals are deflated by lag of total assets 
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Table 5.8 
   Computing discretionary current accruals: an illustration (BBA Aviation PLC) 
 
(Pounds in millions) Variables Data Increase/decrease 
Current non-financial assets, t-1 CAt-1- CSIt-1 461.100 (+) 
Current non-financial liabilities, t-1 CLt-1- STDt-1 306.200 (+) 
Current non-financial assets, t CAt- CSIt 561.000 (+) 
Current non-financial liabilities, t CLt- STDt 344.400 (+) 
Net current non-financial assets, t-1 NCNFAt-1 154.900 (+) 
Net current non-financial assets, t NCNFAt 216.600 (+) 
Change in current non-financial assets NACCt 61.700 (+) 
Deflator: Total assets TAt-1 1,665.400 
 Deflated current accrual ACCt 0.037 (+) 
Predicted, i.e.  nondiscretionary, current accrual NDACCt 0.065 (-) 
Discretionary current accrual* DACCt -0.027 (+) 
 
 
Note, If the accrued revenues and deferred expenses are more than accrued expenses and deferred revenues, then 
income will increase. In other words, if accrued expenses and deferred revenues are more than accrued revenues, 
then deferred expenses income will decrease. 
 
* NDACCt is the nondiscretionary accrual that is a predicted variable and resulting from equation 5.16. 
 
Increases and decreases in current non-financial assets and liabilities are calculated for the periods from 2004-1 
to 2004-2 
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Table 5.9 
     The estimation of the discretionary accruals equation: (BBA Aviation PLC) 
 
    (Pounds in millions) Variables Reg. Variable      Actual data Estimation  Predicted 
Total asset, t-1 TAt-1 
 
            1,665.400  
  Inverse lag of total assets 1/TAt-1 FTA 0.0000000006005 2985.124 0.0000017925670 
Sales, t SAt                 699.900  
  Sales, t-1 SAt-1                 675.100  
  Changing in sales ΔSAt  
 
                 24.800  
  Current accounts receivables, t ARt 
 
               341.700  
  Current accounts receivables, t-1 ARt-1 
 
               242.200  
  Change in accounts receivable ΔARt 
 
                 99.500  
  Change in sales and accounts receivable ΔSAt - ΔARt 
 
                 74.700  
  Total assets, t-1 TAt-1 
 
            1,665.400  
  Chang in sales and accounts receivable; deflated  (ΔSAt - ΔARt)/TAt-1 STA -0.045 -0.775 0.0347459689444 
Operating income OI 
 
                 49.100  
  Total assets (lag) TAt-1 
 
            1,665.400  
  Return on assets ROAt-1 ROA 0.0000000294824 0.119 0.0034993611865 
Intercept Intercept INT 1.000 0.026 0.0262529000000 
Nondiscretionary accruals Prediction: NDACCt 
   
0.0645000226979 
 
* NDACCt is predicted nondiscretionary accruals and it results from equation 5.16. The table above, illustrates deflated current accruals are divided into 
discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals and NDACCt is predicted and confirmed by result of the regression in Table 5.10.  
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5.4.2 The systematic character of accruals in interim reporting 
In order to investigate in detail how the information in Worldscope relates to the source of 
the dataset, i.e. the accounts published by each company, a case study of the Burberry 
group PLC  is given. The regularity in accruals is so evident that it raises questions: 
(a) whether or not the source data is compiled for interim and final accounts on the same 
basis (they would differ systematically if a component of current assets or current liabilities 
is allocated as long term in the interim accounts but not in the final accounts, e.g. a future 
payment on a liability may be due in more than one year at the interim date but in less than 
one year at the accounting year end date); 
(b) whether or not accruals and deferrals are made in full in the interim and final accounts 
e.g. they would differ systematically if the tax charge for the year is only calculated on the 
final profit and not on the interim profit.  
The Worldscope variables used in computing the change in net current assets for Burberry 
PLC are in Table 5.10. Figure 5.1 shows the time series of (non-financial) current assets CA 
and current liabilities CL are characterised by their upward trend (the firm has doubled in 
size in five years), and there is also some seasonality in current assets whereby an increase 
at the interim date is followed in most years by a decrease at the year-end. 
 
  
119 
 
Figure 5.1 Time series of non-financial current assets and current liabilities  
 
 
Table 5.10 
Current assets and liabilities for Burberry group PLC 
 
Period FYD TCA CSI CA TCL STD CL 
2004-1 30/09/2003 295.5 73.6 221.9 149.6 0.1 149.5 
2004-2 31/03/2004 350.0 158.7 191.3 161.2 0.8 160.4 
2005-1 30/09/2004 391.4 143.5 247.9 181.1 0.5 180.6 
2005-2 31/03/2005 387.7 169.9 217.8 207.8 0.0 207.8 
2006-1 30/09/2005 348.9 87.6 261.3 178.0 0.0 178.0 
2006-2 31/03/2006 348.9 116.5 232.4 255.8 101.2 154.6 
2007-1 30/09/2006 390.2 108.0 282.2 314.9 157.4 157.5 
2007-2 31/03/2007 423.7 136.7 287.0 330.4 134.2 196.2 
2008-1 30/09/2007 481.9 102.3 379.6 376.0 187.2 188.8 
2008-2 31/03/2008 588.4 138.6 449.8 436.2 191.8 244.4 
2009-1 30/09/2008 709.8 172.1 537.7 531.2 272.7 258.5 
2009-2 31/03/2009 742.4 275.5 466.9 546.8 244.7 302.1 
2004-1 is the interim report and 2004-2 is the final report and so on. TCA is total current 
assets, CSI is cash short term investments, CA is current accrual (nonfinancial), TCL is 
total current liabilities, STD is short term debt, and CL is current liabilities (non-
financial). FYD is the Fiscal year-end of company.  
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The short term net accrual represents the accrued revenues and deferred costs less the 
accrued costs and deferred revenues that are expected to flow into earnings. This is 
equivalent to the change in net current non-financial assets, and is deflated by the opening 
total assets for the period to give the accrual variable ACC used in our analysis (see figure 
5.2). This calculation can be seen in Table 5.11 as follows:  
 
Table 5.11 
Computing the accrual variable for Burberry  
Period FYD ΔCA ΔCL Δ(CA-CL) TAt-1 ACC 
2004-2 31/03/2004 -30.6 10.9 -41.5 593.1 -0.06997 
2005-1 30/09/2004 56.6 20.2 36.4 613.6 0.05932 
2005-2 31/03/2005 -30.1 27.2 -57.3 665.3 -0.08613 
2006-1 30/09/2005 43.5 -29.8 73.3 663.8 0.11042 
2006-2 31/03/2006 -28.9 -23.4 -5.5 648.2 -0.00849 
2007-1 30/09/2006 49.8 2.9 46.9 655.5 0.07155 
2007-2 31/03/2007 4.8 38.7 -33.9 692.8 -0.04893 
2008-1 30/09/2007 92.6 -7.4 100.0 725.1 0.13791 
2008-2 31/03/2008 70.2 55.6 14.6 780.1 0.01872 
2009-1 30/09/2008 87.9 14.1 73.8 923.7 0.07990 
2009-2 31/03/2009 -70.8 43.6 -114.4 1079.4 -0.10598 
2004-1  is the interim report and 2004-2 is the final report and so on. FYD is the Fiscal 
year-end of company. ΔCA is the changes in current assets, ΔCL is the changes in current 
liabilities, Δ(CA-CL) is differences between changes in current assets and current 
liabilities, TAt-1  is pervious total assets,   ACC is current accrual (nonfinancial). 
 
 
  
121 
 
 
Figure 5.2 demonstrates that the time series pattern of working capital increases (which 
would push profits up at the interim date) and working capital decreases (which would pull 
profits back down at the year-end) is now reflected throughout in current assets (interim 
increases), and is also evident in the last two years in current liabilities (interim decreases). 
The effect on ACC (the deflated accrual variable) is similarly striking (see Figure 5.3). The 
forecast accrual, using the modified predictor based on current changes in realised sales 
after controlling for return on assets, captures the time series pattern. An interesting aspect 
Figure 5.2 Changes in non-financial current assets and current liabilities for Burberry 
group PLC. 
Figure 5.3 Deflated accrual and linear prediction for Burberry group PLC 
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of this analysis, in the case of Burberry, is that the pattern of reversals continues throughout 
the period 2004-2009, including the financial crisis in the last two years. To investigate the 
behaviours of both discretionary and non-discretionary current accruals, five more 
examples of firm’s accruals information are presented in Table 5.12. The firms are as 
follows;
45
  
1. Rolls-Royce Group PLC,  
2. BAE Systems PLC,  
3. Castings PLC,  
4. National Grid PLC and  
5. Rentokil Initial PLC.  
Table 5.12 shows the main information about the variables as follows: variable 
NFCA is the net financial current assets and calculated by differences between total current 
assets (WS#06615) and cash and short term investments (WS#02001).  
Net financial current liabilities (NFCL) is calculated by taking the difference between 
total current liabilities (WS#03101) and short term debt and the current portion of long term 
debt (WS#03051). The variable ∆NFCA is the change in non-financial current asset and 
∆NFCL is the change in non-financial current liabilities. The increase (decrease) in net 
current non-financial assets shows current accruals before deflation. ACC is deflated 
current accruals used as current accruals in this study. The predicted amount of 
nondiscretionary current accruals that comes from the OLS regression is labelled NDACC. 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the data for these selected companies; the data being change in 
non-financial assets, and liabilities and nondiscretionary accruals during the interim periods 
                                                          
45
 All firms are randomly selected from the UK listed companies with total assets higher average for interim 
period 2004-2 to 2009-2. 
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starting from 2004-2 ending to 2009-2. Also for each firm three graphs are presented; the 
first graph shows non-financial assets and liabilities, the second graph displays net financial 
assets and liabilities and current accruals before any deflation; and, finally, the third graph 
presents the behaviour of deflated current accruals and nondiscretionary accruals. 
As mentioned before, NFCA illustrates the net financial current assets and that 
comes from differences between total current assets and cash and short-term investments. 
NFCA and NFCL of all companies increase during the selected period; specially Rolls-
Royce Group PLC and Castings PLC. In the second graph, changes in NFCA and NFCL 
and net current accruals are presented. Rolls-Royce Group PLC and BAE Systems PLC 
have a same pattern of ∆NFCA and NACC (net current accrual before deflation). In the 
third graph, deflated current accruals and non-discretionary accruals (predicted accrual) are 
shown. Interestingly, in all companies, the predicted accrual has similar pattern with current 
accrual. The unexplained part of current accruals is discretionary accruals used by 
managers in earnings management. 
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Table 5.12 
Accruals information for 5 companies during interim periods 2004-2 to 2009-2 (Pounds in millions) 
Variable Entity name 2004-2 2005-1 2005-2 2006-1 2006-2 2007-1 2007-2 2008-1 2008-2 2009-1 2009-2 
NFCA 
Rolls-Royce Group PLC 2438 3875 2713 3576 3091 4223 3975 5553 5179 6409 5064 
BAE Systems PLC 2669 3166 2382 2744 2651 3344 3702 4603 4771 4612 4668 
Castings PLC 18.224 18.102 22.24 22.127 25.725 23.311 28.102 25.779 29.642 30.597 21.255 
National Grid PLC 1679 1721 1646 1416 2052 1375 1344 2357 2724 2945 3234 
Rentokil Initial PLC 496.1 604.2 504.3 482.4 529.5 648.3 514.8 547.4 578.8 509.8 484.8 
NFCL 
Rolls-Royce Group PLC -2570 -2927 -3232 -3288 -3664 -3764 -4720 -5167 -8550 -6401 -6173 
BAE Systems PLC -6565 -6712 -7746 -7511 -7608 -7833 -9255 -8950 -10617 -9799 -11540 
Castings PLC -14.855 -12.032 -17.096 -13.029 -16.871 -14.223 -17.095 -15.717 -20.405 -18.448 -12.918 
National Grid PLC -2807 -2392 -2892 -1958 -2841 -2542 -2329 -2614 -3240 -3641 -3773 
Rentokil Initial PLC -763.1 -683.9 -681 -654.4 -683.7 -694.4 -653.5 -665.2 -739.2 -668.5 -715.8 
ΔNFCA 
Rolls-Royce Group PLC -1022 1437 -1162 863 -485 1132 -248 1578 -374 1230 -1345 
BAE Systems PLC -687 497 -784 362 -93 693 358 901 168 -159 56 
Castings PLC 2.604 -0.122 4.138 -0.113 3.598 -2.414 4.791 -2.323 3.863 0.955 -9.342 
National Grid PLC -240 42 -75 -230 636 -677 -31 1013 367 221 289 
Rentokil Initial PLC 26 108.1 -99.9 -21.9 47.1 118.8 -133.5 32.6 31.4 -69 -25 
ΔNFCL 
Rolls-Royce Group PLC -95 -357 -305 -56 -376 -100 -956 -447 -3383 2149 228 
BAE Systems PLC -961 -147 -1034 235 -97 -225 -1422 305 -1667 818 -1741 
Castings PLC -4.438 2.823 -5.064 4.067 -3.842 2.648 -2.872 1.378 -4.688 1.957 5.53 
National Grid PLC -408 415 -500 934 -883 299 213 -285 -626 -401 -132 
Rentokil Initial PLC -80.2 79.2 2.9 26.6 -29.3 -10.7 40.9 -11.7 -74 70.7 -47.3 
NACC 
Rolls-Royce Group PLC -1117 1080 -1467 807 -861 1032 -1204 1131 -3757 3379 -1117 
BAE Systems PLC -1648 350 -1818 597 -190 468 -1064 1206 -1499 659 -1685 
Castings PLC -1.834 2.701 -0.926 3.954 -0.244 0.234 1.919 -0.945 -0.825 2.912 -3.812 
National Grid PLC -648 457 -575 704 -247 -378 182 728 -259 -180 157 
Rentokil Initial PLC -54.2 187.3 -97 4.7 17.8 108.1 -92.6 20.9 -42.6 1.7 -72.3 
ACC 
Rolls-Royce Group PLC -0.146 0.141 -0.165 0.091 -0.091 0.101 -0.117 0.099 -0.309 0.232 -0.075 
BAE Systems PLC -0.114 0.023 -0.099 0.032 -0.01 0.027 -0.058 0.061 -0.076 0.027 -0.075 
Castings PLC -0.026 0.036 -0.012 0.049 -0.003 0.003 0.022 -0.011 -0.009 0.029 -0.04 
National Grid PLC -0.027 0.02 -0.023 0.028 -0.01 -0.015 0.007 0.026 -0.007 -0.005 0.004 
Rentokil Initial PLC -0.032 0.106 -0.059 0.003 0.013 0.061 -0.049 0.011 -0.02 0.001 -0.036 
NDACC 
Rolls-Royce Group PLC -0.031 0.031 -0.025 0.017 -0.016 0.018 -0.014 0.017 -0.018 0.015 -0.012 
BAE Systems PLC -0.018 0.013 -0.020 0.009 -0.007 0.011 -0.013 0.016 -0.018 0.004 -0.012 
Castings PLC 0.000 0.006 -0.002 0.011 0.001 0.008 -0.006 0.008 0.000 0.007 0.013 
National Grid PLC -0.002 0.010 -0.005 0.009 -0.005 0.010 -0.001 0.009 -0.009 0.007 -0.012 
Rentokil Initial PLC 0.008 0.019 -0.004 0.017 0.002 0.009 -0.004 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.000 
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Figure 5.4  The main components of accruals and their linear prediction for five selected companies   
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Figure 5.4  (Cont.) 
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5.4.3 How information in Worldscope relates to the ultimate source of dataset: case 
studies 
This section investigates in detail whether the information in Worldscope agrees with the 
source data of the dataset. The accounting data for Rolls-Royce Group PLC is used as a 
case study. Table 5.13 shows that Worldscope reclassifies the accounting items into the 
overall account in the balance sheet. For example some accounts such as taxation 
recoverable, other financial assets and assets held for sale that are illustrated as current 
assets in the company balance sheet source data, are shown in other current assets in 
Worldscope. In contrast, prepaid expenses income tax is presented as a separate item in 
Worldscope.   
For fiscal interim periods 30-June-04, 31-Dec-2004, 30-June 2005, 31-Dec-2005 
and 31-Dec-2006, income tax payable for Rolls-Royce Group PLC is as follows: 191, 176, 
209, 171 and 191 in the balance sheet (company source). However, in Worldscope these 
numbers are not reported; they are shifted to the other current assets account. Also, current 
tax liabilities for fiscal interim periods: 30-June-2008, 31-Dec-2008 and 30-June 2009 are 
70, 0 and 80 in the company source, but in the Worldcope dataset that are different. Short-
term debt (financial current liabilities) is sporadically reported in both Worldscope and data 
source. Therefore, to obtain non-financial liabilities in this study we deduct short-term debt 
from total current liabilities.  
Table 5.14 shows the income statement items from the company source and the 
Worldscope database. This table shows that in the Worldscope database some items are 
rebalanced and reclassified into other accounts. For example in 30-June-2004 the amount of 
2,460 is classified as cost of sales and other operating cost. However, this amount is 
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classified in Worldscope in other operating accounts. One of the items that has a large 
effect on non-financial liabilities is income tax payable. In some cases (see 30-June-2008), 
Rolls-Royce Group PLC did not show income tax in the interim period and it shifted an 
amount of 320 to the end of the fiscal year on 31-Dec-2008. In another case, this company 
shows 47 (21+26) as taxation for the interim period ending 30-June-2005. However, the 
amount of taxation for the year-end fiscal period is 130 (61+69). If this amount is reduced 
by the interim period taxation (130-47=83) the balance is the taxation for the second 
interim period.  
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Table 5.13            
Comparing the section on current assets and liabilities from the source dataset with the data in Worldscope: 
 Rolls-Royce Group PLC (Pounds in millions) 
 
     
 
 £m 30-June-
04 
31-Dec-
04 
30-June-
05 
31-Dec-
05 
30-Jun-
06 
31-Dec-
06 
30- June-
07 
31-Dec-
07 
30- June-
08 
31-Dec-
08 
30-Jun-
09 
S
o
u
rc
e
 
Current Assets              
Cash and cash equivalents 1,434 1,452 1,767  1,757  1,837 2,185 1,811 1,897 1,631 2,172 1,929 
Short-term investments 37 36 41  37  36 34 35 40 - - - 
Trade and other receivables 2,045 2,049 1,923  2,047  2,128 2,465 2,535 2,585 3,190 2,727 2,009 
Inventory 1,051 1,090 1,163  1,309  1,423 1,447 2,081 2,203 1,316 1,501 2,153 
Taxation recoverable 7 2 3  3  3 5 3 7 - - - 
Other financial assets - - 786  464  717 644 603 514 - - - 
Assets held for sale  - - - - 22 - - 7 - - - 
Current Assets - Total 4,574 4,629 5,683  5,617  6,166 6,780 7,068 7,253 6,137 6,400 6,091 
               
W
o
rl
d
sc
o
p
e
 
Current Assets            
Cash and St investments 1471 1488 1808 2258 2590 2863 2449 2451 2343 2862 3493 
Total receivables 2419 1224 2712 1234 2131 1412 2538 1616 3076 2400 3811 
Total inventories 1041 1081 1163 1309 1423 1447 1685 2203 2453 2600 2589 
Prepaid expense in-tax - - - - - - - - - - - 
Other current assets - 133 - 170 22 232 - 156 24 179 9 
Current Assets - Total 4931 3926 5683 4971 6166 5954 6672 6426 7896 8041 9902 
             
S
o
u
rc
e
 
Current liabilities              
Trade and other payables -2,285 -2,395 -2,275 -2,689 -2,878 -3,290 -3,826 -4,326 -2,626 -2,748 -3,209 
Borrowings -154 -207 -461 -75 -388 -400 -38 -34 - - - 
Other - - -283 -234 -72 -37 -30 -85 - - - 
Current tax liabilities -191 -176 -209 -171 -186 -191 -189 -188 -70 - -80 
Bank overdrafts and loans - - - - - - - - -1,486 -1,970 -2,243 
Provisions -215 -173 -160 -138 -152 -146 -115 -121 -72 -72 -72 
Current Liabilities - Total -2,845 -2,951 -3,388 -3,307 -3,676 -4,064 -4,198 -4,754 -4,254 -4,790 -5,604 
             
W
o
rl
d
sc
o
p
e
 
Current liabilities            
Accounts payable - - - - 2878 - 3430 778 4647 1042 - 
St debt & Current portltdeb 151 204 461 75 388 400 38 34 13 23 6 
Income taxes payable - - - - 186 - 189 188 198 184 153 
Accrued payroll - - - - - - - - - - - 
Dividendspayable - - - - - - - - - - - 
Other current liabilities 2475 2570 2927 3232 224 3664 145 3754 322 7324 6248 
Current Liabilities - Total 2626 2774 3388 3307 3676 4064 3802 4754 5180 8573 6407 
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Table 5.14 Comparing the income statement items in the source dataset and Worldscope; Rolls-Royce Group PLC 
(Pounds in millions) 
fm Income statement  30-June-04 31-Dec-04  30-June-05 31-Dec-05 30-Jun-06 31-Dec-06  30- June-07 31-Dec-07  30- June-08 31-Dec-08 30-Jun-09 
C
o
m
p
an
y
 s
o
u
rc
e 
Revenue 2750 5947 3184 6603 3390 7156 3591 7435 6008 12217 7017 
Cost of sales and other operating cost -2460 -5270 -2691 -5488 -2900 -6198 -2943 -6003 -2500 -4864 -3047 
Other operating income - - - - 38 57 40 50 57 103 37 
Commercial and administrative costs - - - - 
  
-318 -653 -3492 -7762 -3678 
Research and development costs -138 -288 -117 -282 -177 -370 -195 -381 
 
- - 
Share of profit of joint ventures 12 19 26 46 10 47 26 66 -50 - - 
Provision for associate provision for loan - - - - - - - - - -430 - 
Finance cost - - - - - - - - -49 -70 -45 
Group operating profit 164 408 402 879 361 692 201 514 - - - 
Profit/(loss) on sales of businesses 11 9 -1 -2 - 1 -1 -2 - - - 
Profit on ordinary activities before f.c 175 417 401 877 361 693 322 200 -26 -806 284 
Financial income 19 58 271 472 753 1196 416 718 - - - 
Financial expenses -45 -111 -507 -872 -244 -498 -239 -497 - - - 
Net financing cost -26 -53 -236 -400 509 698 177 221 - - - 
Profit on ordinary activitis before tax 149 364 165 477 870 1391 377 733 - - - 
Taxation -41 -100 
    
-74 -133 - 320 -80 
Taxation – UK - - -21 -61 -196 -299 - - - - - 
Taxation – Overseas - - -26 -69 -57 -98 - - - - - 
Profit/(loss) from conttinuing operations  - - - - - - - - -26 -486 204 
Discountinued operations - - - - - - - - - 22 - 
Profit for the period 108 264 118 347 617 994 303 600 -26 -464 204 
W
o
rl
d
sc
o
p
e 
Income Statement 
   
 
      
 
Net Sales or Revenues 2746 5939 3184 6603 3390 7156 3591 7435 4049 9082 5645 
Cost of Goods Sold - 4527 2609 4681 2791 5296 3149 5770 3083 7022 4379 
Selling, General & Admin Expenses - 880 - 895 - 1051 - 1034 543 1043 856 
Depreciation, Depletion & Amort. 123 252 126 243 109 231 112 233 148 310 269 
Other Operating Expenses 2514 0 117 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Operating Income 109 280 332 784 313 578 135 398 275 707 141 
Extraordinary Credit – Pre tax - - - 0 0 740 0 251 135 0 0 
Extraordinary Charge – Pre tax - 33 - 11 23 0 24 0 60 2484 71 
Interest Expense On Debt 24 106 50 104 169 100 50 89 36 69 92 
Pretax Equity In Earnings - - - - 10 - 26 - - - - 
Other Income/Expense - Net 30 80 -143 -303 739 44 290 24 42 -179 148 
Pretax Income 115 279 139 431 870 1344 377 667 356 -1966 152 
Income Taxes 44 92 47 130 253 397 74 133 97 -547 54 
Minority Interest 0 1 -1 -3 -2 -4 -3 -6 -2 -5 0 
Equity In Earnings 14 18 26 46 - 47 - 66 33 74 18 
Income Before Extra. Items & Disc - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 0 
Discontinued Operations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Net Income Before Extra Items/PrefDiv 85 204 119 350 619 998 306 606 294 -1340 116 
Extra Items & Gain(Loss) Sale of Assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Net Income Before Preferred Dividends 85 204 119 350 619 998 306 606 294 -1340 116 
Preferred Dividend Require 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Net Income to Common Share.h 85 204 119 350 619 998 306 606 294 -1340 116 
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The second case study is tabulated in Table 5.15. The table shows the current assets and 
liabilities for Vodafone Group PLC. In contrast with the first case study (Rolls-Royce 
Group PLC), the data for Vodafone Group PLC from the company’s source is almost the 
same as the data in Worldscope. Downloaded current assets from Worldscope show that 
part of receivables and taxation recoverable are shifted to the other current assets account. 
However, the main body of current assets from the source dataset has the same pattern 
reported in the balance sheet in Worldscope. 
In the current liabilities section, some current liabilities such as third parties, related 
parties and provision for other liabilities are reported separately in the source data but these 
items are shifted into other current assets in Worldscope. Interestingly, there are some 
differences reported in income tax payable for Vodafone Group PLC that are similar to the 
case of Rolls-Royce Group PLC. According to the company source, current taxation 
liabilities are reported for all interim periods. For example, the amount of current tax 
liabilities on 31-Mar-2005, 30-Sep-2005, 31-Mar-2006 and 31- Mar-2007 are as follows; 
4353, 4639, 4448 and 5088. However, these numbers are not reported in Worldscope; they 
are shifted to other current liabilities. This happens for dividends payable as well. Similarly, 
as in the first case study, the short-term debt account is completely reported in Worldscope. 
Therefore, if the analyst uses details of current liabilities to calculate current accruals for 
both interim accounts and final year accounts, accurate amount of current accruals will not 
be calculated because most of these items are hidden in other current assets. For this reason 
we use total current liabilities and short term debt to compute non-financial current 
liabilities.  
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 Table 5.15 
     
    Comparing components  of current assets and liabilities: Vodafone Group PLC (Pounds in million)s) 
    
  
31-Mar-05 30-Sep-05 31-Mar-06 30-Sep-06 31-Mar-07 30-Sep-07 31-Mar-08 30-Sep-08 31-Mar-09 
C
o
m
p
an
y
 s
o
u
rc
e 
Current assets   
       Inventory 440 536 297 356 288 405 417 471 412 
Taxation recoverable 38 68 8 2 21 27 57 37 77 
Trade and other receivables 5449 6068 4438 4963 5023 5739 6551 6687 7662 
Cash and cash equivalent 3769 1400 2789 789 7481 2901 1699 1134 4878 
Current Assets - Total 9696 8072 7532 6110 12813 9072 8724 8329 13029 
           
W
o
rl
d
sc
o
p
e
 
Current Assets 
         Cash and st investments 3666 1400 2789 789 7481 2901 1699 1134 4878 
Total receivables 3472 6136 2960 4965 3185 5766 4182 6724 4871 
Total inventories 430 536 297 356 288 405 417 471 412 
Prepaid expense income taxes - - - - - - - - - 
Other current assets 2130 - 1486 - 1859 - 2426 - 2868 
Current Assets - Total 9698 8072 7532 6110 12813 9072 8724 8329 13029 
 
          
C
o
m
p
an
y
 s
o
u
rc
e 
Current liabilities 
       Short-term borrowing - - - - - - 4532 5783 9624 
Third parties 2003 2026 3070 3539 3975 4652 - - - 
Related parties - - 378 575 842 1021 - - - 
Current taxation liabilities 4353 4639 4448 4911 5088 4997 5123 5363 4552 
Provisions for other liabilities 8002 8212 7477 7768 8774 9867 11962 12096 13398 
Trade and other payables 228 183 139 167 267 253 356 313 373 
 
 14586 15060 15512 16960 18946 20790 21973 23555 27947 
           
W
o
rl
d
sc
o
p
e
 
Current liabilities - - - - - - - - - 
Accounts payable - - - 7768 - 9867 2963 - 3160 
St debt & Current portltdebt 392 2026 3448 4114 4817 5673 4532 5783 9624 
Income taxes payable - - - 4911 - 4997 5123 5363 4552 
Accrued payroll - - - - - - - - - 
Dividends payable - - - - - - - - - 
Other current liabilities 14445 13034 12064 167 14129 253 9355 12409 10611 
Current Liabilities - Total 14837 15060 15512 16960 18946 20790 21973 23555 27947 
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Table 5.16 Comparing the income statement items: Vodafone Group PLC (Pounds in millions) 
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
 s
o
u
rc
e
 
Income statement (£m) 31-Mar-05 30-Sep-05 31-Mar-06 30-Sep-06 31-Mar-07 30-Sep-07 30-Sep-08 30-Sep-09 
Revenue 34073 14548 29350 15594 31104 16994 19902 21761 
Cost of sales -21464 -8399 -17070 -9022 -18725 -10212 -12414 -14115 
Gross profit 12609 6149 12280 6572 12379 6782 7488 7646 
Selling and distribution expenses -2046 -940 -1876 -1038 -2136 -1152 -1349 -1479 
Administrative expenses -3526 -1595 -3416 -1800 -3437 -1850 -2160 -2578 
Share of result in associated undertakings 1980 1187 2428 1413 2728 1443 1792 2322 
Impairment losses - - -23515 -8100 -11600 - -1700 - 
Other income and expenses -475 -515 15 1 502 -15 - 157 
Operating profit 8542 4286 -14084 -2952 -1564 5208 4071 6068 
Non-operating income and expenses 6 - -2 10 4 250 -14 -7 
Investment income 581 165 353 425 789 382 501 634 
Financing costs -1178 -540 -1120 -813 -1612 -1280 -1244 -948 
Profit before taxation 7951 3911 -14853 -3330 -2383 4560 3314 5747 
Tax profit -1433 -1282 -2380 -1218 -2423 -1233 -1145 -952 
Profit for the period 6518 2818 -21821 -4548 -4806 3327 2169 4795 
W
o
rl
d
sc
o
p
e
 
Income Statement (£m) 
        Net Sales or Revenues 33463 18641 30090 15563 30276 16796 21464 21874 
Cost of Goods Sold 15503 11652 12678 6521 13251 7370 9895 10342 
Selling, General & Admin Expenses 5333 - 5425 2832 5425 2967 3784 4078 
Depreciation, Depletion & Amortization 17518 2932 4823 2483 4975 2723 3493 3846 
Other Operating Expenses 0 171 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Operating Income -4891 3886 7164 3727 6625 3736 4291 3608 
Extraordinary Credit - Pretax - - 403 0 235 0 0 0 
Extraordinary Charge - Pretax 311 - 24491 8084 11547 0 1833 0 
Interest Expense On Debt 975 643 618 811 920 1265 1342 953 
Pretax Equity In Earnings 968 1212 - 1410 - - - - 
Other Income/Expense - Net 10 -260 -282 -975 153 610 525 788 
Pretax Income -4610 4195 -17667 -4734 -4931 3081 1641 3443 
Income Taxes 2192 1317 2440 1216 2358 1219 1235 957 
Minority Interest 590 44 147 63 166 37 31 -25 
Equity In Earnings - - 2489 1410 2655 1426 1933 2334 
Income Before Extraordinary Items & Discont'd Ops 0 - 0 - 0 - - - 
Discontinued Operations 0 0 -4704 - - 0 0 0 
Net Income Before Extra Items/Preferred Div -7392 2834 -22468 -4602 -4801 3252 2308 4845 
Extr Items & Gain(Loss) Sale of Assets 0 0 0 -493 -481 0 0 0 
Net Income Before Preferred Dividends -7392 2834 -22468 -5095 -5282 3252 2308 4845 
Preferred Dividend Require 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Net Income to Common Shareholders -7392 2834 -22468 -4602 -4801 3252 2308 4845 
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Table 5.16 shows reported items in the income statement from the company source and the 
downloaded income statement from Worldscope. There are differences between classifying 
items in the two sources. The item of interest in this study is the effect on current liabilities 
of the income tax of the company. Hence, 31-Mar every year is the fiscal year end date of 
this company; there are differences between the profit tax from the company’s source 
(1,433 on 31-Mar-2005) and the income tax (2,192) from downloaded data are the same 
period. However, for year 2006 and 2007 the amount of income tax for the interim period 
and the final year is similar from both sources.  
 
5.4.4 Stock returns 
Most of the researches in the United States use return data from the CRSP
46
 database. 
Datastream is the main data source for studies carried out by UK academics, and some 
researchers use the return index as return data. There is some research in the UK that uses 
the Return index (DS#RI) item from Datastream to calculate stock returns. Acker and Duck 
(2007) calculate the log of monthly returns, as                 ], where       is the return 
index from Datastream at the close of reference day J (J = 1, 2, …, 28) in month t, and 
        is considered as the return index on the same reference day to close the following 
six months. Few researchers in the UK use return data from the London Share Price 
                                                          
46
  The Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), located in the centre of the Chicago financial district, is 
an integral part of the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business. Chicago Booth is famous for 
cutting-edge financial and economic research. CRSP files provide a strong foundation for economic 
forecasting, stock market research and financial analyses to academic institutions, investment banks, 
brokerage firms, corporations, banks and government agencies. 80 per cent of academic research in stock 
market and investment analysis uses CRSP data as a source due to the completeness and accuracy of the 
information.  
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Database (LSPD)
47
. For example, the working paper by Gregory et al. (2009) provides an 
analysis of momentum portfolios for the UK market. They use the return data from LSPD. 
With regard to this database, monthly return is computed as follows: 
        
            
      
                                                                                                         
Where: 
     : log- return in the month; 
    : last traded price in month; 
                : dividend going ex-dividend during month t (included only when x days 
falls in the date range of traded prices) the dividend is adjusted to a month-
end basis;  
                 : last traded price in month t-1 adjusted to the same basis. 
Some researchers use monthly returns to examine earnings or price momentum (Chordia 
and Shivakumar, 2006). They argue that; “The predictive power of past returns is subsumed 
by a zero investment portfolio that is long on stocks with high earnings surprises and short 
on stocks with low earnings surprises”. Their portfolio is classified based on past six-
month returns.  
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that momentum payoffs are significantly 
positive as long as one year after the formation date. Six months are for buy and hold and 
six months for reflection on the returns. Stocks are classified according to the past six 
months’ compound return. In addition, the sample is classified into “high” and “low” 
because the firms are illustrated for discretionary accruals and return information. The six-
                                                          
47
  The London Share Price Database(LSPD) provides several important services for use by investment 
professionals, corporate executives and academics. 
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monthly return is calculated from the six one month returns where the monthly returns are 
calculated as follows: 
    
     
      
                                                                                                                       
Where:     : the arithmetic return; 
    : closing price the end of the month (Datastream #DI); 
                    : dividend payment during month (Datastream #UP#S); 
      : the closing price at the end of the previous months.  
The reason for using Datastream for collecting the data is that the dividend as 
monthly data is available in this database.  
Al-Horani et al. (2003) investigate whether a measure of research and development 
(RD) can help to explain cross-sectional variation in the United Kingdom stock returns. 
They show that RD activity is informative in explaining the unconditional and conditional 
cross-section of returns for a large sample of UK stocks over a ten-year period. They use 
the monthly return index from Datastream.  
Also, Soares and Stark (2009) provide evidence related to the existence of the 
accruals anomaly in the UK stock market. They use accounting data from the Worldscope 
database and market data. They include in their sample only firms that have relevant data 
available on both databases for the financial years ending in the calendar years from 1989 
to 2004. They calculate returns from Datastream’s return index data type using the 
following relation: ri,t = (Ii,t / Ii,t-1)-1, where ri,t is the return of stock i at month t, and Iit is 
the return index for stock i at month t. The I Datasream data type assumes dividend 
reinvestment.  
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As explained earlier, most researches in the UK use returns from the return index. 
To calculate the returns from the return index (I), two items of information from the Return 
index are needed: the current and previous period’s I. In this thesis stock returns are 
calculated as follows: 
      
  
      
                                                                                                         
Where:     is the return index for the current period; 
      is the return index for the previous period; 
    is nominated as the returns for the specified period.  
In Table 5.17, monthly data for just four months of 2009 are provided. This data 
displays no dividend payments although most companies pay two as three dividends per 
year, sometimes up to a maximum of five. Table 5.17 compares the return calculated from 
the return index with the return calculated from prices and dividends. As an example, the 
return from closing price data for the interim period 12/31/09 for Burberry Group PLC 
Company is -0.041949 and it is approximately equal to the return calculated from the return 
index for the same period. The data are similar for other periods. Therefore, in this study 
the return index for the interim period is used because it is easier to calculate. Table 5.18 
demonstrates that market data for the end of a specific day (for example 31 December 2009) 
is equal to the number for the month of December and is also matched by quarter four of 
that year. For example, according to Table 5.18, the return index for date 31/12/2009 for 
the daily, monthly and half-yearly periods is equal to 298.420 
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Table 5.17 
 Comparing the return index with the return from prices and dividends   
Date 12/31/09 11/30/09 10/31/09 9/30/09 
Closing price 3.540000 3.695000 3.908000 3.750000 
Return index 391.700000 408.850000 432.420000 414.930000 
Dividend payment date #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A 
Dividend amount 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Price return -0.041949 -0.054504 0.042133 -0.025468 
Index return -0.041947 -0.054507 0.042152 -0.025483 
Difference -0.000002 0.000004 -0.000018 0.000015 
Above data is collected from Burberry Group Plc Company. Closing price, dividend payment date and 
dividend amount are downloaded from Datastream data base.  
#N/A shows there is no applicable data in data base. Price return is calculated by following formula; 
Rt = ((Pt + Dt) / Pt-1)   
Where: Pt is the closing price for the current period, Dt is the dividend amount that is allocated to the 
share since the previous period until the Closing price date during the period and Rt is defined as the 
return for this period. 
Return index is calculated by Rt=( RIt/ RIt-1)-1 
Where: 
 RIt is the return index for the current period, RIt-1 is the return index for the previous period and Rt is 
nominated as the return for the specified period from the return index. The following case is presented 
as an example to confirm the above reason for using the returns from closing prices. 
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Table 5.18 
 
Overlapping of market data for computing return as daily, monthly and interim 
period. 
 
Burberry Group Plc. 
Daily Data 
 Date 31-Dec-2009 30-Dec-2009 29-Dec-2009 28-Dec-2009 
Closing price 5.990 5.910 5.900 5.860 
Dividend amount 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Dividend payment Date #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A 
Return index 298.420 294.440 293.940 291.950 
       
                                                                      Monthly Data 
 Date Dec-09 Nov-09 Oct-09 Sep-09 
Closing price 5.990 5.700 5.390 5.035 
Dividend amount 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Dividend payment Date #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A 
Return index 298.420 283.980 268.530 250.850 
       
                                                                       Six-monthly Data 
 Date Q4Y2009 Q3Y2009 Q2Y2009 Q1Y2009 
Closing price 5.990 5.035 4.230 2.818 
Dividend amount 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Dividend payment Date #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A 
Return index 298.420 250.850 206.500 137.550 
Note: Monthly data from Datastream shows the date 1/12/2009, but when considering daily, monthly 
and interim data, it is demonstrated by date 31/12/2009. 
The second quarter shows data for first six month, for  example  Q2Y2009 demonstrates the interim 
reporting data (the first six month data of year 2009) and Q4Y2009 implicates the reporting year-end 
date (the second six month of the year 2009) that is overlapped with  the year-end data. 
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5.4.5 Unexpected earnings 
Ball and Brown (1968) show that accounting earnings convey information about the 
underlying value of stocks. Their study is a foundation for most academic research in 
earnings management in accounting and finance. They argue that positive unexpected 
earnings are associated with positive changes in stock returns, and negative unexpected 
earnings are associated with negative changes in stock returns
48
. Their research isolates the 
impact of earnings on prices by considering cross-sectional changes in earnings and the 
corresponding changes in prices. Beaver et al. (1979) extend Ball and Brown’s research by 
examining the magnitude of earnings changes. They evaluate the magnitude of earnings 
surprises and reveal a more pronounced return pattern than those observed by Ball and 
Brown. 
Conroy et al. (2000) provide evidence that stock prices are significantly related to 
earnings surprises in Japan. Levis and Liodakis (2001) find that both positive and negative 
earnings surprises have an asymmetrical effect on the returns of high and low rated stocks 
in the UK. According to the methodology of Jegadeesh and Livant (2006), standard 
unexpected earnings are defined as follows: 
     
           
   
                                                                                                      
Where: 
                                                          
48
 Unexpected earnings are defined as the differences between expected earnings and actual earnings. Ball and 
Brown (1968) demonstrate that many income variables have been applied in searching for the results such as 
earnings per share and net income. Overall, there is evidence that shows developed countries indicating the 
appropriateness of using Earnings per share (EPS) as an earnings variable (Ball and Watts, 1972 and Kothari 
and Zimmerman, 1995). Ball and Brown (1968) show that earnings per share seem to provide more correct 
results. Ball and Watts (1972) find that earnings per share follow a random walk. Therefore, the interim 
reported earnings per share are used as the earnings variable in this study.  
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        : standard unexpected earnings. The difference between second half and 
first half earnings divided by standard deviation of each firm; 
          : second half of earnings (Worldscope#05251); 
         : first half of earnings; 
σ,t :  standard deviation of the unexpected earnings per share ( EPS ). 
 Moorthy (2006) uses market capitalisation (Worldscope#08001) instead of standard 
deviation σ,t  in the above formula. However, Chan et al. (1996) and Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2002) use standard deviation. A drift term can be included in the above 
equation to comply with Bernard and Thomas (1990) and Ball and Bartov (1996). They use 
a seasonal random walk with a trend, and this is repeated in Sadka’s 2006 paper which 
includes the average as a drift term in the equation.
 
 
  
5.4.6 Sales growth and excessive economic earnings 
The earnings management hidden in accruals and economic earnings reflects changes in 
business conditions. There is some evidence indicating sales growth can be used to measure 
discretionary accruals. Jones (1991) points out that the working capital accruals and 
depreciation, as a function of sales growth and investment in property plant and equipment 
(PPE), are reasonable drivers of firm value. In addition, the estimation of the Jones model 
provides a correlation between these fundamental firm attributes and accruals. There is 
research that estimates the normal relationship between credit sales and total sales to 
control for non-discretionary credit sales, documented by Dechow et al. (2003). They also 
add future sales growth and other variables to capture accruals made in anticipation of 
future growth. Their adjustments increase the R-squared from around 9% to 20%.  
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Liu et al. (2004) use future sales growth as a measure for economic earnings. It 
measures economic growth which is driven by rising demand. Following these researchers, 
this study expects that positive SUE is driven more than expected by realised sales. Sales 
(Worldscope#01001) growth is measured as current sales minus past period sales, and is 
deflated by the current value of total assets. Gu and Huang (2010) find winner stocks have 
bigger changes in sales. They define the sales growth as a change in sales (net), scaled by 
total assets.  
 
5.4.7 Size and book-to-market as control variables 
Stocks with high book-to-market ratios present higher average returns when compared with 
stocks with low book-to-market ratios. Daniel and Titman (2006) show that future returns 
are forecast significantly and negatively by intangible returns, and reversal of intangible 
returns creates the higher returns on high book-to-market stocks. Jiang (2010) finds a robust 
link between the trading behaviour of institutions and the book-to-market effect, and also 
finds the book-to-market effect focuses on stocks with a large proportion of active 
performance. Therefore, in this study, following the Fama and French (1993) methodology, 
firm size and firms’ book-to-market value (BM) are used as control variables. Firm size is 
computed as the natural logarithm of year-end market capitalisation (Worldscope#08001), 
and book-to-market value is calculated as common equity (Worldscope#03501) -to- year-
end market capitalisation.  
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5.5 Descriptive statistics 
This chapter provides the statistical characteristics of the sample used in this study and 
introduces the key variables used to test the hypotheses. It is useful before introducing the 
regression tests and presenting the results in the following chapter, to ensure that the 
distributions of the variables explained above are consistent with the existing literature. Table 
5.19 shows the descriptive statistics of these variables.  
 
5.5.1 Full sample 
This study begins by analysing the complete sample provided in Table 5.19. This sample 
covers all industries except financial firms. Stock returns (SR) are computed over all months 
from 1/2004 to 12/2009 using the return index for each half-year interim reporting period
49
. 
Furthermore, SIZE is the natural logarithm of the year-end market capitalisation 
(Worldscope#08001), is determined by multiplying closing price by number of shares. 
Book-to-market (BM) is the ratio of common equity to market capitalisation 
(Worldscope#09704). Sales growth (SG) is measured as reported interim period change in 
sales deflated by total assets at the end of the current period (Worldscope#01001). The 
current accrual (CA) is the six-monthly change in net current operating assets, i.e. current 
assets (Worldscope#02201), excluding cash (Worldscope#02003), minus current liabilities 
(Worldscope#03101), excluding the current portion of long-term debt (Worldscope#03051) 
deflated by Total assets at the end of the current period (Worldscope#02999)
50
. The 
discretionary current accrual (DACC) is the residual from the cross-sectional regression of 
                                                          
49
 SR may also be computed directly from the Return index of Datastream, but with less accuracy 
50
 Even though CA is referred to Current Accrual, it is in fact effectively a net amount comprising revenue 
accruals, expense accruals, revenue deferrals and expense deferrals. 
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ACC on a constant scaled by the Total assets six months earlier
51
. The earnings surprise 
variable is the standard unexpected earnings (SUE) calculated as the six-monthly change in 
earnings scaled by the standard deviation of the firm’s six-monthly earnings series, where 
earnings are before extraordinary items (Worldscope#05202).  
Table 5.19 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the models for 
the UK firms. The average (median) value of accruals is -0.002 with a standard deviation of 
0.085, which is similar to the findings in Xie (2001). Inter quartiles for accrual varies from 
-0.034 to 0.033. The average (mean) and standard deviation for stock returns are -0.003 and 
0.386, similar to figures quoted in Dechow (1994). She presents mean and standard 
deviation of stock returns of -0.007 and 0.160. As can be seen in Table 5.19, SIZE has an 
average of 17.908 and a standard deviation of 2.167. The average for SUE is 0.039 (SD 
0.915; IQR: -0.545 to 0.654) and BM has an average of 0.708 (SD 0.796; IQR: 0.279 to 
0.925). Sales growth (SG) has an average of 0.026 (SD 0.128; IQR: -0.019 to 0.071) is 
demonstrated in table 5.19 
 
                                                          
51
 Note that a positive accrual is income-increasing and a negative accrual is income-decreasing 
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Table 5.19 
        Descriptive statistics  
 
        
  
Mean Std. Dev. 
25th 
Percentiles Median 
75th 
Percentiles Skewness Kurtosis 
Stock return SR -0.003 0.386 -0.253 -0.019 0.192 0.851 5.081 
Stock return(Lag) SRt-1 -0.004 0.373 -0.238 -0.019 0.179 1.028 6.019 
Firm size SIZE 17.908 2.167 16.300 17.721 19.450 0.242 2.407 
Book to market value BM 0.708 0.796 0.279 0.516 0.925 1.688 9.549 
Sales growth SG 0.026 0.128 -0.019 0.012 0.071 0.424 7.098 
Current accruals  ACC -0.002 0.085 -0.034 -0.001 0.033 -0.309 8.299 
Discretionary current accruals   DACC -0.013 0.117 -0.061 -0.016 0.036 0.094 6.494 
Discretionary current accruals with ROA  DACC_ROA 0.001 0.081 -0.032 0.001 0.034 -0.070 7.521 
Standard unexpected earnings SUE 0.039 0.915 -0.545 0.041 0.654 -0.091 2.753 
Note: The sample consists of 5,616 firm-period observations 
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5.5.2 Correlation matrix  
 Summary statistics and correlation coefficients are computed for all variables. The 
variables are reported as follows. The stock return from months one to six is calculated from 
the return index. The natural logarithm of the market value of equity (year-end market capital # 
WS # 8001) at the end of the interim period, and the ratio of the book-to-market (BM) from the 
end of interim period are calculated by dividing common equity (WS#3501) by year-end 
market capitalisation. This study follows Fama and French (1993) when computing the size 
and book-to-market values. 
The past six months’ return and the interim sales are calculated by taking the 
differences between past sales and current sales and then dividing them by the lag of total 
assets, therefore growth in sales is covered from months one to six. In addition, unexpected 
earnings are considered for six months; as mentioned in this chapter, unexpected earnings are 
calculated by taking differences of income before extraordinary items and dividing by year-end 
market capital. 
Table 5.20 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlations and their significance 
levels (in italics) between the selected variables for the set of UK companies. A preliminary 
indication of the association between discretionary accruals and the earnings and stock 
returns for firms can be obtained by looking at the simple (Pearson) correlations between 
variables presented Table 5.20. As mentioned earlier, managers use discretionary accruals 
to drive stock returns via accounting earnings. The stock return is correlated with standard 
unexpected earnings as the variable used to measure earnings surprises; a positive 
correlation between SUE and stock returns is expected. Table 5.20 reveals that the SUE 
positively and significantly associated with SR (the proxy for the managed component) at 
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the 0.01 level (0.092, p-value <0.001). This is consistent with the finding of Jegadeesh and 
Livant (2006). There is a positive correlation between sales growth and stock returns which 
is expected according to the literature reviews. Similarly, the lag of Stock returns has a 
negative correlation with discretionary accruals (0.061, p-value <0.001) and there is 
positive correlation between DACC and SUE (0.248, p-value <0.001). Also the correlation 
between DACC_ROA and SUE is significant (0.082, p-value <0.001). In this study, 
discretionary accruals are divided into dummy variables
52
. According to this table, the 
correlation coefficient demonstrates that discretionary accruals have a negative relationship 
with the lag of stock returns; the coefficient is -0.061 and it is significant. However, at the 
same time the discretionary accruals have a negative relationship with stock return. In the 
present study, the standard unexpected earrings are divided into two dummy variables 
which are standard unexpected earnings high and low. The former is expected to have 
positive earnings surprises and be significantly correlated with stock returns. Regardless, 
the positive correlation between stock returns and standard unexpected earnings 
demonstrates that future stock return can be explained by positive earnings surprises. SIZE 
has a positive correlation with SR (0.147, p-value <0.001) while it has a positive correlation 
with SUE (0.033, p-value 0.013). Correlations between SIZE and SR are also relatively 
high. This high correlation between accounting-based control variables is consistent with 
prior studies on earnings management (see Li, 2011).  
As a result, it is unlikely that multicollinearity will be a problem for our estimated 
regressions. In addition, the magnitude of the Spearmen correlation coefficients is 
                                                          
52
 DCA_H is defined as high discretionary accruals and shows the positive accruals. DAC_L presents low 
discretionary accruals and it is negative. 
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sometimes different when compared with the results reported for the Pearson correlation 
coefficients. This hints at the possibility of extreme observations influencing the 
correlations and, also, any subsequent analyses using untreated data. 
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Table 5. 20  
Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between variables. 
 
 
SR LSR Size BM SG LSG ACC DACC DACC_ROA SUE 
SR 
 
0.117 0.185 -0.129 0.015 0.034 -0.006 -0.023 -0.040 0.093 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.285 0.017 0.669 0.104 0.005 0.000 
LSR 0.063 
 
0.251 -0.232 0.142 0.023 -0.007 0.085 -0.014 0.091 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.113 0.601 0.000 0.323 0.000 
SIZE 0.147 0.180 
 
-0.333 0.128 0.110 0.034 0.050 0.007 0.028 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.626 0.053 
BM -0.107 -0.176 -0.270 
 
-0.136 -0.133 -0.014 -0.054 -0.012 -0.077 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.339 0.000 0.386 0.000 
SG 0.009 0.091 0.073 -0.093 
 
-0.178 0.023 0.611 0.165 0.329 
 
0.507 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LSG 0.025 0.004 0.043 -0.057 -0.167 
 
0.063 -0.154 -0.002 -0.168 
 
0.078 0.775 0.003 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.864 0.000 
ACC 0.007 -0.001 0.028 0.011 0.001 0.024 
 
0.460 0.945 0.040 
 
0.592 0.948 0.035 0.400 0.929 0.093 
 
0.000 0.000 0.005 
DACC -0.023 0.061 0.025 -0.043 0.668 -0.138 0.508 
 
0.630 0.248 
 
0.091 0.000 0.065 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
DACC_ROA -0.018 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 0.152 -0.023 0.960 0.669 
 
0.082 
 
0.176 0.793 0.909 0.750 0.000 0.107 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 
SUE 0.092 0.075 0.033 -0.077 0.283 -0.079 0.049 0.216 0.080 
 
 
0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
Pearson correlation (below diagonal) and Spearman correlation (above diagonal) are reported. The sample consists of  5,616 firm-
period observations. In addition, P-value of each variable is reported regarding the coefficient to show the level of significance. Stock 
Return (SR) is computed over all months from 1/2004 to 12/2009 using Datastream closing prices (Datastream#UP#S) and 
dividend (Datastream #DI), In addition, it is defined as the difference between the closing price (plus dividends) at the end of 
each half year interim reporting period and the natural logarithm of the price at the beginning of the interim reporting period 
(SR may also be computed directly from the DataStream Total Return Index, but with less accuracy). Note; their significance 
levels is shown in italics. The upper right triangle data contains Spearman coefficients and the lower of triangle contains 
Pearson coefficient. Two reported correlation coefficients, linear (eg, Pearson) and rank (eg, Spearman), that are commonly 
used to measure linear and general relationships between two variables.  This thesis focuses on Pearson (linear correlation).  
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5.5.3 Winners and losers  
In the literature review, it was noted that managers are extremely interested in maintaining 
growth in earnings because their compensation is often tied to firm profits. The fact that a 
firm has falling earnings expectations can immediately affect its stock price. On the other 
hand, firms that beat expectations are rewarded by investors (Chan et al., 2006). Research 
suggests that the market fixates on firms’ bottom line income to the exclusion of other 
indicators of operating performance. With regard to these hypotheses it will be important to 
follow up winner and loser firms. 
Winner firms are defined as firms for which the short term stock return is high, and 
they are in the top quintiles. Loser firms are defined as firms stabilised in the bottom 
quintiles of returns. As mentioned in the data definition, return is based on share price and 
dividend amount during the specified period. Much research focuses on stocks and the 
impact of accounting performance by examining winner and loser firms, as documented in 
the literature review. Sloan (1996) finds a return anomaly associated with discretionary 
accruals. He shows that stocks with large positive accruals in a given year tend to have low 
returns in the next year, and then these stocks have an average size-adjusted return in the 
following year. This finding is confirmed by Collins and Hribar (2000) with quarterly 
accruals. These results demonstrate that large positive accruals are a sign of managed 
earnings. It is not expected that investors realize this; therefore they believe that firms will 
retain their profitability in the future.  
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5.7 Summary 
This chapter explains the data collection process and discusses the research methodology of 
the study. This chapter also describes the criteria used to select the full sample and the 
characteristics of the sample. Interim data problems in the Thomson One Banker data base 
and particularly Worldscope and Datastream are described. In addition, this chapter 
discusses reported accounting data for interim periods and for fiscal year-end in 
Worldscope. Finally, this chapter gives a brief explanation of the variables employed in the 
study.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Regression methodology and model limitations 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This study demonstrates that past returns are positively correlated with future earnings 
management. Winner and loser firms try to continue a return pattern from the current 
period to the next period using discretionary accruals.  The regression model includes 
control variables, such as size of firm and book-to-market values. The companies having 
the highest returns during the period are defined as winners and those with lowest returns as 
losers. The profit from the returns anomaly results from a portfolio holding the best past 
performing stocks (winner stocks) and shorting the weak past performing stocks (loser 
stocks). Winners and losers are obtained by ranking returns from the top to bottom 
quintiles. The combination of winners and losers in the top and bottom quintiles yield 
significantly positive returns. Thus, past and future returns have a linear relationship. 
  The other definition of winners and losers in this study concerns stocks ranked at 
the top and bottom of returns performance over an interim period. This ranking is known as 
the ‘formation period’ of the portfolio. The first part of this thesis is as follows:  
 Whether past returns that are positively correlated to the future management 
performance in the winner and loser firms are continued in the returns pattern from 
the first to the second semester. 
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 Whether returns over the last six months are positively correlated to discretionary 
accruals.  
Based on the hypothesis of this study, firms use discretionary accruals in the first semester to 
create positive earnings surprises in order to remain as winners. Also, loser firms attempt to 
change their earnings in the first semester in order to be considered as winners over the 
longer term. Winner and loser firms have motivations to continue their returns from 
semester to semester. It seems that profit is created from short-term returns anomalies that 
are formed as a result of holding a portfolio in the best condition. 
The profit resulting from the fluctuation of short-term anomalies is the outcome of 
holding the best portfolio of winners and avoiding holding the portfolio of lowest 
performing firms. In addition, in the top and bottom quintiles, the relation between winners 
and losers is positive. This means that there is a linear relationship between returns in the 
past and in the future. 
 
6.2 Panel data regression  
Much research uses the panel data model in empirical economics because it allows them to 
control the unobserved individual time-invariant characteristics. Panel data presents data 
that is grouped or that has a hierarchical structure. This analysis has an important role in 
modern econometric methodology. Using this method, it is possible to take advantage of 
the grouping structure to address substantive questions more accurately than with simple 
forms of data. Data with a grouping structure may be used to estimate models with complex 
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forms of heterogeneity. For example, in an earnings model in which individuals have 
different permanent levels of income, this may arise from differences in ability. 
Observations on many individual economic units such as firms, households or 
geographical areas over a period of time are defined as ‘panel data sets’. One of the earliest 
studies to use panel data is Balestra and Nerlove (1966) which employed data on 36 US 
states over a 13-year period in a regression analysis. Panel data may be used with pure 
cross-sectional data observations on individual units at a specific time, and with pure 
observational time-series data. Panel data may be useful to view a cross-section with a time 
dimension. Sometimes the panel data methods are used as ‘cross-sections over time’ or 
‘pooled’ cross-sectional time-series data. Panel data provides some advantages over data 
sets with only a temporal dimension. This point is made presented by Nerlove (2000) as 
follows: 
“(a) First, more observations are generally available than with conventional 
time-series data, although cross-section data sets are often very large. 
(b) panel data are not so highly aggregated as typical time-series and because, 
in the best of circumstances, we observe the same individual units through time, 
more complicated dynamic and behavioural hypotheses can be tested than 
those that can be tested using unidimensional data 
(c) the use of panel data may also provide a means for analysing more fully the 
nature of the latent, or unobserved, disturbance terms in the econometric 
relationships.”. (Nerlove, 2000, pp.3-4) 
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Other researchers such as Hsio (2003) and Baltagi (2005) have outlined advantages and 
disadvantages of panel data regression. Some of the disadvantages of using panel data 
regression are as follows: First, there is the problem of designing and collecting the panel 
data; second, there is the possibility of measurement errors; third, there is the problem of 
data selection; and fourth, there is the problem of determining the short data and cross-
sectional dependence. However, despite these disadvantages, panel data provides the 
opportunity to employ many more explanatory variables and investigate complicated data 
dynamics. 
 
6.3 The stock returns as a benchmark measure of firm performance 
This study assumes that stock markets are efficient, in the sense that stock prices 
incorporate all commonly available information about firms without bias. Thus, share price 
performance is used as a benchmark to evaluate other information about firms.  
According to the research design of Dechow (1994), which was extended by Loftus 
and Sin (1997), there is a stronger contemporaneous association between stock returns and 
earnings than between stock returns and cash flows from operations adjusted for current 
accruals. These authors calculate stock returns as the change in price plus dividends, divided 
by the starting price. They consider that the measurement interval for stock returns is the same 
as the one they use to calculate accounting variables. With regard to Loftus and Sin’s research, 
the stock returns do not capture the effects on expected cash flows after the end of the period. 
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They use balance dates
53
 to calculate the returns. Loftus and Sin use the following regression 
to test their hypothesis: 
         
   
   
                                                                                                                                                                                               
where: 
Pit  : price per share of firm i at time t 
Rit : returns per share of firm i for period t-1  to t 
Eit : accounting earnings per share of firm i from t-1 to t 
Loftus and Sin (1997) conduct their analysis on annual data because quarterly data was not 
available in Australia at the time of research; however Dechow (1994) conducts her 
analysis on quarterly intervals in the United States. Loftus and Sin test the above 
assumption by comparing the R-squared of the regression of the stock returns on earnings 
in the above model. In the above model, earnings per share are scaled by starting price. The 
Table B in the appendix shows the summary statistics and the results of their research.   
 
6.4 Estimating the association between stock returns and related variables 
The present study explores whether past performance can explain future earnings 
management. If winner or loser firms use positive or negative discretionary accruals in the 
next period we expect past returns to be positively correlated to future discretionary 
accruals. According to this hypothesis, if past winner (or loser) firms use positive (or 
negative) discretionary accruals in the next period, we expect to be able to split 
discretionary accruals. The evidence shows that poorer returns to growth stocks relative to 
                                                          
53
 The end of an accounting year is defined as a balance date. 
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value stocks are the result of expectation errors about future earnings performance. 
Furthermore, evidence demonstrates that growth stocks exhibit an asymmetric response to 
earnings surprises (Skinner and Sloan, 2002). They find that while growth stocks are at 
least as likely to announce negative earnings surprises as positive earnings surprises, they 
show an asymmetrically large negative price response to negative earnings surprises. After 
controlling for this asymmetric price response, they display no remaining evidence of a 
returns differential between growth and stocks value. They also find that poorer returns to 
growth stocks are attributable to overoptimistic expectation errors that are corrected 
through subsequent negative earnings surprises. 
               In addition, the present study considers sales growth as one of the control 
variables. This study follows the method of Liu et al. (2004) who use future sales growth as 
a measure for economic earnings. It measures economic growth which is driven by rising 
demand. Firm size and book-to-market value are also control variables. Firm size is used 
for investor coverage. This is because larger firms have more shareholders and therefore 
more analysis is needed to follow them. Following Hong et al. (2000), small firms are 
found to have more pronounced fluctuations than large firms. Accordingly, this study 
expects to find that small firms use more discretionary accruals to change the returns in the 
short term (see Louis, Robinson and Sbaraglia, 2005). Following the asset pricing 
literature, the book-to-market ratio is considered in research model regressions as a method 
for distress risk (Fama and French, 1992). They show that size and book-to-market equity 
are methods for providing sensitivity of risk factors in returns. Other researchers find high 
book-to-market firms that are distressed have lower rates of sales growth and low earnings. 
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In this study it is expected that high book-to-market value firms to have low accruals, and 
vice versa, the winner firms with low book-to-market values have a high volume of 
discretionary accruals. Moreover, if the returns of winner firms manage accruals leading 
towards a higher level of returns, and loser returns manage to stay as losers, it is therefore 
can be expected that earnings management is in the same direction as earnings surprises. 
For this purpose, an independent variable to define standard unexpected earnings is used. 
This study attempts to find out how earnings management is positively correlated 
with contemporaneous return by considering the stock return performance. Given the 
hypothesis it should be expected that the short-term returns of winner firms are at the top, 
and the returns of loser firms over the same period have lower accruals. This leads to a 
positive relationship between returns and accruals.  
In this section, the study attempts to find whether earnings management is positively 
correlated with return performance. According to the hypothesis presented in Chapter 3, it is 
expected that the short-term returns of winner firms have higher accruals, and the short-term 
returns of loser firms have lower accruals. This leads to a positive relationship between 
discretionary accruals and returns. As explained in this chapter, future returns are related to past 
returns, so companies that are winners or losers in the past are expected to show returns 
correlated with accruals in the future. Therefore, in this study a regression model is defined to 
show the function of accruals according to the association between returns and other 
independent variables such as past returns, size and book-to-market value.  
Also, a regression by firm with dummy variables (in this thesis high and low 
standard unexpected earnings is defined as dummy variables) and discretionary accruals is 
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employed for month 6 and month 12 on the six-month returns, and also using various 
control variables. Therefore, the cumulative six-month returns are fitted to the 
contemporaneous discretionary accruals and other variables. The panel regression used is as 
follows: 
Yt =    +   Rt-1 +    SIZEt +   BMt +    SGt +   DACCt +    SUEt + ε          (6.3)          
Rt  : the stock return over the last semester of the year; 
Rt-1   : the stock return over the first semester of the year;  
SIZEt : the natural logarithm of the year of the market value of equity over 
the first six months;  
   BMt   : the book value of equity over the last semester divided by the 
market value of equity over the second half year;  
SGt : growth in half-yearly sales, i.e. second-half sales divided by first-
half sales, minus one;  
DACCt : discretionary current accrual in the second semester of the year;  
SUEt  : standard unexpected earnings, i.e. the difference between second-
half and first-half earnings divided by the standard deviation of all 
six-monthly earnings of the firm.  
Following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), past returns are included as a control variable for 
current returns. It is expected that the relationship between past returns and future returns 
are positive. Risk control variables are also included. The variables are firm size and book-
to-market value, following Fama and French (1993). According to asset pricing theory, a 
positive relationship between book-to-market value and returns is expected since, as 
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mentioned earlier, smaller firms have more risky investments than large firms, and firms 
with high book-to-market values have greater distress risks
54
.  
According to the literature, it is expected that sales growth and unexpected earnings 
are positively related to returns (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2002). In addition, to examine the 
effect of positive earnings surprises, dummy variables are included which are high standard 
unexpected earnings (SUE_H) for positive surprises and low standard unexpected earnings 
(SUE_L) for negative surprises. Thus, the regression is modified again as follows: 
Rt = α +   Rt-1 +    SIZEt +   BMt +    SGt  + 
   DACC     SUE_Ht +   SUE_Lt + ε    (6.5) 
According to the results explained in the next chapter, the coefficient of past returns 
decreases after adding the other variables. This indicates that sales growth and earnings 
management have a relationship with past returns. However, discretionary accruals and past 
returns change the coefficient regarding past returns and this result indicates that their 
explanatory power is additional to past returns. There is a negative correlation between 
discretionary accruals and returns which confirms the hypothesis presented in this study, 
and shows that earnings management drives stock returns performance by following 
unexpected returns.
55
 
Furthermore, the results show that the previous six month returns, sales growth, 
discretionary accruals and standard unexpected earnings are significant variables to explain 
                                                          
54
 In this study the market risk factor (β) is not considered as a control variable because according to Fama 
and French (1993), prior research finds that beta (β) does not have additional explanatory power. 
 
55
 After controlling the mean factor in accruals, it is considered that past discretionary accruals and 
contemporaneous accruals are negatively related to future returns (Sloan, 1996). Sloan finds a negative 
relationship between past accruals and future returns. 
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future returns, as well as the risk control variables of size and book-to-market value. The 
following tables demonstrate that discretionary accruals and size are positively correlated to 
returns and to the price of stocks as the main part of returns, while other variables are 
negatively correlated to returns. This indicates that returns are explained by earnings 
management. Variable definitions and the expected signs of regression coefficients in the 
main model are presented in Table 6.1. 
Over the last two decades, researchers have found that past returns contain 
information about expected returns. Both short-term (less than 1 month) and long-term (3-5 
year) past returns are inversely related to future average returns
56
, while intermediate 
horizon past returns (3 to 12 months) are positively related to future average returns 
(Grinblatt et al., 2004). Previous researches show that the ratio of equity book value to 
market value is positively related to future stock  returns.  See  Fama and French (1993), 
Daniel and Titman (2006),  Zhang (2009) and Jiang (2010). 
Current sales growth and standardized unexpected earnings are also included as 
control variables. According to the existing literature both sales growth and unexpected 
earnings are expected to be positively related to current returns; see for example Chan et al. 
(1996) and Jegadeesh (2002). The relation between discretionary accruals and future returns 
are included in the main model regression. The positive relationship between these items is  
                                                          
56
  Some classic papers that focuses on this topic include Jegadeesh (1990), DeBondt and Thaler(1985),  
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Grundy and Martin (2001), and Lee and Swaminathan (2000). 
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captured well in the regression model used by Teoh et al. (1998), Jones (1991) and Li 
(2011). Some researchers find a negative relationship between size and future returns, e.g., 
Table 6.1 
Expected signs of regression coefficients and definitions of test variables                                                                                         
Variable Expected sign Definition of variable 
Similarly defined in  
prior research 
Lag of Stock return  + Pt is the price close for the current period, Dt 
is the dividend amount that allocated to the 
share price since previous period until the 
price close date during this period and Rt is 
defined as the returns for this period 
Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993), 
Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2006). 
Natural  logarithm of  
Market capitalisation 
(SIZE)  
 
+ the natural logarithm of year-end market 
capitalisation 
Li(2011) 
Book-to-Market + market capitalisation-to-common equity Fama and French 
(1993), Daniel and 
Titman (2006) and   
Jiang (2010) 
Sales growth  + Sales growth is measured as current sales 
minus past period sales, and is deflated by 
the current value of total assets 
Dechow et al. 
(2003),  Liu, et 
al.(2004) and  Gu 
and Huang (2010 
Discretionary 
accruals  
+    
  is total current accrual for firm i and six 
month t,        
  is the change in total sales 
for the six-month period,     
 is the total 
accounts receivable,     
  is the total assets for 
the first six months and      
   is the total 
assets from the previous six months 
Teoh et 
al.(1998),Jones 
(1991) and Li(2011) 
Standard unexpected 
earnings  
+ The difference between second-half and 
first-half earnings divided by standard 
deviation of each firm,      is the second 
half of earnings and          is the first half 
of earnings and σ,t is the standard deviation 
of the unexpected earnings per share by 
firm. 
Ball and Brown 
(1968),  Beaver et 
al. (1979),  
Jegadeesh and 
Livant (2006), 
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Fama and French (1993) and Zhang (2009). However recently research by Li (2011) finds 
a positive relation between size (as market capitalisation) and future stock returns. 
 
6.5 Incorporation of data for first and second semesters  
This study follows a parallel procedure for testing the main model with a comprehensive 
sample of firm-years to disclose the association between stock returns and related variables 
such as sales growth and standard unexpected earnings. The main aim of these new 
examinations is to test the association between stock returns and discretionary accruals 
based on different period performances. As mentioned, periods are defined as first semester 
(S1) and second semesters (S2). Therefore, for this further analysis each semester is 
compared with the same semester in the last year. For example, the lag of total assets 2006-
2 is the amount of total assets in 2005-2. This new analysis is applied to find out the robust 
tests and consistency of our findings with annual report.  
As mentioned before, based on the main model regression (6.3), each variable is 
divided into six monthly performances (semesters). As an example, Rt is the stock return 
over the last six months of the year (semester, S2)., and Rt-1 is the stock return over the first 
semester (S1) of the year.  
In the new regression, Rt is the stock return for semesters (S1) or (S2) and Rt-1 is the 
stock return for these semesters and in the previous year, and so on. The regression model 
(6.3A) is defined as follows: 
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Rt =    +    S1+    Rt-1 +   S1Rt-1 +    SIZEt+     S1SIZEt +  BMt + 
   S1BMt +    SGt +   S1SGt +   DACCt +    S1DACCt +    SUEt +     
S1SUEt + ε               (6.3A) 
Where, S1 is a dummy variable indicating 1 for the first semester and 0 for the second 
semester.  
The estimation for yearly effects runs regression (6.3), and t is interpreted as the financial 
year, not the half yearly period. The results show there is a negative relation between stock 
returns and discretionary accruals; these results confirm the previous results of the main 
equation in this study. In contrast, the result based on yearly data show positive 
discretionary accruals similar to the results of  Dechow et al. (2003).   
 
6.6 Returns portfolios for winner and loser firms    
 As described in the literature review, managers are extremely interested in maintaining 
growth in income because their compensation is often linked to their firms’ profits (Chan et 
al., 2006). The research also shows that if a firm has fallen short of earnings expectations, 
this can immediately affect its stock price, while firms that beat expectations are 
attractively rewarded by investors. The focus on earnings is so strong that is suggested that 
the market focus on firms’ bottom line income is to the detriment of other indicators of 
operating performance.  
Chan et al. (2006) examine the power of accruals regarding stock returns by 
considering three steps. First, they test the operating performance of firms with high and 
low accruals. Their research follows whether the timing of changes in accruals coincides 
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with the timing of changes in underlying profitability, by applying methods with indicators 
such as sales turnover. Second, they test the individual components of accruals, such as 
accounts receivable and inventories. Some items offer an opportunity for managers to have 
more discretion (e.g. relating to the timing of revenue recognition). Therefore, focusing on 
such items may highlight the effects of manipulation.
57
 Third, they decompose accruals into 
discretionary and nondiscretionary components and examine the information in each 
component for returns. Their findings show that accruals are negatively related to future 
stock returns, as documented by Sloan (1996). In addition, Chan et al. show that the 
nondiscretionary component of accruals, constructed by assessing past trends in sales and 
accruals, cannot predict future returns. Sloan (1996) finds that stocks with large positive 
accruals (increases in net income) in a given year tend to have low returns in subsequent 
years; these stocks have an average size-adjusted return of 5.5% in the following year. 
Collins and Hribar (2000) repeat these results with quarterly accruals. One important 
interpretation of these results is that large positive accruals are a sign of earnings 
management, but investors are not aware of this and are misled into believing that future 
profitability will stay at a high level. A large number of researchers examine whether 
mispricing can be linked to the portion of accruals that reflects opportunistic managerial 
behaviour, defined as discretionary accruals. Jones (1991) provides a model to identify the 
discretionary and nondiscretionary components of accruals. With regard to this model, 
Subramanyam (1996) and Xie (2001) show that discretionary accruals predict returns, but 
they do not find evidence that nondiscretionary accruals predict returns. Thomas and Zhang 
                                                          
57
 Hribar (2000), and Thomas and Zhang (2002), for instance, focus on the relation between inventory 
changes and future stock returns. 
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(2002) examine the importance of the different components of working capital changes. 
Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b) demonstrate a negative relationship between discretionary 
current accruals and subsequent stock returns for companies issuing new stock, as well as 
all non-issuing companies. 
Chan et al. (2006) provide a method to predict returns using earnings by 
considering accruals as a measure of the quality of earnings. They classify stocks at the 
end of each April over the sample period into one of five categories on the basis of 
earnings surprises, and at the same time, stocks are independently classified into quintile 
groups on the basis of accruals. Afterwards, they make an intersection of these two 
classifications, prepared across 25 categories
58
; stocks are equally weighted within each 
group.  
 
 
6.8 Summary 
This chapter describes a model to test hypotheses. The regression model provides the link 
between stock returns and other relevant variables. Furthermore, this chapter, discusses two 
                                                          
58 They provide annual buy-and-hold returns in the first year after portfolio formation. Size and book-to-
market adjusted abnormal returns are computed as follows: each April, Chan et al. (2006) calculate quintile 
break points for size (market value of equity) on the basis of NYSE stocks. Since the bottom quintile of firms 
contains a disproportionately large number of firms (mostly NASDAQ stocks), they divide this group into 
two subgroups (the first and second deciles of the distribution of firm size). Accordingly, there are six 
categories by firm size. Furthermore, Chan et al. (2006) calculate quintile break points for the ratio of book-
to-market value of equity. The intersection of these two classifications gives 30 groups, and buy-and-hold 
returns are calculated for equally weighted portfolios of the stocks within each group. Underlying where a 
stock falls given the size and book-to-market break points, one of these portfolios is assigned as a control. 
Chan et al. then compute abnormal returns for a stock as the difference between its raw return and the return 
of the control portfolio. 
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hypotheses that result from the research questions. According to these hypotheses the 
relevant independent variables are sales growth, discretionary accruals, standard 
unexpected earnings. Also, control variables are size and book-to-market. In addition, this 
chapter gives an explanation of the regression models and the variables employed in the 
study. 
The next chapter (Chapter 7) includes the results of testing the relation between 
returns and earnings management. In addition, the chapter discusses a comparison of the 
results with those from prior studies. Finally, the limitations and implications of the 
research are given, and the potential for further research. 
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                                                   Chapter 7 
Analysis and results 
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, the main regression is discussed concerning the hypotheses in Chapter 4. As 
seen in the regression model documented in the previous chapter, the regression model 
explains the associations between stock returns and the independent variables discussed 
earlier. In this regression model, past returns, current sales growth, current discretionary 
accruals and standard unexpected earnings are the main independent variables, while book-to-
market value and size are control variables.  
 
7.2 Analysis of discretionary accruals  
Based on the literature review of Chapter 2, and the definitions of variables set out in 
Chapter 5, current accruals include short-term assets and liabilities supporting daily 
operations; in addition, accruals are decomposed into discretionary and nondiscretionary. 
Current accruals are calculated as follows. First, the change in cash and short term 
investments (WS#02001) is subtracted from total current assets (WS#06615), and then 
short term debt and current portion of long term debt (WS#03051) is subtracted from total 
current liabilities (WS#03101). Third, the second item is subtracted from the first. Finally, the 
result is deflated by the one period lag of total assets (WS # 02999). All items are considered 
as six-month data and Table 7.1 shows the descriptive statistics of actual, discretionary and 
 169 
 
predicted accruals for interim and final year reporting from 2004-2 to 2009-2. According to 
Table 7.1 the mean value for ACC in the first semester is positive whenever ACC in the 
second semester (S2) is negative, and this is repeated for DACC and NDACC. The mean of 
Non-discretionary accruals is equal to the differences between actual accruals and 
discretionary accruals, for example, for 2009-2 the mean of NDACC is -0.012 which is the 
difference between ACC and DACC (0.062 - 0.074= -0.012).  
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Table 7.1 
      Descriptive statistics of actual, discretionary and predicted current accruals  
 
 
ACC DACC NDACC 
Period Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
2005-1 0.027 0.005 0.020 0.005 0.007 0.001 
2005-2 -0.029 0.005 -0.020 0.005 -0.009 0.001 
2006-1 0.013 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.001 
2006-2 -0.010 0.004 -0.003 0.004 -0.007 0.001 
2007-1 0.013 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.005 0.001 
2007-2 -0.012 0.004 -0.004 0.004 -0.008 0.001 
2008-1 0.013 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.003 0.001 
2008-2 -0.012 0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.008 0.001 
2009-1 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001 
2009-2 -0.016 0.003 -0.010 0.003 -0.006 0.001 
 
‘ACC ‘ is the actual current accrual that is deflated by lag of total assets. ‘DACC’ is discretionary 
accrual and NDACC is non-discretionary accrual that is predicted.  
In this study, current accruals come from the following formula: ACCt = [Δ (CAt -  CSIt) – Δ (CL - 
STDt)]/TAt-1 . CAt  is defined as current accruals , CAt is the Total current assets (WS#06615), CIt is 
Cash and Short term Investments (WS#02001), CLt is Total Current liabilities (WS#03101), STDt 
is Short term debt and current portion of long term debt (WS#03051), TA
l
t-1 is the total assets 
(WS#02999) from the last  period, and Δ is defined as six-monthly change in the respective 
variables, for firm i and month t. In addition, in the current study, to calculate discretionary accruals, 
the regression is as follows:  ACCt= a1 (1/TAt-1) + a2 (ΔSAt - ΔARt/TAt-1) + ROA+ εt .  
Where ACCt is total current accruals for firm i and six months t,  ΔSAt is the change in total sales 
(WS # 01001) for six months and  ARt  is the total assets for the first six months, ROA is return 
on assets  and TAt-1 is the total assets from the previous six months and     
 is the total accounts 
receivable (WS#02051). Thus, discretionary current accruals are computed as follows:     t , the 
differences between discretionary accruals and current accruals which is defined as result is 
taken from nondiscretionary accruals. FTA is calculated as 1/TAt-1 and STA is ΔSAt - ΔARt/TAt-1. . 
Note: There is 5,616 firm-period observation. 
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Figure 7.1 shows the relationship between deflated accruals and predicted accruals. 
This figure demonstrates that current accruals in interim periods and final year periods are 
predicted systematically. For example, the means of current accruals (ACC) in interim 
periods 2006-1 and 2007-1 are 0.013 and they are positive. Predicted accruals (NDACC) in 
the same periods 2006-2 and 2007-2 are 0.005 and they are positive as well. The means of 
current accruals for periods 2006-2 and 2007-2 (final year) are -0.010 and -0.012 and they 
are negative. The predicted accruals for same periods are -0.007 and -0.008 and they are 
negative. This graph shows there are systematic reversals in accruals in interim periods in 
UK companies.  
Figure 7.2 composes the behaviour of current accruals and predicted accruals with 
discretionary accruals. This figure demonstrates the current, discretionary and predicted 
accruals have the same pattern. The mean of current accruals, discretionary accruals and 
predicted accruals for the interim period 2008-1 are 0.013, 0.010 and 0.003 respectively 
and they have positive signs. The means of current accruals, discretionary accruals and 
predicted accruals for the final year 2008-2 are -0.012, -0.004 and -0.008, and all signs are 
negative; this happens for the following and previous interim and final periods as well.  
 
This figure 7.2 shows  that predicted accruals, using the modified predictor based on 
current changes in sales after controlling for return on assets, can capture the time series 
pattern.  
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Figure 7.1 The behaviour of current and predicted accruals during interim and 
final reporting periods 
 
Figure 7.2 The behaviour of current accruals and predicted accruals  with 
discretionary accruals during interim and final reporting periods 
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Table 7.2 shows the mean and standard deviations of independent variables including stock 
returns, previous stock returns, book to market, sales growth and standard unexpected 
earnings for interim and final year reporting. There is a big reduction in stock returns 
during the interim period 2007-1 to 2009-1 because of the financial crisis. The average 
stock return in 2007-1 is 0.088 which reduces to -0.107 in 2007-2, falling again in 2008-1 
and again in 2008-2 to -0.274.  
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Table 7.2 
             Mean and standard deviation of variables by interim and final year 
 
SR SR-1 SIZE BM SG DACC SUE 
Period Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
2005-1 0.082 0.019 0.073 0.017 18.440 0.144 0.509 0.029 0.001 0.007 0.018 0.005 0.037 0.056 
2005-2 0.093 0.016 0.081 0.015 18.404 0.110 0.478 0.023 0.056 0.007 -0.011 0.004 0.126 0.044 
2006-1 0.043 0.016 0.089 0.015 18.450 0.112 0.480 0.021 0.025 0.007 0.008 0.004 0.076 0.041 
2006-2 0.132 0.014 0.049 0.014 18.320 0.092 0.470 0.023 0.049 0.006 -0.006 0.004 0.114 0.036 
2007-1 0.096 0.014 0.130 0.014 18.413 0.092 0.488 0.021 0.018 0.006 0.010 0.004 0.022 0.037 
2007-2 -0.160 0.010 0.091 0.012 17.963 0.077 0.540 0.024 0.046 0.005 -0.001 0.003 0.143 0.031 
2008-1 -0.138 0.011 -0.148 0.010 17.876 0.080 0.688 0.026 0.021 0.004 0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.034 
2008-2 -0.370 0.010 -0.115 0.011 17.368 0.075 0.991 0.037 0.044 0.005 -0.001 0.003 -0.036 0.034 
2009-1 0.232 0.018 -0.352 0.011 17.426 0.081 0.988 0.037 -0.015 0.005 0.000 0.003 -0.127 0.037 
2009-2 0.196 0.015 0.252 0.019 17.535 0.084 0.972 0.038 0.010 0.005 -0.011 0.003 0.117 0.041 
 
The table provides descriptive statistics for interim periods: suffix _1 is the first six months up to the interim reporting date, and _2 is the second six 
months up to the annual reporting date. Rt is the stock return over the six month period, Rt-1 is  the stock return over the six month period (i.e. not 
annualised), SIZEt is the natural logarithm  of the market value of equity at the end of each period, BMt is  the ratio of the book value of equity to the market 
value of equity at the end of the period, SGt is growth in half-yearly sales divided by opening total assets. SUEt is standard unexpected earnings, i.e. the 
difference between second-half and first-half earnings divided by the standard deviation of all six-monthly earnings of the firm. Note: there is 5,616 firm-
period observation. 
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Figure 7.3 shows the current and lagged stock returns during the interim period. The main 
reason for the fall in returns is the financial crisis during 2007-1 to 2008-2.  
According to Figure 7.4, sales growth is low with a seasonal pattern. Until 2008-1 
this pattern is also exhibited by standard unexpected earnings. However, the standard 
unexpected earnings jump down and then up between 2008-1 and 2009-1. Therefore, 
earnings surprises that are indicated by standard unexpected earnings are affected by the 
financial crisis between; 2007-1 to 2009-1. In contrast during the same period, sales growth 
was not severely affected by the financial crisis.  
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Figure 7.3 Descriptive statistics (mean) of stock return and lag of stock return 
  
Figure 7.4 Descriptive statistics (mean) of standard unexpected earnings and lag of 
changes in sales 
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7.3 Deflated, discretionary and non-discretionary accruals in winner and loser firms. 
It is important to understand about accruals behaviour in winner and loser portfolios. Table 
7.3 demonstrates the amount of deflated accruals, discretionary accruals and predicted 
accruals for winner and loser companies for interim and final year reporting from 2004-2 to 
2009-2.  
According to Table 7.3 the mean value for ACC in the first semester for both 
(winners and losers) are positive whenever ACC in the second semester (S2) for winners 
and losers are negative; this is repeated for NDACC as well. However, this regular pattern 
is not exhibited by discretionary accruals (DACC). For example, in the second semester 
2005 discretionary accruals for losers are 0.007, however at the same time winner firms 
have negative discretionary accruals of -0.008. This opposite pattern happens for the 
second semesters of 2008 and 2009 as well. The pattern of discretionary accruals for 
winners and losers is not the same pattern as current accruals and non-discretionary 
accruals. 
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‘ACC’ is the actual current accruals that is deflated by lag of total assets. ‘DACC’ is discretionary accruals and NDACC is non-
discretionary accruals that is predicted.  
 
 
 
Table 7.3 
          Deflated, discretionary and non-discretionary accruals in winner and loser firms 
 
    
ACC: 2005/1 2005/2 2006/1 2006/2 2007/1 2007/2 2008/1 2008/2 2009/1 2009/2 
Loser (1) 0.012 -0.014 0.014 -0.015 0.007 -0.012 0.018 -0.015 -0.003 -0.007 
2 0.007 -0.026 0.015 -0.015 0.016 -0.012 0.012 -0.006 -0.006 -0.016 
3 0.059 -0.020 0.007 -0.008 0.018 -0.013 0.003 -0.006 0.021 -0.018 
4 0.025 -0.030 0.017 -0.015 0.017 -0.009 0.007 -0.016 0.007 -0.020 
Winner (5) 0.023 -0.016 0.016 -0.013 0.011 -0.005 0.011 -0.004 0.003 -0.024 
DACC: 
          Loser (1) 0.003 0.007 0.013 -0.003 0.012 0.003 0.018 -0.003 -0.006 0.000 
2 0.005 -0.019 0.007 -0.005 0.010 -0.004 0.008 0.002 -0.007 -0.011 
3 0.049 -0.012 -0.002 -0.007 0.010 -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.014 -0.016 
4 0.020 -0.024 0.014 -0.010 0.014 -0.001 0.005 -0.009 0.001 -0.013 
Winner (5) 0.012 -0.008 0.007 -0.003 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.006 -0.004 -0.016 
NDACC: 
          Loser (1) 0.009 -0.021 0.001 -0.011 -0.005 -0.014 0.000 -0.012 0.003 -0.007 
2 0.002 -0.008 0.008 -0.010 0.005 -0.008 0.005 -0.008 0.002 -0.005 
3 0.010 -0.008 0.009 -0.001 0.008 -0.006 0.003 -0.006 0.007 -0.002 
4 0.005 -0.006 0.002 -0.005 0.003 -0.008 0.002 -0.008 0.006 -0.007 
Winner (5) 0.011 -0.009 0.008 -0.009 0.008 -0.009 0.004 -0.010 0.007 -0.008 
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Figure 7.5 shows the relationship between deflated current accruals and predicted 
accruals in loser firms. This figure shows current accruals in interim and final semesters are 
systematically predicted and the pattern is quite striking 
Figure 7.6 demonstrates the pattern of current accruals and predicted accruals in 
winner firms. This graph shows current accruals in interim and final semesters are also 
systematically predicted. The pattern for winners is even more striking than the pattern for 
losers.  
 
Figure 7.5 Deflated and predicted accruals in loser firms 
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Figure 7.6  Deflated and predicted accruals in winner firms 
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Figure 7.7 compares the relationship between deflated current accruals in winner 
and loser firms. This figure shows the increases and decreases in current accruals for 
winner and loser firms follow the same patterns between interim and final periods. Changes 
for winners are bigger than changes for losers. Figure 7.8 compares non-discretionary 
accruals for winners and losers. Predicted accruals in winner firms are less volatile 
domestic than for losers; this means current accruals in winner firms are more predictable 
than losers. 
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Figure 7.7 Deflated accruals of winner and loser firms  
 
Figure 7.8 Non-discretionary accruals of winner and loser firms 
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Kothari et al. (2005) demonstrate how data collection problems can produce biased 
conclusions. They refer to two types of bias that can be introduced into the process of 
sample selection; these are referred to as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ data truncation. The case of 
passive data truncation occurs when firms that become delisted during the period of the 
analysis are excluded from the sample. However, the delisting of these firms is not 
controlled by the researchers; their exclusion from the sample is caused by the firms 
themselves. Active truncation occurs when researchers either delete or change the 
observations by trimming or winsorising
59
 the collected data, usually in order to minimise 
the effect of extreme observations. In the present study all variables (i.e. all variables that are 
used in the regression analysis) are trimmed at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles, to ensure that 
outliers do not drive the results. 
Table 7.4 shows the results of analysing discretionary accruals with and without using 
return on assets (ROA). Without using ROA all variables are significant. The R-squared for the 
two regressions (with and without ROA) are equal. The results in Table 7.4 show the 
coefficient on FTA (calculated as 1/     
 ) in the model containing ROA is not significant. 
Therefore, in this study the regression model without ROA is used. 
Table 7.4 shows the regression results for the equations (5.12), (5.16) and (5.16A) 
using ACC as a dependent variable. Overall the results reflect the findings in the previous 
section. The table demonstrates the estimation of discretionary accruals equations to create 
discretionary accruals variable. For the UK firms, column equation (5.12) reports the 
regression results for 6,917 firm-year observations; and for equations (5.16) and (5.16A) the 
                                                          
59
 Winsorising is a method that solves the problem of outliers by limiting extreme values in the statistical data to reduce the 
effect of spurious outliers. This method is defined after the engineer-turned-biostatistician Charles P. Winsor (1895–1951).  
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number of firm-years is 5,282. Table 7.4 shows the coefficient as the inverse lag total assets 
(FTA) in equation 5.12 is negative (-11799.090, t-statistic = -5.710, p-value <0.001). The 
coefficient on change in sales (STA) is negative and significant (-0.769, t-statistic = -40.130, 
p-value <0.001) which is consistent with the research of Teoh et al. (1998). The Adj R-
squared for equation (5.12) is 18.9% compared with the Adj R-squared of 27% found by 
Teoh et al. (1998). Equation (5.16) shows the estimation of accruals using ROA. The result 
for Equation (5.16) shows the coefficient as FTA is positive (21873.940, t-statistic = 3.620, 
p-value <0.001) and the STA coefficient is similar to Equation (5.12) but with a low adjusted 
R-Squared (6.44%). The equation (5.16A) shows the discretionary accruals with ROA and 
seasonality effects.  The related result shows the same pattern as equation (5.16). The factor 
of change in sales since last year (STA_y) is positive with t-statistic = 2.350 which is not 
highly significant.  
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Table 7.4         
The estimation of the discretionary accruals equation to create the discretionary accruals variable  
  Equation (5.12) Equation (5.16) Equation (5.16A) 
 Variables Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept Intercept 0.027 3.070 -0.002 -1.310 -0.002 -1.620 
   0.002  0.189  0.105 
Inverse lag total assets FTA -11799.090 -5.710 21873.940 3.620 21034.260 3.480 
   <0.001  <0.001  0.001 
Change in sales STA -0.769 -40.130 -0.146 -17.340 -0.155 -16.720 
   <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
Return on assets ROA   0.102 9.900 0.099 9.620 
     <0.001  <0.001 
Change in sales (since last year) STA_y     0.023 2.350 
       0.019 
Number of observation  6917  5282  5282  
Adj R-squared  18.9%  6.44%  6.45%  
T-Stat is defined as T-Statistics. In this study, current accruals come from the following formula: ACCt = [Δ (CAt -  CSIt) – Δ (CL - STDt)]/TAt-1 . CAt  
is defined as current accruals , CAt is the Total current assets (WS#06615), CIt is Cash and Short term Investments (WS#02001), CLt is Total 
Current liabilities (WS#03101), STDt is Short term debt and current portion of long term debt (WS#03051), TA
l
t-1 is the total assets (WS#02999) 
from the last  period, and Δ is defined as six-monthly change in the respective variables, for firm i and month t. In addition, in the current study, to 
calculate discretionary accruals, the regression analysis runs base under linear function as follows:  CAt= a1 (1/TAt-1) + a2 (ΔSAt - ΔARt/TAt-1) + εt 
Where ACCt is total current accruals for firm i and six months t,  ΔSAt is the change in total sales (WS # 01001) for six months and  ARt  is the 
total assets for the first six months, and TAt-1 is the total assets from the previous six months and     
 is the total accounts receivable (WS#02051). 
Thus, discretionary current accruals are computed as follows:     t , the differences between discretionary accruals and current accruals which 
is defined as result will be taken from nondiscretionary accruals. FTA is calculated as 1/TAt-1 and STA is demonstrated as ΔSAt - ΔARt/TAt-1.   
 
First regression model presented without seasonality effect and second regression include seasonality effect by semester. According to equation 
(5.16A) in Chapter 5, change in realised sales for semester (t) since last semester (t-1) and change in realised sales for semester (t) since same 
semester last year (t-2) is added to regression by using variable STA_y to show the effect of seasonality. Therefore, new current accrual equation 
defined as equation (5.16A) 
 
 185 
 
7.4 Analysis of the association between returns and other independent variables. 
This study begins with the estimation of Equations (6.3), (6.5) and (6.3A) by pooling the 
sample for the interim and final semesters 2004-1 to 2009-2 and pooling time-series and 
cross-sectional data. According to Gujarati (2003), it is assumed that intercept and slope 
coefficients are constant across time and firms, so the error term captures differences over 
time and firms
60
. Therefore, the pooled regression model may distort the real picture of the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables in the regression model. In 
chapter 7 we use the panel data analysis to show relationship between winner and loser 
firms and we use the Fixed and the Random Effects Model.  
Table 7.5 demonstrates the main regression results (OLS) and contains the findings 
for the fixed effects estimation of the model developed on 5616 observations for UK firms 
on the baseline model, including stock return, discretionary accrual and the other variables 
shown in equations (6.3), (6.5) and (6.3A). Table 7.5 shows the regression results for 
equation (6.3). As expected, the coefficient as DACC is negative and significant: the 
coefficient is -0.159 and the t-statistic is -2.740. In equation (6.3A) this coefficient is again 
negative and significant: the coefficient is -0.117 and t-statistic is -2.010.  As expected, 
there is a positive relationship between previous stock returns and current returns, the 
coefficients in equations (6.3) and (6.3A) are 0.027 and 0.111respectively. The t-statistics 
are 1.910 and 10.760, the first being weakly significant and the second strong signeficant.  
  
                                                          
60
 Gujarati (2003) shows that the assumptions of the pooled sample thatthe intercept and the slope coefficients 
are constant across time and firms and that the error term captures differences over time are highly restrictive. 
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Standard unexpected earnings are an important measure of surprise in reported 
earnings. In this study, to follow the effects of positive and negative surprises in earnings, 
two dummy variables are defined: as discussed in Chapter 6: positive discretionary accruals 
(DACC_H) and negative discretionary accruals (DACC_L) are defined as dummy variables in 
the regression model. Standard unexpected earnings have a significant, positive relationship 
with stock returns. The results for equation (6.3) show there is a strong  positive 
relationship between SUE and SR, the coefficient is 0.039 and significant (t-statistic is 
6.690). Also, in equation (6.3A), the SUE coefficient is 0.049 (t-statistic is 8.820 and 
significant). In equation (6.5), the two dummy variables SUE_H and SUE_L are positive 
and significant; the coefficients are 0.036 and 0.042 and their t-statistics are -2.740 and 
6.690, both being significant. The explanatory power of standard unexpected earnings (SUE) 
is related to the other variables, exposing a question about what information investors 
could find in these standard unexpected earnings to drive stock returns in the short term. 
With regard to the implications of behavioural models, investors’ overreaction to earnings 
would be reflected in the explanatory power of standard unexpected earnings, and would 
be less closely correlated to a business performance measure, or even to earnings 
management. As explained in the literature review, stock returns can be increased through 
management of discretionary accruals and such management is used to mask distressed 
business conditions. Therefore, if discretionary accruals are used to defer income for future 
periods, discretionary accruals are negative. Thus, there are motivations which may drive 
the cross-sectional accrual-return relation. Linear regression would not accurately provide the 
earnings management information during the extreme fluctuations in the returns of firms. 
Therefore, in Chapter 7 in the section as winner and loser portfolio analysis the technique of 
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‘portfolio dependent classifications of winner and loser firms’ is used to capture more detail 
of the earnings management. 
Results for the control variables are consistent with findings in earlier studies and 
with our expectations; Li (2011) finds a positive relation between SIZE (as market 
capitalisation) and future stock returns that is consistent with this study. According to 
equation (6.3) the coefficient for SIZE is 0.022 and the t-statistic is 8.930 and significant. 
Again, in equation (6.3A), the coefficient for SIZE is significant and the coefficient and t-
statistic are 0.034 and 14.580. Equation (6.3) shows that there is a negative relationship 
between book-to-market as a control variable and stock return; the coefficient is  -0.031 and 
the t-statistic is -4.660 and significant. Also, in equation (6.3A) the coefficient for BM is -
0.030 and t-statistic is -5.010, and significant.  
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Table 7.5 
       Regression result of association between returns and independent variables 
 
  
 
Equation (6.3) Equation(6.5) Equation (6.3A) 
 
 
        Coeff. t-Statistic Coeff. t-Statistic Coeff. t-Statistic Fixed effects 
Intercept -0.377 -8.280 -0.377 -8.280 -0.653 -15.120 -2.620 
  
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 <0.001 
S1intercept 
    
0.729 11.080 10.480 
      
<0.001 <0.001 
LSR 0.027 1.910 0.027 1.910 0.111 10.760 6.490 
  
0.056 
 
0.056 
 
<0.001 <0.001 
S1 LSR 
    
1.008 71.040 63.460 
      
<0.001 <0.001 
SIZE 0.022 8.930 0.022 8.930 0.034 14.580 2.560 
  
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 0.011 
S1 SIZE 
    
-0.038 -10.900 -10.480 
      
<0.001 <0.001 
BM -0.031 -4.660 -0.031 -4.660 -0.030 -5.010 -6.550 
  
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 <0.001 
S1BM 
    
0.042 4.270 3.840 
      
<0.001 <0.001 
SG -0.007 -0.120 -0.007 -0.120 -0.002 -0.040 -1.110 
  
0.903 
 
0.903 
 
0.972 0.266 
S1SG 
    
-0.011 -0.140 0.950 
      
0.885 0.344 
DACC -0.159 -2.740 -0.159 -2.74 -0.117 -2.010 -0.72 
  
0.006 
 
0.006 
 
0.044 0.469 
S1DACC 
    
0.121 1.440 0.000 
      
0.149 0.998 
SUE 0.039 6.690 
  
0.049 8.820 4.940 
  
<0.001 
   
<0.001 <0.001 
S1SUE 
    
-0.050 -6.020 -6.370 
      
<0.001 <0.001 
SUE_H 
  
0.036 -2.740 
  
1.320 
    
0.006 
  
0.187 
SIUE_L 
  
0.042 6.690 
   
    
<0.001 
   Adj R-squared 3.50% 
 
3.50%
 
50.92% 
 
50.42% 
within 
      
49.53% 
between 
      
43.20% 
Prob>F 
      
<0.001 
All variables that are used in the regression association between returns and other independent variables 
are trimmed at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles, to ensure that outliers do not drive the results.  
***, **, *  Statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level of significance. 
The number of observation for all equation is 5,616 firm-period observations.  
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Appendix C shows the summary statistics of UK non-financial firms by industry for the 
equation (6.3) and (6.3A). According to the information in this table, industrial firms 
comprise the largest group followed by utility and then transportation. This table contains 
the results of regressions showing the association between returns and the independent 
variables for each group of firms. There is a significant relationship between stock returns 
and all independent variables such as past returns, size, book-to-market, sales growth, 
unexpected earnings and discretionary accruals in the industrial group. According to 
equation (6.3) and (6.3A), there is a negative relationship between discretionary accruals 
and stock returns; for the industrial sector the coefficients are  -0141 and -0.134 
respectively (both significant). For other sectors very little is not significant. Standard 
unexpected earning is assumed to be an important factor, investors expecting the sign for 
this variable to be positive. The table shows the coefficients on SUE are 0.040 and 0.051 
and they are significant. Generally, the results show that returns for the industrial group are 
well explained by the independent variables. 
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A large number of early studies of combined data from multiple subjects use the ‘fixed-
effect’ method. This method only takes into account within-subject variability. This model 
is used to report results from case studies. It is not possible to make formal conclusions 
about population effects using this method, unlike ‘random-effect’ analysis which takes 
into account both sources of variation and makes it possible to make formal inferences 
about the population from which the subjects are drawn. Fixed effect models make it 
possible to control for variables that cannot be measured. Eisenhart (1947, pp. 3-5) divides 
detection and estimation into different classes as follows:  
“Class I: detection and estimation of fixed (constant) relations among means of sub-
sets of the universe of objects concerned”.  
This class includes all the usual problems of estimating and testing to determine 
whether to infer the existence of true differences among “treatment” means, among “variety” 
means, and, under certain conditions, among “place” means. In this class all of the 
problems of univariate and multivariate regression are included. With regard to problems of 
estimation belonging to this class, analysis of variance is simply a form of the method of 
least squares. 
“Class II: detection and estimation of components of (random) variation associated 
with a multiple population”. 
This class includes all problems of estimating, and testing to infer the existence of, 
components to random deviation. The regressions are run under the assumption that the 
intercept and coefficient remain constant across firms. Therefore, there are systematic 
differences among firms. These firm variations can be controlled by applying an 
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econometric method that is called the fixed effects controller. The individual-level of 
variable effects are controlled by the independent variables which are nominated as fixed 
effects. This model permits variations to the intercept across companies. However, the 
coefficients remain constant across firms. There is another econometric method for panel 
data mentioned above which is the random effect estimator. This estimator considers that 
the individual-level effects are not correlated to the independent variables; hence, the 
random effect model is more efficient than the fixed effect model.
61
 
Table 7.6 presents the summary of the estimation using the random and fixed effect 
model estimation and Hausman result test for equations (6.3) and (6.3A). According to this 
table, the coefficient of the random model is similar to the main regression model, all 
predictor variables are significant, the sign is the same and the R-adjusted is close to the 
main regression model. As explained above, to select the fixed or random effect model for 
estimation, Hausman’s test is run. Table 7.6 also presents the result of Hausman’s test, 
which tests whether a fixed effect or random effect model is better for the specific 
regression in which this model is used. This table shows the difference in the coefficients of 
the two models estimated by this test (Chi2=47.42, <0.001) , and demonstrates that, for this 
research, using the fixed effect model is better than the random effect model. 
 
 
 
                                                          
61
 To examine whether a fixed effect or random effect model is better for specific research, researchers use 
Hausman’s test. If the result of this test is rejected, it means that the random effects model is biased; therefore 
the correct estimation model would be the fixed effects model 
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Table 7.6 
    Fixed and random effect analysis of equation (6.3) and (6.3A) and Huasman test result 
 
 
 
Effects Hausman test 
 
Fix Ran Diff. (F-R)) sqrt* 
Intercept -0.467 -0.652 
  
 
0.012 <0.001 
  intercep_S1 0.717 0.722 -0.005 0.021 
 
<0.001 <0.001 
  LSR 0.077 0.101 -0.024 0.006 
 
<0.001 <0.001 
  S1 LSR 1.010 1.011 -0.001 0.007 
 
<0.001 <0.001 
  SIZE 0.025 0.034 -0.009 0.010 
 
0.013 <0.001 
  S1 SIZE -0.038 -0.038 0.000 0.001 
 
<0.001 <0.001 
  BM -0.061 -0.033 -0.028 0.007 
 
<0.001 <0.001 
  S1BM 0.040 0.041 -0.001 0.004 
 
<0.001 0.864 
  SG -0.070 -0.009 -0.061 0.033 
 
0.275 0.964 
  S1SG 0.090 0.004 0.086 0.054 
 
0.357 0.050 
  DACC -0.052 -0.117 0.065 0.039 
 
0.463 0.216 
  S1DACC 0.000 0.109 -0.109 0.066 
 
0.997 <0.001 
  SUE 0.055 0.050 0.004 0.003 
 
<0.001 <0.001 
  S1SUE -0.064 -0.054 -0.009 0.005 
 
<0.001 <0.001 
  R-sq: within 0.495 0.493 
  Between 0.431 0.467 
  Prob > chi2     <0.001 <0.001 
  Number of obs 5616 5616 
  Chi2*   47.42 
Prob>chi2 
  
<0.001 
 Note: Table 7.6 provides estimation of fixed and random effect analysis and 
also provides Hausman test .  
*Hausman test; H0: difference in coefficients not systematic. The number of 
observation for all equation is 5,616 firm-period observations.  
* Covariance matrix estimate that it calls sqrt 
 
 
 
 
 
  
193 
 
7.5 Analysis of winner and loser firms 
In the previous chapter, regression analysis shows there is a relationship between short-term 
returns and accruals, as proposed by the hypothesis of this study. Two testable implications 
result from the hypothesis presented in Chapter 4. First, past returns (over the first semester) 
are positively correlated with future earnings management; second, discretionary accruals and 
future returns (over the second semester) are positively related to contemporaneous 
discretionary accruals. This chapter provides regression results showing earnings 
management using discretionary accruals. Companies are grouped into winners and losers 
by classifying them into quintiles based on their returns over the first half year (months 1 to 
6). Then they are formed as portfolios by equally weighting firms in each quintile. The 
correlation between the variables is found via the statistical significance of the differences 
in discretionary accruals over the second six-month period (month 7 to 12) among these 
quintiles. 
The second step considers the significance of standard unexpected earnings and sales 
growth among these quintiles to see if the assumptions that are made in the hypothesis can 
be supported. The sample is classified into quintiles based on returns over the months 1 to 6 
(first semester), and portfolios are formed by equally weighting firms in each quintile. The 
statistical significance of the differences in discretionary accruals over the 7 to 12 month 
period (second semester) among these quintiles is then considered. As mentioned above, 
the statistical significance of standard unexpected earnings and sales growth among these 
quintiles is examined to see whether the assumptions made in the hypotheses are supported. 
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Table 7.7 presents summary statistics for quintiles of data sorted by lagged stock return. 
The table also presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. Portfolios formed and 
classified based on previous stock return continue to have the same classification for the 
following six months. The top of portfolio is defined as ‘winner’ firms and the bottom is 
called ‘loser’ firms. This sample covers all industries except financial firms. In this study, 
winner and loser companies are classified based on their past six months’ stock returns, and 
is also defined as the lag of stock returns (Rt-1) into equal-weighted quintiles at the same 
time. Chan et al (2006) classified characteristics of stocks by accruals to 10 equal-sized 
portfolios. In the portfolio of the highest-ranked stocks they show accruals average 18.9%, 
whereas in the portfolio of the lowest-ranked, accruals are -16.2%. In Table 7.7 the highest-
ranked (winner) has 10.1% accrual average and in lowest-ranked it is -10.3% and it is 
negative that is similar with the result of Chan et al (2006). Also, they find earnings in top 
decile portfolio 17.6% but only 7.1% for the bottom decile of portfolio. We found 
unexpected earnings for winner (top quintile) 9.5% and for bottom (loser) -3.2% 
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Table 7.7 
Summary statistics for quintiles of data (firms sorted by lagged stock return) 
Variables L 2 3 4 W 
R Mean -0.004 -0.008 0.011 -0.001 -0.016 
 
Std. Dev. 0.416 0.375 0.390 0.371 0.377 
Rt-1 Mean 0.016 -0.014 -0.021 -0.002 0.001 
 
Std. Dev. 0.391 0.355 0.361 0.359 0.396 
SIZE Mean 17.503 17.986 18.242 18.212 17.598 
 
Std. Dev. 2.116 2.193 2.223 2.162 2.029 
BM Mean 0.612 0.790 0.811 0.719 0.608 
 
Std. Dev. 0.833 0.841 0.795 0.732 0.752 
SG Mean 0.024 0.025 0.017 0.027 0.036 
 
Std. Dev. 0.162 0.116 0.091 0.109 0.149 
ACC Mean -0.115 -0.026 -0.001 0.025 0.106 
 
Std. Dev. 0.076 0.010 0.006 0.010 0.068 
DACC Mean -0.094 -0.025 -0.015 0.005 0.063 
 
Std. Dev. 0.138 0.095 0.068 0.082 0.129 
DACCt-1 Mean -0.103 -0.022 0.000 0.025 0.101 
 
Std. Dev. 0.071 0.021 0.015 0.021 0.069 
SUE Mean -0.032 0.009 0.035 0.088 0.095 
 
Std. Dev. 0.969 0.958 0.881 0.876 0.879 
Obs 
 
1124 1123 1123 1123 1123 
Table 7.7 shows the summary statistics for quintiles of data that is sorted by accruals. The first quintile 
(lowest quintiles) is defined as loser companies, and the fifth quintile (upper quintile) are defined as winner 
companies. This table shows the characteristics of means and standard deviations of companies at five levels. 
Stock Return (R) is computed over all months from 1/2004 to 12/2009 using Datastream closing prices 
(Datastream # UP # S) and dividends (Datastream # DI), and there is a difference between the closing price 
(plus dividends) at the end of each half-year interim reporting period and the natural logarithm of the price at 
the beginning of the interim reporting period (SR may also be computed directly from the Datastream total 
return index, but with less accuracy); Size is the natural logarithm of the year-end market capitalisation 
(Worldscope # 08001, closing price x number of shares). Book-to-market (BM) is the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of common equity to market capitalisation (Worldscope # 09704); sales growth (SG) is measured as the 
six-monthly change in sales and deflated by total assets at the end of the current period (Worldscope # 
01001); the current accrual (ACC) is the six-monthly change in net current operating assets, i.e. current assets 
(Worldscope # 02201) excluding cash (Worldscope # 02003) minus current liabilities (Worldscope # 03101) 
excluding the current portion of long-term debt (Worldscope # 03051) and deflated by total assets at the end 
of the current period (Worldscope # 02999). Although, ACC is referred to the current accrual, it is effectively 
a net amount which comprising revenue accruals, expense accruals, revenue deferrals and expense deferrals; 
the discretionary current accrual (DACC) is the residual from the cross-sectional regression of ACC on a 
constant scaled by the total assets, six months earlier. It should be noted that positive accrual is an income-
increasing factor, and negative accrual is an income-decreasing factor.  
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Table 7.8 ranks the return for each period by the lag of stock returns in the previous 
interim period. Portfolios are formed for each interim period for the UK firms between 
2005 and 2009. Mean, standard deviation and number of observations for each interim and 
final year period are presented. The highest average stock return is for winner firms 0.223 
relating to the final period of 2009 and the lowest one is -0.373 that is related to final year 
of 2008.  For loser firms, the highest return is 0.442 during the interim period of 2009 and 
the lowest average return is -0.407 and during the final period of 2008. The big fluctuations 
in return during 2008 are and 2009 because of the financial crisis. 
Thomas and Zhang (2002) show an increase in accounts payable can be an early 
warning sign of deterioration in cash flow and it can give signals of poor stock price 
performance in the future. In summary, inventory changes are the dominant component of 
accruals for predicting returns. Thus, changes in accruals payable have some predictive 
power. In addition, the non-uniform impact of changes in accruals suggests that managers 
are manipulating earnings.  
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Table 7.8 
      Summary statistics for quintiles of return data (firms sorted by lagged stock 
return) 
 
  
L(1) 2 3 4 W(5) 
2005-1 Mean 0.059 0.149 0.080 0.047 0.078 
 
Std. Dev. 0.357 0.340 0.161 0.183 0.307 
 
Obs 45 44 44 44 44 
2005-2 Mean 0.010 0.031 0.106 0.197 0.119 
 
Std. Dev. 0.390 0.239 0.233 0.209 0.345 
 
Obs 74 74 74 74 74 
2006-1 Mean -0.026 -0.022 0.065 0.066 0.133 
 
Std. Dev. 0.372 0.311 0.206 0.227 0.328 
 
Obs 74 74 74 74 73 
2006-2 Mean 0.038 0.149 0.162 0.136 0.175 
 
Std. Dev. 0.401 0.343 0.216 0.250 0.303 
 
Obs 107 107 106 107 106 
2007-1 Mean 0.036 0.096 0.107 0.145 0.097 
 
Std. Dev. 0.419 0.273 0.271 0.259 0.330 
 
Obs 108 107 107 107 107 
2007-2 Mean -0.228 -0.173 -0.117 -0.130 -0.150 
 
Std. Dev. 0.306 0.246 0.213 0.271 0.285 
 
Obs 147 147 147 147 146 
2008-1 Mean -0.233 -0.147 -0.140 -0.101 -0.068 
 
Std. Dev. 0.273 0.370 0.245 0.275 0.266 
 
Obs 140 140 139 140 139 
2008-2 Mean -0.407 -0.393 -0.335 -0.342 -0.373 
 
Std. Dev. 0.309 0.259 0.253 0.252 0.280 
 
Obs 157 156 157 156 156 
2009-1 Mean 0.442 0.294 0.221 0.134 0.065 
 
Std. Dev. 0.557 0.536 0.451 0.379 0.293 
 
Obs 139 138 138 138 138 
2009-2 Mean 0.161 0.193 0.211 0.192 0.223 
 
Std. Dev. 0.409 0.356 0.343 0.375 0.450 
 
Obs 137 136 137 136 136 
Summary statistics for quintiles of data is sorted by pervious stock return. The first quintile 
(lowest quintiles) is defined as loser companies and it is shown by (L), and the fifth quintile 
(upper quintile) is defined as winner companies (W). 
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7.6 Portfolio formation methods 
This section describes the portfolio formation methods. Stocks are segregated into quintile 
portfolios on each portfolio formation date based on the ascending rank of the stocks’ past 
stock six month performance. To study the impact of earnings momentum on price 
momentum, we first create earnings portfolios that capture the post-earnings announcement 
drift phenomenon. For each period, we sort all firms into quintiles based on their SUE from 
the most recent earnings announcement.  
Table 7.8 gives the current six month returns using the basic accrual estimation, 
where quintiles are formed from past six month returns (SRt-1). We form 5 price momentum 
portfolios based on past returns. Thus, for each period t, we rank all stocks with returns for 
period t through t-1 into quintiles based on their formation period returns. The momentum 
portfolios are formed by equally weighting all firms in the quintile rankings. Our 
momentum portfolios follow the approach of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Chordia 
and Shivakumar (2005)
62
. Chordia and Shivakumar demonstrate that over the entire sample 
period from January 1972 through December 1999, the monthly holding-period returns 
increase from 0.84% for the lowest past-return portfolio, P1, to 1.60% for the highest past-
return portfolio, P10. The result of Table 7.8 shows that returns increase from -4.10% for 
the lowest past-return portfolio, L (1), to 1.31% for the highest past-return portfolio, W(5). 
The returns to the WML portfolio are consistent with positive in all periods except interim 
                                                          
62  Chordia and Shivakumar (2005) focus on earnings momentum on price momentum; they first create 
earnings portfolios that capture the post-earnings announcement drift phenomenon. They sort all NYSE-
AMEX firms on the monthly Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) files with data on COMPUSTAT 
into deciles based on their SUE from the most recent earnings announcement. They sort firms into deciles 
based on current-quarter earnings less earnings four quarters ago. For cross-sectional comparison, They 
standardize this change in earnings by the standard deviation of the earnings changes in the prior eight 
quarters 
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period of 2009-1. Figure 7.1 shows the price momentum behaviour during the period. In 
2009-1 after financial crises the return of L (1) is more than W (5). The difference in 
returns between the winner and the loser past-return portfolios, WML, is a statistically 
significant in most periods; see 2005-2, 2006-1, 2006-2, 2007-2, 2008-1 and 2009-1. For 
example in 2006-1 the WML is 1.60 % and the t-statistic is 2.759 and it is significant. This 
result is consistent with Grundy and Martin (2001) who document a payoff of 0.86% per 
month over the sample period 1962 to 1995. While there is wide variation in the average 
six monthly returns to WML across the sub periods, we are unable to reject the null that the 
payoffs are the same across the periods. 
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Table 7.9 
      The current six month returns, where quintiles are formed from past six month return 
 
Period L(1) 2 3 4 W(5) WML T-Stat 
2005/1 0.059 0.149 0.08 0.047 0.078 0.019 0.268 
2005/2 0.01 0.031 0.106 0.197 0.119 0.109 1.800** 
2006/1 -0.026 -0.022 0.065 0.066 0.133 0.16 2.759** 
2006/2 0.038 0.149 0.162 0.136 0.175 0.137       2.814** 
2007/1 0.036 0.096 0.107 0.145 0.097 0.061 1.194 
2007/2 -0.228 -0.173 -0.117 -0.13 -0.15 0.078 2.261** 
2008/1 -0.233 -0.147 -0.14 -0.101 -0.068 0.165 5.109** 
2008/2 -0.407 -0.393 -0.335 -0.342 -0.373 0.034 1.019 
2009/1 0.442 0.294 0.221 0.134 0.065 -0.377 -0.272** 
2009/2 0.161 0.193 0.211 0.192 0.223 0.062 1.19 
The price momentum portfolio is sorted based on the returns in the prior six-month period. The portfolios are 
held for the following six-month period (SRt-1).  
The table reports the returns to these portfolios as well as the payoffs from a strategy of being long the highest 
portfolio W(5) and short the lowest portfolio L(1).  
Note, “WML” is defined as the mean differences between winner and loser firms and “T-Stat” demonstrates the 
T-Statistics of these differences. According to the returns, all stock are ranked to five levels. ** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. “According to the returns, all stock are ranked to five levels.  LMW means losers 
minus winners.   quintiles are formed from past six month returns (SRt-1) 
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Figure  7.9 Price momentum winner and loser firms  
 
 
Figure 7.10 Earnings momentum winner and loser firms 
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We also sort firms into quintiles based on current-six month earnings. Table 7.10 gives the 
current six month returns using the basic accruals estimation where quintiles are formed on 
past six month unexpected earnings (SUEt-1). According to the most recent earnings 
surprise, measured as standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) following standard practice 
in the post-earnings announcement drift literature, we sort firms into quintiles portfolios 
base on past six month unexpected earnings and then examine whether being long the 
highest earnings surprise portfolio and short the lowest earnings surprise portfolio captures 
exhibits momentum. For cross-sectional comparison, we standardize this change in 
earnings by the standard deviation of the earnings changes in the prior six month. Our 
methodology is consistent with prior studies in accounting that investigate post- earnings 
drift (see, e.g., Chordia and Shivakumar, 2005). We implement this for each interim period 
using the same methodology as Chan et al. (2006). We form quintile portfolios, which we 
also refer to as SUE portfolios, by equally weighting all firms in the quintile rankings. 
Table 7.10 presents the returns on the SUE portfolios. Over the entire sample period from 
2004 to 2009, the six monthly holding-period returns increase from -35.6% for the lowest 
SUE portfolio, L(1), to 28.4% for the highest SUE portfolio, W for interim period 2006-1. 
The difference in returns between the highest and the lowest SUE portfolios, WML, is a 
statistically significant, the t-statistic bing 3.11. These result are consistent with the result 
that exhibited by Chordia and Shivakumar (2005). Figure 7.10 is provided according to 
table 7.10. The figure demonstrates the earnings momentum behaviour during the interim 
and final year period. In 2008-2 after a financial crises the return of L(1) is more than W(5). 
We use the portfolio WML to study the impact of the post-earnings announcement drift 
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phenomenon on stock returns. We refer to this portfolio as the portfolio WML to signify 
that the difference between extreme SUE portfolios represents positive minus negative 
earnings changes. In most of the periods the difference in the six monthly holding-period 
returns between the winner and the loser SUE portfolio is statistically significant, and we 
are able to accept the null that the WML returns are the same across sub periods.  
To follow the price momentum on yearly basis Table 7.11 is provided. In this table 
we use the current six month and next six month returns as one year return where quintiles 
are formed from past six month returns.   
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Table 7.10 
      
The current six month returns where quintiles are formed on past six month unexpected 
earnings 
Period L(1) 2 3 4 W(5) WML T-Stat 
2005/1 0.016 0.098 0.133 0.07 0.096 0.08 1.255 
2005/2 0.098 0.036 0.126 0.091 0.171 0.073 1.258 
2006/1 -0.058 0.066 0.025 0.093 0.089 0.147 3.238** 
2006/2 0.105 0.169 0.142 0.123 0.161 0.056 1.27 
2007/1 0.027 0.096 0.081 0.104 0.172 0.145 3.114** 
2007/2 -0.19 -0.16 -0.172 -0.164 -0.106 0.084 2.116** 
2008/1 -0.161 -0.153 -0.14 -0.119 -0.116 0.045 1.272 
2008/2 -0.356 -0.354 -0.414 -0.369 -0.364 -0.008 -0.234 
2009/1 0.187 0.204 0.273 0.211 0.284 0.097 1.740** 
2009/2 0.171 0.179 0.25 0.155 0.224 0.052 1.114 
 
For each interim period, firms are sorted into quintiles based on their standardized change in earnings from 
the most recent earnings announcement (SUE portfolios).  
 
In each period, SUE portfolios are computed using all earnings announcements made in the prior period. The 
standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) is computed as follows;  SUEt =EPSt - EPSt-1 / σ,t where SUEt  is 
difference between second half and first half earnings divided by standard deviation of each firms,        is 
the second half of earnings (Worldscope#05251),         is the first half of earnings and σ,t  is the standard 
deviation of the unexpected earnings per share ( EPS ).  
 
The portfolios are held for the following six-month period. The table reports the returns to these portfolios as 
well as the payoffs from a strategy of being long the highest portfolio W(5) and short the lowest portfolio 
L(1). The table also reports the p-value from F-test for test of equality of payoffs across sub-periods. “WML” 
is defined as the mean differences between winner and loser firms and also “T-Stat” demonstrates the T-
Statistics of these differences. According to the returns, all stock are ranked to five levels ** denotes 
significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 7.11 and Figure 7.11 give one year returns (the current six month and the next six 
months) where quintiles are formed on past six month returns (SRt-1). The pattern in returns 
between the winner and the loser past-return portfolios is similar to that in Table 7.8 for 
price momentum WML is a statistically significant variable in most period.  
Table 7.12 demonstrates current six month returns where quintiles are formed from 
past six month discretionary accruals (DACC). Unlike the results in Chan et al (2006) the 
results for all interim and final periods show insignificant differences between losers and 
winners. Figure 7.12 shows these differences clearly; most of the time the winner and loser 
lines overlap and the differences are zero.  
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Table 7.11 
      One year returns (the current six month and the next six months)  where quintiles are 
formed from past six month returns 
Period L(1) 2 3 4 W(5) WML T-Stat 
2005/1 0.185 0.264 0.216 0.169 0.28 0.095 0.582 
2005/2 0.038 0.083 0.129 0.309 0.252 0.214 2.072** 
2006/1 0.073 0.076 0.25 0.28 0.347 0.274 2.837** 
2006/2 0.104 0.22 0.298 0.235 0.34 0.235 2.631** 
2007/1 -0.162 -0.071 -0.06 -0.004 -0.087 0.075 1.196 
2007/2 -0.362 -0.249 -0.166 -0.196 -0.232 0.13 2.915** 
2008/1 -0.599 -0.48 -0.47 -0.383 -0.408 0.191 5.521** 
2008/2 -0.245 -0.267 -0.213 -0.227 -0.199 0.046 0.861 
2009/1 0.889 0.622 0.463 0.329 0.237 -0.651 -6.280** 
 Table 7.11 demonstrates the current six month and next six month returns as one year return where quintiles are 
formed from past six month returns (SRt-1).  “WML” is defined as the mean differences between winner and loser 
firms and also “T-Stat” demonstrates   the T-Statistics of these differences. According to the returns, all stock are 
ranked to five levels. ** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 7.12 
      Current six month returns where quintiles are formed from past six month discretionary 
accruals 
 
Period L(1) 2 3 4 W(5) WML T-Stat 
2005/1 0.125 0.054 0.110 0.058 0.063 -0.062 -0.857 
2005/2 0.034 0.137 0.091 0.116 0.145 0.111 1.728 
2006/1 0.044 0.027 0.046 0.070 0.028 -0.016 0.284 
2006/2 0.168 0.199 0.100 0.115 0.118 -0.050 -0.989 
2007/1 0.087 0.114 0.151 0.022 0.107 0.020 0.421 
2007/2 -0.179 -0.134 -0.149 -0.168 -0.162 0.017 0.421 
2008/1 -0.137 -0.113 -0.126 -0.159 -0.154 -0.018 -0.491 
2008/2 -0.370 -0.366 -0.377 -0.355 -0.390 -0.020 -0.574 
2009/1 0.206 0.278 0.194 0.240 0.241 0.034 0.620 
2009/2 0.188 0.202 0.190 0.225 0.175 -0.014 -0.264 
“WML” is defined as the mean differences between winner and loser firms and also “T-Stat” demonstrates   
the T-Statistics of these differences.  
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Figure 7.11 Current year returns (the current six month plus next six 
month) ranked base on accruals by LSR 
 
Figure 7.12 Current six month returns where quintiles are formed from past 
six month discretionary accruals DACC 
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7.7 Econometric techniques  
The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method is used to estimate most of the models employed 
in the study. Several econometric techniques are employed check the OLS regressions and 
to achieve the aims of the study. The following model and assumptions underlie the method 
of Ordinary Least Square (see Gujarati, 2003):  
Yi= ß0 + ß1X1i + ß2X2i +  i  
Where ß0 is the intercept, Yi is the dependent variable, Xi is the independent variable (s) 
and  i is the error term (the disturbance). There are some assumptions underlying the OLS 
method as follows:  
a. The mean or expected value of the random disturbance term  i is zero.  
b. The variance of the error term  i is the same for all observations (the disturbances are 
homoscedastic and no heteroskedasticity). 
c. Given any two X values, Xi and Xj (i j), the correlation between any two  i and  i (i j) is 
zero (there no autocorrelation exist)  
d. No correlation between the disturbances and any independent variable is expected. 
e. There is no specification bias or error in the model regression used in the empirical 
analysis.  
f. There are no perfect linear relationships among the explanatory variables 
(multicollinearity).  
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In this section an explanation of each econometric technique briefly is offered as follows: 
In OLS regression, independent variables can be correlated. When two variables both 
strongly predict a third variable then it can be expected that the first two variables are 
correlated (Bernard and Russell, 2006). Other words, multicollinearity is a condition where 
independent variables are strongly correlated with each other. When multicollinearity exists 
in the model, very high standard errors and low t- statistics may appear in the results. This 
problem may results is invalid results for individual predictors, or suggest same predictors. 
For the main model (6.3A), Table 7.13 presents the VIF results of multicollinearity 
test to check this issue. This Table illustrates multicollinearity is not a significant concern 
as most of the variables have a VIF ratio of less than 4 and a 1/VIF ratio of greater than 
0.25
63
. 
 
Table 7.13 Multicollinearity test  
 
Variable         VIF 1/VIF   
    Sales growth SG 1.15 0.87 
Discretionary Current accruals  DACC 1.15 0.87 
Stock return(Lag) LSR 1.02 0.98 
Firm size SIZE 1.02 0.99 
Standard unexpected earnings SUE 1.01 0.99 
Book to market value BM 1.00 1.00 
 
                                                          
63 The variance inflation factor (VIF) is a measure that can guide a researcher in identifying multicollinearity 
in an ordinary least squares regression analysis. It presents an index that measures how much the variance of 
an estimated regression coefficient will increase because of collinearity. 
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Another assumption in OLS is that error terms that is homoskedastic, and is independent 
(serially uncorrelated). When the standard deviations of a variable, monitored over a 
specific amount of time, are non-constant then heteroskedasticity exists. Heteroskedasticity 
often appears in two ways, conditional and unconditional. Conditional heteroskedasticity is 
defined as non-constant volatility when future periods of high and low volatility cannot be 
identified. Unconditional heteroskedasticity is employed when future periods of high and 
low volatility can be identified. Table 7.5 shows the p-value for Equatoins (6.3), (6.5) and 
(6.3A). Exept for sales growth (SG) and the lag of stock return (LSR) the p-values for the 
remaning variables are less than is 0.05 or smaller, then the null hypothesis is rejected and 
there is evidence that there is no heteroskedasticity. 
 
7.8 Summary 
In this chapter linear regression results of association between returns and other 
independent variables are presented. The results show that apart from sales growth the 
independent variables are significantly associated with stock returns. Hausman’s test is 
used to determine that the fixed effect model is superior to the random effect model. To 
find the behaviour of winners and losers, stock return data portfolios are formed and 
momentum strategies are followed. The portfolios are formed by equally weighting firms in 
quintiles and the winner and loser quintiles are analysed. The results show winners and losers 
can use discretionary accruals to manage earnings. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusions and suggestions for future research 
 
The earnings number has conventionally been the focus of analysts, investors, and 
researchers, however other items of ﬁnancial statements have generally been overlooked. 
Other items of financial statements may provide information about the management of a 
ﬁrm’s earnings and be associated with stock returns. This thesis calls attention to the 
potential relevance of interim reporting and price momentum, borrowing from the empirical 
accounting literature. It finds that the association between accruals and future stock returns 
is reliable and negative. Also, the behaviour of accruals plays an important role in the 
connection between earnings surprises and stock returns. In the empirical ﬁnance literature 
review, the association between surprises in earnings via standard unexpected earnings and 
stock returns has been documented as an aid to forming investment strategies.  
 In earlier research what is less well documented is that the relationship between 
accounting earnings and stock returns must include the behaviour of accruals and that the 
relationship is significant using short-term data: quarterly data (Shivakumar, 2006) and 
semester data (this thesis). Changes in earnings that are accompanied by high accruals are 
associated with stock returns. Therefore, current (working capital) accruals may present 
information about the managing of earnings. This study demonstrates that 
contemporaneous discretionary accruals, plus size and book-to-market variables as risk 
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control variables, can significantly explain current returns and a semester by semester basis.  
We find interim report accruals are negatively related to future stock returns (as 
first documented by Sloan (1996) and extended by Chan et al (2006)). Firms with large 
accruals exhibit high level of past earnings. They continue to show growing earnings even 
as accruals are high, and only in the next period do earnings deteriorate. As a result, the 
time-series behaviour of accruals and operating performance for firms with the largest 
accruals give strong evidence that managers can manage or manipulate earnings, and they 
can mislead the market initially. Other things being equal, a positive relationship exists 
between discretionary accruals and stock returns, indicating that returns are deliberately 
managed by managers. These results support the main hypothesis. The results demonstrate 
that standard unexpected earnings (SUE) have a strong relationship with contemporaneous 
returns. The analysis also shows a positive relationship between earnings and stock returns. 
Earnings management is done to avoid decreases and losses in earnings in future 
periods, or because of pending corporate actions such as acquisitions. Finding how upward 
earnings management impacts returns portfolios versus downward earnings management is 
crucial to understanding the factors causing managers to manipulate earnings. It is expected 
that firms manage accruals in order to have optimum performance during the period. It is 
also expected that firms manage earnings to meet changes in business conditions. Firms 
that do not manage earnings may not be able to continue their returns pattern.  
To investigate the existence of earnings management, regressions are run for all data 
in the main models outlined in the methodology section of this study. When the regressions 
for ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ are run, the results show the relationship between variables for 
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‘winners’ is more significant than for ‘losers’. It is demonstrated that past returns (over six 
months) are significantly related to discretionary accruals.  
Dummy variables in the regression allow the effect of positive and negative 
independent variables to be demonstrated clearly. High standard unexpected earnings 
(SUE_H) and low standard unexpected earnings (SUE_L) variables are the two dummy 
variables employed. Based on the results in Chapter 7, low discretionary accruals are 
negatively and significantly related to contemporaneous returns. According to the first 
hypothesis, we expect winners firms to use accruals to provide positive earnings surprises. 
The result of the main regression in Table 7.5 confirms that surprises in earnings have a 
positive relation with stock returns, therefore we confirm the result of Chan et al (1996) that 
earnings surprises and returns are positively related.  
The finding demonstrates if the firms make positive earnings surprises then it drives 
the returns to the upside. The finding shows a positive relation between discretionary 
accruals and earnings surprises. It means positive discretionary accruals make positive 
earnings surprises as measured by SUE in this thesis. To investigate the behaviour of  loser 
and winner firms, the winners and losers portfolio are presented under interim data for each 
interim reporting period (two times a year) from 2004 to 2009. With regard to the return 
characteristics for each firm, the stock returns are classified into quintiles as documented in 
earlier research such as  Jegadeesh, Narasimhan (1993), Sloan (1996), Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2006), and then the analysis of regressions are run for each quintile.  
We find the earnings momentum for some interim and final periods are different 
and significant (see 2006/1, 2007/1, 2007/2 and 2009/1).  Also, the finding provides 
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evidence that the returns based on discretionary accruals and earnings surprise have the 
same pattern. We conclude that winner firms use positive discretionary accruals to drive 
earnings surprises. The second hypothesis also yields interest results. The losers can use 
discretionary accruals to make positive or negative earnings surprises that leads them to 
stay as losers. This thesis finds that between winner and losers, price and earnings 
momentum differences are significant. Thus, winners have more opportunity to manage 
earnings by discretionary accruals than losers in some interim periods. Further research 
also looks at the relation between earnings management and stock returns for winners and 
losers by using components of discretionary accruals. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A 
A detailed examination by Liu and Strong (2008, pp. 2246-7) of explanations of the 
‘rebalanced’ method of portfolio allocation in key finance research papers (Source: W. Liu 
and N. Strong, ‘Biases in decomposing holding-period portfolio returns’, Review of 
Financial Studies, 2008, pp.2246-7)  
 
  Key: Journal of Finance JF, Journal of Financial Economics JFE, Review of Financial Studies RFS 
 
Fama and French (JF, 1996) ‘‘At the end of June of each year t (1963–1993), the NYSE stocks 
on COMPUSTAT are allocated to ten portfolios . . . Equal-weight 
returns on the portfolios are calculated from July to the following 
June’’ (Table 2, p. 61). ‘‘. . . the high E/P return (HE/P) is the 
average of the top three E/P decile returns..’’ (p. 72). 
Carhart (JF, 1997) ‘‘The portfolios are equally weighted monthly so the weights are 
readjusted whenever a fund disappears’’ (Table 3, p. 64). 
La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer 
and Vishny (JF, 1997) 
‘‘Annual portfolio returns are obtained by equally weighting the 
returns on all stocks that belong to the portfolio . . . Portfolios are 
rebalanced to equal weights at the end of each year’’ (pp. 861–862). 
Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and 
Wermers (JF, 1997) 
‘‘All quintile portfolios were rebalanced monthly’’ (p. 1053).  
Wermers (JF, 1999) ‘‘Equal-weighted, size-adjusted, quarterly abnormal returns are 
calculated for each of these ten portfolios during . . . the following 
four quarters. . . . For example, the return shown for portfolio B1 in 
the first quarter (quarter +1) represents the hypothetical size-
adjusted quarterly return that would accrue to investing, on April 1, 
1975, in an equal-weighted portfolio of stocks the funds most 
strongly buy as a herd during the first quarter of 1975, holding this 
portfolio until June 30, 1975, and then rebalancing to hold an equal-
weighted portfolio of stocks’’ (p. 607). 
Zheng (JF, 1999) ‘‘I construct all trading portfolios at the beginning of each 
quarter . . . I hold these portfolios for three months, . . . For 
example, in order to construct the returns for portfolio 5 for July 
through September 1970, I first select funds with positive new 
money in the quarter that ends in June 1970. The July through 
September monthly returns of these selected funds are then 
weighted by their corresponding new money measure. The three 
weighted average numbers are the monthly returns earned by 
portfolio 5 for the three months desired’’ (p. 906). 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (JF, 
1999) 
‘‘Ranking the 20 industries based on their L-month lagged returns, 
we form portfolios of the highest and lowest past performing 
industries, hold them for H months, and rebalance monthly’’ (p. 
  
232 
 
1269). 
Nofsinger and Sias (JF, 1999) ‘‘Monthly abnormal returns are calculated as the difference 
between the raw return for firm i in month t and the cross-sectional 
average return for firms in the same capitalization decile in month t. 
Capitalization deciles (breakpoints based on firms included in our 
sample) are formed annually at the beginning of each October’’ (fn. 
10, p. 2271). 
Shumway and Warther (JF, 
1999) 
‘‘Returns are calculated as equal-weighted averages of monthly 
returns for all the stocks in the portfolio’’ (Table 4, p. 2371). 
Wermers (JF, 2000) ‘‘Every fund existing during a given calendar quarter (and having a 
complete data record) is included in the computation of that 
quarter’s average net returns (TNA weights are updated at the 
beginning of each quarter). These quarterly . . . returns are 
compounded to give the quarterly rebalanced annual returns’’ 
(Table 1, p. 1662). 
Lee and Swaminathan (JF, 2000) ‘‘The portfolios are rebalanced each month’’ (Table 3, p. 2032). 
Lamont and Polk (JF, 2001) ‘‘If a firm exits from the CRSP database, we drop it from the 
portfolio. This requires rebalancing portfolios during their 12-
month holding period.” (fn. 2, p. 1701). 
Lakonishok and Lee (RFS, 2001) ‘‘We calculate the portfolio returns by equally weighting the returns 
of individual stocks. We rebalance the portfolios annually so that 
each stock starts with the same weight at the beginning of the 
period’’ (p. 97). 
Cohen, Gompers, and 
Vuolteenaho (JFE, 2002) 
‘‘On June 30 of year t , . . . we set the portfolio weight for each 
stock equal to the year t − 1 cash-flow news . . . We compute 
monthly returns for this cash-flow-news portfolio from July 1 to 
June 30 of the next year (t + 1) and rebalance the weights every 
month’’ (p. 433). 
Chan, Chen and Lakonishok 
(RFS, 2002) 
‘‘For each of the resulting nine portfolios, equally weighted returns 
are calculated over the subsequent 12 months, and the process is 
repeated’’ (p. 1425). 
Conrad, Cooper, and Kaul (JF, 
2003) 
‘‘We compute the average cross-sectional differences in returns 
based on the predictive variables and methods that are commonly 
used in the literature . . . and the monthly returns of the portfolios 
are calculated from July to June of the following year’’ (p. 1972). 
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Chan (JFE, 2003) ‘‘I form monthly equal-weighted portfolios of the winner and loser 
stocks . . . As an example, suppose we want to look at how good 
news affects returns over four months. At the end of each calendar 
month, we calculate the abnormal return for all stocks . . . We then 
average the abnormal returns for the calendar month across stocks 
to get the abnormal return on a portfolio’’ (pp. 228–229). 
Ahn, Conrad and Dittmar (RFS, 
2003) 
‘‘We follow the method outlined in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
for the construction of the momentum strategy payoffs’’ (p. 467). 
Korajczyk and Sadka (JF, 2004) ‘‘The portfolio is rebalanced on a monthly basis’’ (Table 4, p. 
1057). 
Sapp and Tiwana (JF, 2004) ‘‘We compute monthly returns for the two sets of new-money 
portfolios using two portfolio-weighting schemes. First, we 
compute cash-flow weighted returns for the portfolio using the cash 
flows realized during the previous quarter by the funds within the 
portfolio. Additionally, we compute equally weighted returns for 
the new-money portfolios’’ (p. 2610). 
Hogan, Jarrow, Teo, and 
Warachka (JFE, 2004) 
‘‘. . . we long the top return decile, short the bottom return decile, 
and hold this portfolio for six months. The portfolio is rebalanced 
monthly to account for stocks that drop out of the database’’ (p. 
543). 
Teo and Woo (JFE, 2004) ‘‘We hold the portfolios for one year, then reform them . . . Stocks 
that disappear during the course of the year are included in the 
equally weighted average until they disappear, then the portfolio 
weights are readjusted appropriately. That is, the portfolio weights 
are rebalanced to equal at the end of every month’’ (p. 374). 
Cohen, Coval and Pastor (JF, 
2005) 
‘‘All estimators are constructed using the past 12 months’ 
performance record of each fund. Fund returns are then averaged 
within each of the 25 portfolios over months 1, 2, and 3 following 
portfolio formation. The three-month return series are linked across 
quarters to form a monthly series of returns on each portfolio, and 
the alphas of the resulting 25 return series are reported’’ (Table 
VIII, p. 1087). 
Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer, and 
Swaminathan (JFE, 2005) 
‘‘In computing future portfolio returns, we include every firm that 
has . . . return data available for that month. Similar to Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993), holding period portfolio returns are calculated 
as the equal-weighted average’’ (p. 660). 
Nagel (JFE, 2005) ‘‘For all variables, portfolio boundaries are defined by quintile 
breakpoints . . . Returns in each portfolio are equally weighted and 
they are reported in percent per month’’ (p. 289). 
Hanna and Ready (JFE, 2005) ‘‘We examine simple portfolio strategies, similar to those reported 
in both Fama and French (1992) and Haugen and Baker (1996), that 
hold only the stocks in a particular decile. We also consider 
strategies that are similar to those reported by Jegadeesh and 
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Titman (1993)’’ (p. 483). ‘‘The results in Fama and French (1992), 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and Haugen and Baker (1996) reflect 
simple averages of the monthly returns of the stocks in each 
portfolio. This calculation implies a portfolio strategy that 
maintains equal weights on all of the component stocks, which in 
turn implies monthly rebalancing. We report results for both 
equally weighted and value-weighted portfolios’’ (p. 501). 
Bollen and Busse (RFS, 2005) ‘‘We sort funds each quarter . . . and form deciles of funds We then 
examine the performance of the deciles the following period’’ (p. 
576). ‘‘Table 2 shows the results in the post-ranking quarter. Note 
that we calculate the average both across funds and across time’’ (p. 
577). 
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Appendix B 
 Results of regression analyses of returns on earnings (Loftus and Sin, 1997) 
 
 
 
1-year interval 
 
2-year interval 
 
3-year interval 
 
4-year interval 
Variables Coeff. t-state 
 
Coeff. t-state 
 
Coeff. t-state 
 
Coeff. t-state 
α0 0.263 3.500***  
0.553 3.250*** 
 
0.343*** 2.800*** 
 
0.165 1.300 
α1 1.160 3.880**  1.370 
4.040** 
 
1.212 6.960** 
 
1.233 9.500** 
R-squared 0.1404   01512   03556   0.5094  
 
t statistics are in parentheses. 
Pi, is price per share of firm i at time t. 
RiT  is returns per share of firm i for period 0 to T. 
EiT, is earnings per share divided by beginning of period price. 
For brevity, results for the first partition only are reported for the one- and two-year intervals 
Rit=α0+α1  
   
   
 +     
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Note; the number of observation for all equation is 5,616 firm-period observation. 
 
 
Appendix  C 
      Regression analysis of association between returns and other independent variables 
by Industry 
 
 
Industrial Utility  Transportation 
 
Eq (6.3) Eq (6.3A) Eq (6.3) Eq (6.3A) Eq (6.3) Eq (6.3A) 
Intercept -0.385 -0.644 -0.276 -0.713 -0.233 -1.100 
 
<0.001 <0.001 0.135 <0.001 0.646 0.062 
intercep_S1 
 
0.722 
 
0.731 
 
0.872 
  
<0.001 
 
0.015 
 
0.401 
LSR 0.032 0.117 -0.129 0.019 0.042 -0.073 
 
0.026 <0.001 0.065 0.737 0.38 0.505 
S1 LSR 
 
1.009 
 
1.002 
 
1.020 
  
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
SIZE 0.023 0.034 0.017 0.037 0.015 0.061 
 
<0.001 <0.001 0.073 <0.001 0.6 0.037 
S1 SIZE 
 
-0.038 
 
-0.038 
 
-0.050 
  
<0.001 
 
0.012 
 
0.329 
BM -0.032 -0.030 -0.026 -0.014 -0.040 -0.062 
 
<0.001 <0.001 0.466 0.705 0.457 0.255 
S1BM 
 
0.043 
 
0.016 
 
0.076 
  
<0.001 
 
0.762 
 
0.538 
SG -0.099 0.010 0.038 -0.051 -0.335 -0.252 
 
<0.001 0.851 0.867 0.868 0.263 0.632 
S1SG 
 
-0.025 
 
0.044 
 
0.186 
  
0.754 
 
0.921 
 
0.832 
DACC -0.141 -0.134 0.803 0.401 0.803 -0.428 
 
0.03 0.024 0.017 0.215 0.222 0.517 
S1DACC 
 
0.141 
 
-0.399 
 
0.492 
  
0.103 
 
0.374 
 
0.632 
SUE 0.040 0.051 0.021 0.038 0.010 -0.046 
 
<0.001 <0.001 0.435 0.146 0.801 0.348 
S1SUE 
 
-0.051 
 
-0.040 
 
0.061 
  
<0.001 
 
0.334 
 
0.475 
Adj R-squared 0.036 0.514 0.034 0.479 -0.017 0.277 
